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Executive summary 
This dissertation creates a model that combines the literature on employee stock ownership (ESO), 
middle management involvement in strategy and the participative leadership style with the 
motivational literature on psychological ownership. The model is based on the recognition that 
despite a strong theoretical foundation of the first three concepts supporting a positive relationship 
with performance, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Additionally, the literature on the three 
concepts finds that the performance effect of the concepts seems to be mediated by the creation of 
internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of psychological empowerment, organisational 
citizenship behaviour or psychological ownership. Based on the literature on psychological 
ownership, ESO, middle management involvement and a participative leadership style are argued to 
be determinants of psychological ownership. The model thereby argues that the three concepts must 
be seen as determinants of psychological ownership and that their potential positive effect on 
performance is triggered by their potential motivational effect. The three concepts can also be seen 
as interrelated and the model argues that a combination of the three would enhance the performance 
effect. 
Based on the model, a number of hypotheses are empirically tested to investigate the relationships 
in the model. The tests are based on a cross-sectional survey of 300 top 500 Danish companies as 
measured by number of employees. The analysis found that different types of companies employ 
different kinds of ESO schemes ranging from covering only a few key employees to covering a 
majority of the employees. It can also be seen that the prevalence of ESO schemes is high in stable 
sectors with relatively low-educated and low-paid employees, e.g. construction, while the 
prevalence is low in dynamic sectors with highly educated and high-paid employees such as IT and 
telecommunication.  
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The test of ESO, middle management involvement and participative leadership style as 
determinants of psychological ownership supported the model arguing that the effect on 
performance is based on the concepts’ potential motivating effects and that no direct effect on 
performance can be found. The analysis found that while middle management participation in the 
strategy process was a significant determinant of psychological ownership, autonomy had no 
significant effect; this calls for a better understanding of the different effects of the two types of 
middle management involvement. It was also found that a participative leadership style was the 
most influential factor in the creation of psychological ownership and that ESO only had an indirect 
effect which was mediated by middle management participation in strategy. Psychological 
ownership had a significant positive effect on company performance. 
The dissertation contributes to our knowledge by underpinning the importance of the creation of 
internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of psychological ownership. This means that both 
scholars and practitioners need to analyse how ESO, middle management involvement in strategy 
and participative leadership style can be combined in the pursuit of psychological ownership and 
that the three areas might be combined with other initiatives that enhance motivation. The findings 
also highlight the need for a better understanding of how different employees are motivated by the 
different initiatives at an individual level. It may be expected that employees at different 
organisational levels, in different job types in different sectors and with different job characteristics 
will be affected differently by the three factors and that the effect on the creation of psychological 
ownership and thus company performance will be affected by these individual factors. 
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Executive summary in Danish. 
Denne afhandling udvikler en model, der kombinerer teori omkring medarbejder medejerskab, 
involvering af mellemledere i strategiprocessen og involverende ledelsesstil, med 
motivationsteorierne om psykologisk ejerskab. Litteraturstudier af de tre områder afslører, at det er 
vanskeligt empirisk at påvise en effekt på virksomhedens resultater på trods af stærke teoretiske 
argumenter. Ligeledes viser det sig, at for alle tre områder er en evt. effekt på resultatet medieret af 
skabelsen af en følelse af medejerskab blandt medarbejderne. Denne følelse af medejerskab angives 
i litteraturen på forskellig vis i form af ”psychological empowerment”, ”organizational citizenship 
behaviour” eller ”psychological ownership”. Alle tre former for motivation angiver dog en tilstand, 
hvor medarbejderen opfatter virksomhedens mål og succes, som identisk med egne mål og egen 
succes. En analyse af motivationsteorien omkring psykologisk medejerskab afslører, at dette 
teoriområde ser medejerskab, involvering og involverende ledelsesstil som elementer eller 
forudsætninger for at skabe motivation. Forfatteren argumenterer derfor for i sin model, at 
medejerskab, involvering og involverende ledelsesstil udelukkende påvirker virksomhedens 
resultater via deres indflydelse på medarbejdernes motivation og at de tre områder må forventes at 
påvirke og forstærke hinanden. 
Den udarbejdede model initierer en række hypoteser om de forventede sammenhænge i modellen, 
som bliver testet empirisk i afhandlingen. Den empiriske del er baseret på en 
spørgeskemaundersøgelse blandt 300 af de 500 største virksomheder i Danmark målt på antal 
medarbejdere.  
Det første empiriske afsnit finder, at forskellige typer af virksomheder anvender forskellige type at 
medarbejderaktie programmer. Det påvises, at andelen af virksomheder med medarbejderaktier er 
høj i en stabil sektor med relativt lavt uddannede medarbejde som bygge- og anlægssektoren, mens 
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andelen af virksomheder med medarbejderaktieprogrammer er lav i IT og telekommunikation, der 
er en dynamisk sektor med relativt højtuddannede og vellønnede medarbejdere. Ligeledes viser det 
sig at virksomheder, der har medarbejderaktieprogrammer, der omfatter mere end halvdelen af alle 
medarbejdere også i højere grad anvender gruppe baserede bonusordninger, mens virksomheder der 
har medarbejderaktieprogrammer, der kun omfatter nøglemedarbejdere i højere grad anvender 
individuelle bonusordninger. Dette resultat er i modstrid med den generelle opfattelse af, at brede 
aktieprogrammer bør komplementeres med individuelle bonusordninger for at understøtte både den 
langsigtede og den individuelle kortsigtede præstation. 
Analysen af medarbejder medejerskab, involvering af mellemledere og involverende lederskab, som 
forudsætninger for at skabe en følelse af medejerskab understøttede den udviklede model. Ligeledes 
blev det påvist, at der ikke er en direkte effekt af de tre områder på virksomhedens resultater, men 
udelukkende via deres evne til at skabe motivation i form af en følelse af medejerskab blandt 
medarbejderne. Dette bidrag til vores viden omkring effekterne af medarbejder medejerskab, 
involvering af mellemledere og involverende ledelsesstil åbner op for helt nye forskningsområder. 
Vi bliver nødt til at ændre vores opfattelse af, at det at involvere medarbejderne, eller tilbyde dem 
aktier, i sig selv skaber bedre resultater. Vi er nødt til at se de forskellige tiltag i sammenhæng og 
fokusere på, hvordan de i den konkrete situation kan skabe motivation. Det betyder også, at vi skal 
kombinere de tre teoriområder med resultaterne fra motivationsteorien.  
Motivationsteorien har bidraget med en lang række resultater der fremhæver at mennesker bliver 
motiveret af en række forskellige tiltag. Medarbejdere i forskellige jobfunktioner, på forskellige 
organisatoriske niveauer og i forskellige sektorer bliver motiveret på forskellig vis, og effekten på 
virksomhedens resultater afhænger af, hvilke medarbejdere der bliver motiveret.     
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Preface 
 
This dissertation consists of an introductory chapter followed by four papers addressing the topic of 
middle managers in strategy from different angles. Each chapter is intended to be a contribution in its 
own right and can be read individually as well as in the larger context of this dissertation. 
The development of this thesis and the model included is the result of a journey through a number of 
research areas and streams. Based on my interest in corporate finance, I initially wondered how 
ownership structures could support company development and performance. I therefore started out 
analyzing how employee stock ownership (ESO) among employees at different organizational layers 
affected performance. This analysis concluded that despite a rich literature on ESO based on agency 
theory explaining how the introduction of ESO would align the interest of the employee with the 
interest of the company based on an economic incentive, the dissertation reveals that the effect is 
mainly rooted in the potential motivational effect of the creation of psychological ownership feelings. 
While the argument based on an economic incentive might be correct among top managers, who has 
the organizational power to significantly influence the value of the firm, this influence becomes 
insignificant at lower organizational levels. Claiming that ESO creates an economic incentive at lower 
organizational levels thereby violates the general assumption that controllability is a prerequisite for 
ESO to be effective. This conclusion is also in line with the diverse ESO effect findings which range 
from neutral to marginally positive. The effect of ESO on performance was found to be mediated by 
both top management’s willingness to involve middle managers in decisions and by the creation of a 
psychological sense of ownership. If a sense of controllability of the development of the firm’s value is 
needed among stock owning employees and if involvement mediates the effect, involvement in strategy 
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processes seems to fulfill both needs. This conclusion motivated me to examine the strategy literature 
with a focus on employee involvement. In this literature review, I especially looked at the involvement 
of middle managers in strategy processes. The middle manager perspective seemed highly 
underdeveloped yet very promising due to the theory strongly emphasizing the importance of middle 
managers as creators of strategic responsiveness, innovations and facilitators of strategy processes. 
When analyzing the middle manager perspective in strategy, I was puzzled by a number of questions: 
Can it be assumed that middle managers are automatically motivated to participate, just by allowing 
them to do so? If participating, are they then doing so in the best interest of the company? If 
participation creates more innovations, better strategy implementation, more information sharing, better 
decision-making, then why are the articles testing the performance effects so diverse in their findings? 
Some scholars advocate that the leadership style conducted can both promote and restrain participation 
despite a general wish from top management to involve employees in the strategy development. The 
effect of involvement seems also to be mediated by the creation of engagement, commitment and 
psychological ownership. Based on the realization that both the effect of ESO and the involvement of 
middle managers in the strategy process seemed to be mediated by top management’s willingness to 
involve and the leadership style conducted, led me to explore the participative leadership style research 
stream. 
The literature on participative leadership style analyzes how top management can support the 
involvement of employees in organizational decisions. A participative leader creates a culture in the 
context of which the employees are aware that their contribution is valuable, cared for and expected 
and an organizational structure that clearly guides the employees in how new ideas, arguments and 
problems can be brought to the attention of top management. Despite the reported positive effects of a 
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participative leadership style, such as increased decision quality, motivation and commitment, the 
performance effects are reported to be mediated by the creation of psychological empowerment.  
This discovery of three research streams, ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and 
participative leadership style, with strong theoretical and empirical support but all mediated by the 
creation of psychological ownership, encouraged me to investigate the research stream of 
psychological ownership. Psychological ownership is defined as the state in which individuals “feel as 
though the target of ownership or a piece of that target is theirs” and is found to increase commitment, 
stewardship and company performance. The creation of psychological ownership is also found to be 
supported by involvement and task significance (i.e. involvement in strategy), feedback, trust and 
autonomy (i.e. participative leadership style) and formal ownership (i.e. ESO). By exploring this fourth 
research stream, the final piece of the jigsaw seemed to fall into place. There appeared to be a clear 
interconnection between ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and participative leadership 
style and they all supported the creation of psychological ownership. It also seemed clear that a gap 
existed in our understanding of how these four areas are interrelated and that a combination of the areas 
could create new insights into how to combine the areas in the pursuit of improved company 
performance. 
The objective of this thesis to theoretically and empirically contribute to the understanding of the 
interrelation and performance effects of these four areas. The literature review of the four areas 
revealed that a number of relationships between the four areas lacked a broad-based empirical 
investigation, and that a contribution could be made by conducting an updated large-scale survey. To 
ensure statistical validity and avoid common method bias, data needed to be collected from multiple 
sources. This was achieved by collecting answers from two top managers and two middle managers in 
200-300 companies among the top 500 Danish companies. These data were joined by financial data 
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collected from external sources. Based on the literature review combining the four areas and the data 
collected, four articles were written, one conceptual article developing the model and three empirical 
articles analyzing some of the relationships in the model. I am aware that a number of other 
relationships could be explored and that a finer grained analysis could be conducted based on the model 
and the data collected, but this task will hopefully be pursued in a future career in academia.  
The process of completing this thesis has taught me that I cannot cover everything in one article. An 
article needs to be focused and thoroughly present theory, method and conclusions in a manner that 
allows colleagues to review the quality and contribution of the research conducted. Each article is 
therefore an expression of my view on areas needing contributions and due to the above-mentioned 
need for focus, they will be restrained by a number of limitations; finally, each article calls for future 
research to improve and extend the findings.   
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1. Employee Stock Ownership: Effect on Strategic 
Management and Performance 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Within business studies, the point of interest has often been the intersections between ownership, 
management and employees. Different traditions and interests have highlighted different aspects of the 
interconnection between the areas, just like some have focused on the areas separately. The ownership 
of companies has been addressed within political science, discussing who should own companies, how 
profit should be distributed and if any political constraints should be put on the enforcement of 
ownership rights. Ownership of companies has also been analysed within the context of corporate 
finance, addressing the effects of different ownership structures. Some scholars have tested the effect of 
venture capital ownership on company growth, stock listing vs private ownership and companies partly 
or wholly owned by the employees (Bennedsen, 2001; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Jensen et al., 1976; 
Zhou, 2002). None of the findings has been able to conclusively determine that specific ownership 
structures are more efficient than others. Within management studies, a substantial body of work 
addresses strategies and strategy development.  
The diversity within the strategy literature reflects different perceptions of the process, the purpose and 
the definition of strategy. While some scholars regard strategy as a normative or prescriptive process 
primarily defined and conducted by top management (Ansoff and McDonell, 1990; Chandler, 1962; 
Porter, 1980, 1985), other schools see it as a descriptive process only partly controllable which mainly 
takes the form of interaction between employees at different organisational layers and which may be 
initiated at different places in the organisation (Burgelman, 1983; Hamel et al., 1994; Mintzberg, 1983, 
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Mintzberg et al., 1999; Penrose, 1957). While the first approach mainly focuses on the management 
area, the latter tries to grasp the interaction between management and employees combining 
management studies with the extensive literature on employees and organisational studies addressing 
how people interact in organisations through formal and informal power structures and incentive and 
motivational systems (Maslow, 1954; Mintzberg, 1984; Tayler, 1913; Weber, 1921). Similarly, other 
research areas combine ownership and management or ownership and employees. Within agency 
theory (Eisenhart, 1989), the problems of motivating the agent, initially mainly focusing on top 
management, have been addressed through incentives like stocks, stock options, warrants or other 
performance related bonuses. The key focus has been on aligning the interest of the utility maximising 
agent (top management) with the interests of the firm. The recent financial crisis, however, has brought 
to light some of the potential shortcomings of a short-term performance focus among top managers, 
namely increased risk, greed and destabilisation of organisation and societies. Agency theory and the 
alignment of interests have also formed the basis for a research area combing ownership and employees 
by extending the motivational effects of stock ownership found within top management to all 
employees. The interest was sparked by the fact that many western companies have developed from 
being low tech industrial firms to more knowledge intensive service companies; a transformation 
process during which the motivation of and initiatives from employees became crucial for creating of 
competitive advantages. Founded in the agency theory, the argument behind employee stock ownership 
(ESO) covering a larger part of the employees is to create an economic incentive to work in the key 
interest of the company. While the effect of ESO was found to be significant among top management, 
the effect of more general ESO programmes is more diverse (Kruse, 2002). Some scholars have 
reported that the effect is mediated by the creation of psychological ownership, while others report that 
the size of ownership has no impact on the motivational effect of ESO (Hammer, Landau and Stern, 
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1981); in fact, it may even have a negative effect on commitment (Pendleton, 2010). This suggests that 
there is more to the effect of ESO at lower organisational levels than the mere economic incentive and 
indicates that the motivational effect of being considered important and included in decisions might 
offer a more plausible explanation for the effect of ESO than the economic incentive founded in agency 
theory (McCarthy et al. 2010). This position is supported by findings indicating that the effect of ESO 
is mediated by the creation of psychological ownership among employees and inclusion of employees 
in the decision-making process. The sense of psychological ownership is enhanced when employees are 
allowed to participate in strategic decisions due to the importance of the decisions. While all employees 
could be involved in strategic decisions, interest has increasingly focused on the importance of 
involving middle managers in the strategy process. The uniqueness of middle managers lies in their 
access to both top and front end managers coupled with their operations knowledge. In a top-down 
perspective, this central position allows middle managers to act as sources of change through strategy 
implementation and by “selling” the strategy at lower organisational levels, hereby working as the 
extended arm of top management. From a bottom-up perspective, middle managers are in a position to 
influence the strategic debate at top management level by influencing the issues brought to the top 
management’s attention (Dutton et al., 2001). Additionally, middle managers act as sources of 
innovation on account of their close contact with front end managers and the market and their ability to 
increase information sharing across the organisation, vertically as well as horizontally. In the literature, 
the term middle manager is understood in a rather wide sense, including all managers below top 
management and above first-level supervision (Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Uyterhoven, 1972). Despite 
the rich literature on the middle management perspective (Wooldridge et al. 2008) and the theoretically 
and empirically findings reporting a number of positive effects of middle management involvement in 
strategy (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000; Huy, 2002; Wooldridge et al., 
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2008), analyses of the effect on company performance are few and the findings are diverse (Andersen, 
2004; Mair, 2005). This could suggest that middle managers are not automatically willing to become 
involved even if invited to be so and if they get involved, they might not act in the best interest of the 
company. Meyer (2006) reported how middle management involvement led to destructive interventions 
by middle managers and Guth and MacMillan (1986) found that middle managers obstructed strategy 
implementation through foot-dragging and sabotage. In their analysis of 12 organisations, Mantera and 
Vaara (2008) found that the leadership style conducted by top management could both constrain and 
support involvement despite an official policy of involvement.  
This thesis will address a number of the gaps that exist in our understanding of how ESOPs, 
involvement of middle managers in the strategy process and a participative leadership style can 
increase company performance. While the agency theory based findings of ESOPs assume that the 
economic incentive of the ESOP will automatically align the interest of the middle manager with the 
interest of the firm, other findings suggest that it is the creation of motivation spurred by psychological 
ownership that generates a positive effect. Similarly, the literature on involvement of middle managers 
in strategy assumes that allowing middle managers to become involved in strategy by definition 
motivates the middle managers to do so and automatically in the best interest of the company. The 
findings of Meyer (2006) indicate that involvement in itself may support both supportive and 
destructive middle management actions and that middle managers somehow need to be motivated to 
participate and feel committed to act in the best interest of the company. This suggests that our 
understanding of how middle managers become involved in strategy and how they are motivated is 
incomplete and that more research in the field is called for.  
The creation of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is addressed in self-determinations theory (SDT) 
based on need theories (Ryan and Deci, 2000) reporting that intrinsic motivation and the integration of 
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extrinsic motivation are based on the need for competence, relatedness and autonomy. The thesis will 
study the interaction between ESOPs, the involvement of middle managers in strategy and a 
participative leadership style. Based on the theoretical assumption that middle management level 
ESOPs only create a limited economic incentive due to the lack of controllability with the reward and 
the (often) limited economic importance of the plan, the effect of the ESOP needs to be found in the 
plan’s potential effect on the creation of motivation and psychological ownership. Similarly, 
involvement of middle managers in strategy should be understood in the framework of motivation, 
supported by both formal ownership and a participative leadership style. The SDT stresses the 
importance of competence, relatedness and autonomy as human needs leading to motivation, personal 
development and behavioural self-regulation (Ryan, Kuhl and Deci, 1997). This suggests that 
involvement in strategy (competence, autonomy), ESOP (relatedness) and a participative leadership 
style (relatedness, autonomy) combined would release the human potential to  “be agentic and 
inspired, striving to learn, extend themselves, master new skills, and apply their talents responsibly” 
(Ryan and Deci, 2000); without motivation, employees become apathetic, alienated and irresponsible. 
This introduction chapter reviews the fundamental literature within the areas of interest, sets the scene 
for the gaps addressed in the succeeding four chapters and presents the methodological approach to 
collecting the empirical data for the thesis.   
 
MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY 
From early childhood, human beings are naturally curious, vital and self-motivated. They show 
considerable effort, agency and commitment in their lives and this attitude seems to be more the rule 
than the exception (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Despite this positive feature of human nature, the problem 
of motivating employees and releasing this attitude in a work setting has been at the core of 
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organisational studies for decades. This paradox suggests that the work setting in itself seems to 
restrain the nature of humans. The self-determination theory (SDT) “has focused on the social-
contextual conditions that facilitate versus forestall the natural processes of self-motivation and 
healthy psychological development” (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Social contexts are found to both facilitate 
and restrain motivation and personal growth and the effects vary among people. SDT is “an organic 
metatheory that highlights the importance of humans’ evolved inner resources for personality 
development and behavioral self-regulation” (Ryan, Kuhl and Deci, 1997). The theory has identified 
three human needs that, if satisfied, facilitate the natural propensities for growth and integration, social 
development and personal well-being (Ryan and Deci, 2000). The three needs are competence (Harter, 
1978), relatedness (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Reis, 1994) and autonomy (deCharms, 1968; Deci, 
1975). Deci and Ryan (1985) have developed the cognitive evaluation theory (CET) as a subtheory of 
SDT and find that social-contextual events, like feedback, communication and rewards support the 
sense of competence and enhance intrinsic motivation. They also find that the sense of competence is 
powerless to enhance intrinsic motivation if not accompanied by a sense of autonomy or, in other 
words, self-determination. This underlines the need for contextual settings that support both autonomy 
and a sense of competence. Despite the feeling of competence and autonomy, a sense of relatedness to 
the task and the settings increases the likelihood of intrinsic motivation flourishing. This requires that 
the employees are met with trust and respect from the company and their immediate manager(s) and 
that management makes an effort to provide feedback and takes an interest in the employees. While 
intrinsic motivation is defined as the inherent tendency to seek out novelty and challenges for the task’s 
own sake, SDT underlines that people will only feel intrinsically motivated to undertake activities that 
have the appeal of novelty, challenge and aesthetic value (Ryan and Deci, 2000). To understand the 
motivation of other activities, SDT addresses the nature and dynamics of extrinsic motivation. 
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Extrinsic motivation refers “to the performance of an activity in order to attain some separable 
outcome” (Ryan and Deci, 2000). The tasks or the behaviour are defined by others and motivation can 
range from amotivation or unwillingness, to passive compliance and to active personal commitment. 
SDT defines five types of extrinsic motivation due to the level of internalisation and perceived locus of 
causality. The amotivated person has an impersonal locus of causality and either does not act at all or 
act without intent. External regulation is motivated by external rewards and externally regulated 
individuals experience control and feel alienated from the task. There is an external locus of control 
and the person does not perceive the task (or the job) to be a part of the person’s self (deCharms, 1968). 
Although still externally driven, Introjected regulation is motivated by a wish to demonstrate ability 
or to avoid guilt. The activities are based on self-control and a sense of duty but the task remains 
isolated from the personal self (Deci and Ryan, 1995). Identified regulation is a more autonomous or 
self-regulated form of extrinsic motivation where the activities are partly internal and accepted or 
owned as personally important. The most autonomous and self-determined form of extrinsic motivation 
is integrated regulation; locus of control is internal and the task is internalised and seen as part of the 
personal self. The task has been valued and brought into congruence with one’s other values and needs. 
Integrated regulation has many features in common with intrinsic motivation; however, it is still 
considered extrinsically motivated since the task is performed for the purpose of achieving separable 
outcomes rather than for the enjoyment of completing the task in itself.  
A number of studies have found that well-internalised extrinsic motivation is associated with higher 
engagement (Connell and Wellborn, 1991), higher quality learning (Grolnick and Ryan, 1987) and 
better performance (Miserandino, 1996).  
Extrinsic motivation is considered integrated if the task or behaviour is being prompted, modelled or 
valued by significant others (persons or organisations) to whom the person feels attached or related. 
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This implies that the feeling of relatedness is a strong facilitator of internalisation. To create a feeling 
of relatedness, the task must be meaningful, the person must experience autonomy and self-
determination and an absence of control and finally, experience competence by fulfilling the task.  
In the following sections, the literature on employee stock ownership, involvement of middle managers 
in strategy processes, participative leadership style and psychological ownership will be presented and 
related to the theoretical framework of motivation based on SDT. The research streams will be 
synthesised in the model that is tested in the rest of the thesis. Before setting the scene for the rest of 
the four chapters in the thesis, the methodology of the empirical part will be presented to frame the 
articles both theoretically and empirically.  
 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
In the literature, employee stock ownership (ESO) is commonly defined as ownership through an 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) initiated by the company. The plan is either set up freely or 
restricted by government laws “with the explicit intention of providing employees with an additional 
source of income related to enterprise results” (Pendleton et al., 2001). The plan can either be narrow-
based covering less than 50% of the employees or broad-based covering more than 50% (Pendleton et 
al., 2001; Robinson and Zhang, 2005). Narrow-based schemes are mainly introduced to present key 
employees with an economic incentive and to retain them in the company, while broad-based schemes 
may be introduced to create an incentive and/or as part of a political wish to share the ownership or as 
part of a leadership style and company culture acknowledging all employees as key stakeholders in the 
development of the company. The interest in and use of ESOPs increased during the 1980s and 1990s 
due to government incentives and legislation as well as an increased emphasis on agency cost reduction 
and employee motivation. Based on 15 different analyses of the prevalence of ESO in America, Kruse 
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et al. (2008) reported that 21%-24% of all American workers were covered by an ESOP in the 1990s; a 
substantial percentage when considering that ESOPs were virtually non-existing in 1978 when the 401k 
plan was introduced (Blasi, Kruse, Sesil and Kroumova, 2003). As far as the EU is concerned, large 
diversities exist among the individual EU members; for instance, 5% of Portuguese companies with 
more than 100 employees employed an ESOP in 1999/2000 while the corresponding UK figure was 
45% (Pendleton et al., 2001). Due to the financial crisis in the beginning of the 21st century, the USA 
has experienced a decline in the use of ESO from 24% in 1999 to 18% in 2006 (Buchele et al., 2009; 
Kruse et al., 2008; Rogers, 1999) and a similar decline in Ireland was reported by D’Art and Turner 
(2006). This decline indicates that the incentive for participating in an ESOP is mainly financial and 
that turbulence on the financial markets might increase employees’ risk aversion and perception of risk 
(Markowitz et al., 2010), discouraging them from participating in the plan. The current prevalence of 
ESO and the use of narrow and broad-based schemes, however, are yet to be explored for the purpose 
of establishing if the use of ESOPs declines when financial markets are turbulent. If this is indeed the 
case, it could indicate that companies, in periods of turbulence, tend to reduce the use of an incentive 
system which has the potential to increase employee involvement and commitment and thus prove 
essential for the survival of the company. The effects of introducing an ESOP have been found to be 
increased commitment and job satisfaction (Beatty, 1994; Drago and Heywood, 1995, Kruse, 1996), 
higher survival rates (Kruse, 2002), higher corporate productivity (Kim, 2009) and partly increased 
company performance (Addison and Belfield, 2000, 2001; Jones et al., 2010; Kruse, 2002; Logue and 
Yates, 2001). The effects, however, are mediated by participation in decisions and management’s 
readiness to provide employees with access to company information and the opportunity to bring their 
influence to bear in the decision-making process (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Kruse, 2002; Long, 
1977; Quarrey and Rosen, 1993). The analyses of the effect on company performance have yielded 
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different results; some scholars’ report of a positive effect, others neutral effects, while no one have 
found negative effects (Kruse, 2002). Despite the fact that the majority of research conducted on ESO 
is based on agency theory, increasing the share of ownership and thereby the financial incentive has 
failed to impact company performance. Especially wholly employee-owned companies have been 
reported to have either insignificant effects on company performance when controlling for company 
size (Kramer, 2010) or even a negative effect (Kim, 2009) due to degeneration or abuse of power 
(Sauser, 2009). The findings also suggest that the effect is somehow influenced by the involvement of 
employees in the decision-making process and the leadership style conducted. The next sections will 
address the interface of these areas. 
 
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT IN STRATEGY 
In the last decades, the middle management perspective in organisations has been the target of 
increasing attention (Wooldridge, Schmid and Floyd, 2008) as a supplement to the traditional view on 
top management as the prime source of change and initiatives. The middle management perspective 
explores the role and importance of middle managers in corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1983), 
innovation and organisational learning (Kanter, 1982; Nonaka, 1994), strategy implementation 
(Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Huy, 2002) and strategy processes (Currie and Procter, 2005; Floyd and 
Lane, 2000; Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). The perspective addresses 
the internal processes in the organisation and highlights the middle managers’ role as facilitators of 
strategy implementation (Huy, 2002) or sources of innovations and change through issue-selling or 
championing activities (Dutton, Asford, O’Neil and Lawrence, 2001; Ling, Floyd and Baldridge, 
2005). The uniqueness of middle managers lies in their access to both top and front end managers 
coupled with an unrivalled knowledge of the day-to-day operations. In a top-down perspective, this 
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position in the middle allows middle managers to act as sources of change through strategy 
implementation and by “selling” the strategy at lower organisational levels, hereby working as the 
auxiliary arm of top management (Conway and Monks, 2010). From a bottom-up perspective, middle 
managers are in a position to influence the strategic debate at top management level by influencing the 
issues brought to the attention of top management (Dutton et al., 2001). Additionally, middle managers 
act as sources of innovation on account of their close contact with front end managers and the market 
and by increasing information sharing across the organisation, vertically as well as horizontally. Middle 
management involvement in strategy development can be seen both as allowing middle managers to 
participate in decisions, providing them with the possibility to advocate their ideas (Andersen, 2004), 
or by distributing the strategic decision authority to middle managers, in the literature referred to as 
autonomy (Burgelman, 1984). By allowing middle managers to participate in decision-making, their 
knowledge of operations can be included in the decisions and/or they are in a position to perform 
champion or issue-selling activities by bringing new ventures or innovations to the attention of top 
management. Participation in the strategy process also increases the sense of ownership to and 
responsibility for the strategy creating a culture in which middle managers function as agents of change 
by selling and thus implementing the strategy in the organisation. Distributing decision authority to 
middle managers allows organisations to react faster to changes in their environment in recognition of 
the fact that complex geographically dispersed organisations cannot be managed by top management 
alone but require a form of interactive leadership distributed to middle managers with decision 
authority (Balugan and Johnson, 2004).  
The effects of middle management involvement are multifaceted and address both individual and 
organisational levels. Ketokivi and Casterñer (2004) reported how middle management involvement in 
strategy increased acceptance of the strategy and reduced the inclination to pursue subunit goals 
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enhancing goal convergence and coordination both vertically and horizontally. Similar findings were 
reported by Vilá and Canales (2008) who arrived at the conclusion that middle management 
involvement enhanced the acceptance and appreciation of strategic actions and encouraged active 
participation in the coordination and implementation of the strategy. Involvement of middle managers 
in strategy has also been found to enhance organisational responsiveness and innovation by increasing 
the speed at which information reaches top management and by bringing in its train faster 
implementation of actions taken to address environmental changes (Westley, 1990). Laine and Vaara 
(2006) added the perspective that without involving middle managers and thereby ensuring acceptance 
of the strategy, middle managers were prone to create their own strategic conversation and obstruct the 
implementation of the corporate strategy. The effect of middle management strategy involvement on 
company performance has been tested by some scholars with varying results. Mair (2005) tested the 
effect of involvement in a large service firm and found improved subunit performance while Andersen 
in an analysis of 185 American companies (2004) found a significant effect of autonomy in dynamic 
environments but no effect of participation. As a contrast to the expected positive effects of 
involvement, Guth and MacMillan (1986) reported that involvement of middle managers led to foot-
dragging and sabotage hindering strategy implementation. In a more recent analysis, Meyer (2006) 
observed that the pursuit of subunit goals by middle managers led to destructive interventions and the 
failure of a top management initiated merger. Sillince and Mueller (2007) ascertained that without a 
firm top management mandate, middle managers reframed responsibilities and pursued opportunism. 
Wooldridge et al. (2008) conclude in their review of the middle management literature that even though 
some evidence exists to suggest that middle management involvement can provide positive 
organisational outcomes, other studies suggest that involvement may be associated with negative 
performance and that much more research in the area is warranted; particularly in terms of 
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understanding why some middle managers get more involved than others and how to motivate them to 
become involved in the best interest of the company. Mantera and Vaara (2008) found that the 
leadership style conducted could both obstruct and promote involvement despite an intention on 
management’s part to involve in both situations. These findings suggest that middle managers need to 
be motivated to become involved in the best interest of the company and top management needs to 
conduct a leadership style that supports involvement; in the literature sometimes referred to as 
participative leadership style (Chen and Tjosvold, 2006; Kaufman, 2001; Kim, 2002). 
 
PARTICIPATIVE LEADERSHIP STYLE 
A participative leadership style supports the involvement of employees in organisational decision 
making (Kaufman, 2001; Kim, 2002). Participative leaders do so by consulting employees before 
decisions are made, asking for their opinions and taking them into account. They create a culture in 
which the employees are aware that their contribution is valuable, appreciated and expected, and 
believe that they have the opportunity and right to discuss problems and influence organisational 
decisions (Emery, 1995; Stanton, 1993). The distributed decision authority, in case of involvement of 
middle managers referred to as autonomy, is in the leadership literature often referred to as 
empowerment, defined as the delegation of decision authority to the lowest level in the organisation 
capable of making a competent decision (Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; 
Seibert, Silver and Randolph, 2004). The concept of empowerment is very similar to the concept of 
autonomy in that it measures the degree of decision authority distribution. Two theoretical models are 
often used to explain the effect of a participative leadership style. The motivational model focuses on 
the motivation created by having the opportunity to participate in decisions which, in return, supports 
the creation of psychological empowerment (Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). The 
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exchange model describes how participation signals that superiors trust, respect and show concern for 
the employee thereby inspiring confidence in the leader (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). The trust intimated 
by the leader and the organisation is reciprocated by the employees who exhibit a higher level of work 
performance (Cohen, 1992; Zallars and Tepper, 2003). Huang et al. (2009) found that while the effect 
of participative leadership on middle managers was mediated by psychological empowerment 
(motivational model), the effect on non-managerial employees was mediated by trust-in-supervisor 
(exchange-based model).  
Despite its intention to involve employees in the strategy process, top management may still create 
systems and a culture that constrain involvement. Mantere and Vaara (2008) found in an analysis of 12 
Nordic organisations that mystification, disciplining and technologisation impeded involvement, while 
self-actualisation, dialogisation and concretisation promoted involvement. This suggests that top 
management needs to devise systems enabling employees to see how they can participate, it needs to 
actively seek the opinions of the employees and to engage in constructive controversy involving open-
minded discussions of opposing positions (Tjosvold, 1998). To create such a culture, the employees 
need to feel safe and top management needs to be curious and make an effort to understand the position 
of the employee (Poon et al., 2001).  
The effect of a participative leadership style is reported to be increased quality of decisions (Scully, 
Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1995), increased employee motivation (Locke and Latham, 1990), commitment 
(Armenakis, Harris and Mossholder, 1993), satisfaction (Smylie, Lazarus and Brownlee-Conyers, 
1996) and psychological empowerment (Eby et al., 1999). The effect on performance has been reported 
to be mediated by psychological empowerment (Careless, 2004; Seibert et al., 2004) suggesting that 
involvement per se does not increase performance; to be successful, it needs to be propelled by the 
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creation of internalised extrinsic motivation of the employee. Especially middle managers have been 
found to have a pressing need to be empowered to be able to perform effectively (Kanter, 2004).  
 
OWNERSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND LEADERSHIP – A MATTER OF MOTIVATION? 
When analysing the three research streams presented above, it transpires that despite the extensive 
literature on the subjects, they all seem to fall short when it comes to understanding the processes 
related to the area at the individual level. It also becomes evident that all three areas are mediated by 
the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation within the individual employee, manifesting itself as 
commitment, loyalty, citizenship behaviour, psychological empowerment and psychological 
ownership. All concepts are capturing a state of mind which facilitate the employee’s willingness to 
participate in the development of the company, and to do so in the best interest of the company. While 
commitment and loyalty can be seen as subsets or consequences of citizenship behaviour, 
psychological empowerment and psychological ownership, the distinction between the three last-
mentioned is more complex and the concepts are partly overlapping. Organisational citizenship 
behaviour (OCB) is defined as “individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly 
recognized by the formal reward system, and in the aggregate promotes the efficient and effective 
functioning of the organization” (Organ, Podsakoff and MacKenzie, 2006, p. 3). Participation in job 
tasks that are intrinsically motivating has been found to trigger the creation of OCB and motivate 
employees to intensify their work effort (Bateman and Organ, 1983). OCB can, however, be directed 
both towards organisations and individuals and mainly the first is seen to drive organisational 
performance and be influenced by environmental and organisational factors, such as involvement in 
decisions (Skarilicki and Latham, 1997; Williams and Anderson, 1991). The creation of OCB in terms 
of the organisation is mainly explained through the motivational model and the fact that it is supported 
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by positive interaction with the employee’s supervisor suggests that especially middle managers will 
develop OCB towards the organisation through involvement in decisions (Huang et al., 2010). 
Psychological empowerment is defined as “an individual’s experience of intrinsic motivation that is 
based on cognitions about him- or herself in relation to his or her work role” (Spreitzer, 1995). The 
construct is composed by four cognitions: meaning, competence, self-determination and impact 
(Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995). Meaning refers to the value of the work performed 
based on the individual’s subjective evaluation and competence is the individual’s confidence in their 
own ability to successfully perform a given task or activity. Self-determination is the individual’s sense 
of having a say in how tasks are distributed and which methods should be employed and finally, impact 
is the possibility to influence organisational outcomes (Spreitzer, 1995). The level of empowerment is 
based on subjective evaluations of the match between individual values and the demands and 
opportunities of his or her work task. The creation and enhancement of psychological empowerment 
have been found to be mediated by the empowerment climate (Seibert, Silver and Randolph, 2004) 
which refers to the organisational climate supporting empowerment. It is defined by a set of shared 
perceptions regarding the policies, practices, and procedures that are rewarded, supported and expected 
by an organisation  (James, Joyce and Slocum, 1988; Schneider and Reichers, 1983). Thus, the 
empowerment climate can be viewed as closely related to a participative leadership style made up of 
systems, signals and procedures used by top management to support, encourage and expect 
involvement and autonomy from middle managers. Pierce et al. (2003, p. 86) have defined 
psychological ownership as “the state in which individuals feel as though the target of ownership or a 
piece of that target is theirs”. Psychological ownership in organisations has been linked to increased 
commitment (O’Driscoll et al., 2006; VandeWalle et al., 1995), stewardship (Pierce et al., 2003) and 
increased company performance (O’Driscoll et al., 2006; Pierce and Rodgers, 2004). The antecedents 
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of psychological ownership are found to be involvement and formal ownership (Pierce et al., 1991) 
autonomy and feedback (Pierce et al., 2009) and investment of oneself in the target of ownership 
(Pierce et al., 2001, 2003). The creation of psychological ownership is based on five human motives; a) 
efficacy and effectance, b) self-identity, c) having a place, d) territoriality and e) accountability (Avey 
et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 2003). Pierce et al. (2001, 2003) suggested that stewardship, personal 
sacrifice and risk, promotion of organisational change and caring and protective behaviour towards the 
company all are enhanced by the creation of psychological ownership.  
As described above, the three concepts, OCB, psychological empowerment and psychological 
ownership, all constitute different ways of defining organisational commitment and are all based on the 
generation of internalised extrinsic motivation. Where OCB focuses on increasing the work effort 
without involving formal incentives and psychological empowerment addresses identification with the 
organisation, psychological ownership highlights the wish to develop and improve the company, 
leaving personal interest out of account. As presented previously, ESO, involvement of middle 
managers in strategy making and participative leadership style were all mediated by the creation of one 
of these motivational concepts. This raises the question of whether ESO, involvement and leadership 
style are the prime concepts to investigate in preparation for analysing how to improve company 
performance, which is a hallmark of strategy management research (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 
1991), or if the three concepts are antecedents of internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of i.e. 
psychological ownership. If the latter is the case, research needs to spotlight the individual level of the 
process of creating psychological ownership, analysing how ESO, involvement and leadership style 
affect the creation of psychological ownership in a variety of different employees and how they 
interact. This assumption raises a number of research questions to be answered of which some will be 
addressed in the next four chapters of the thesis. In the following section, the methodology of the 
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of case studies within the different research streams and a desire to quantify the effect of ESO, 
involvement of middle managers in strategy and a participative leadership style on the creation of 
psychological ownership and ultimately, the effect of psychological ownership on company 
performance, the choice of a broad-based quantitative survey seems most appropriate.  
When preparing a questionnaire and performing a survey, the concepts of validity and reliability of the 
responses need to be addressed. Validity is “concerned with whether a variable measures what it is 
supposed to measure” (Bollen, 1989, p. 184), while reliability refers to the instrument’s capacity for 
consistently and stably measuring what it is supposed to measure (Black and Champion, 1976; Winter, 
2000). The concept of validity has been divided into a number of different subtypes of validity. Some 
scholars have divided it into content-related, criterion-related and construct-related validity, while 
others have divided the concept into internal and external validity.  
To ensure content-related validity, all constructs and relationships were based on a theoretical 
foundation and items were based on former studies where possible. To increase the content-related 
validity, all questionnaires were pretested on a sample of 3 middle managers to test whether the items 
were understandable, clear and precise; this led to small linguistic adjustments. After the initial pretest, 
the questionnaire was pretested again on a group of 66 middle managers and 21 CFOs to test the 
validity of the constructs. None of the respondents in this pretest formed part of the following main 
survey. To further test the content-related validity, all constructs were tested in an exploratory factor 
analysis to ensure a Cronbach’s alpha of at least 0.7 and factor loadings of at least 0.7 (Kline, 2005). 
All tests supported a sufficient content-related validity.  
Criterion-related validity was addressed by collecting performance measure data from official Danish 
databases containing financial data. The criterion-related validity was also tested by conducting tests 
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for non-response bias and collection method. The above actions gave no cause for concern in terms of 
criterion-related validity problems.  
Construct-related validity was ensured by using theoretically founded and formerly tested items, 
constructs and relationships and by collecting data from multiple sources and from 3-4 respondents 
from each company.  
The questionnaires were developed in the autumn of 2009 and were based on a literature review; all 
items were founded on theory and former surveys or case studies. To increase the possibility of a high 
response rate, the questionnaires were limited to two pages plus an introduction letter. Despite the 
limited space, the questionnaire included items addressing aspects of employee stock ownership, 
involvement of middle managers in strategy, leadership style and psychological ownership relevant for 
this thesis, but also other items to be used in future research.2  
In the winter of 2009/spring of 2010, a list of the 500 largest Danish companies, measured in terms of 
number of employees (a minimum of 225 full-time employees), was extracted from 
“Kobmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau”. The 500 companies cover a broad set of industries. In 
addition to number of employees and company contact information, the database also provided us with 
2004-2009 financial data, industry code, stock market listing and founding year. In a first step, the CFO 
was contacted by means of a personalised cover letter and the CFO questionnaire including questions 
about the use of ESO. Due to their position in the finance department, the CFOs are most likely to have 
access to information about who owns shares in the company and how many shares. Two weeks later, 
the first letter was followed by a second letter directed to the CFOs who had failed to respond to the 
initial letter. The two waves of letters produced a total of 149 answers from the CFOs. In a third step, 
the remaining 351 CFOs were contacted by phone and asked to participate in the survey. This resulted 
                                                            
2 See the questionnaires in the appendix. 
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in additional 167 answers yielding a total of 316 answers from the CFOs. Careful inspection for 
completeness and plausibility of the responses led to the elimination of nineteen answers (one firm had 
actually received and answered the questionnaire twice, one firm was in the process of liquidation, 
three firms had severely reduced the number of employees during the autumn of 2009, thus no longer 
exhibiting the required number of employees, the other responses were severely incomplete or 
implausible). Thus, a total of 297 answers were collected from a broad set of industries (i.e. a response 
rate of 59.4%). The questionnaire was sent by mail to the head of marketing/sales in the 297 companies 
in February 2010; a second letter was sent two weeks later to the non-respondents and finally, the 
remaining companies were contacted by phone, resulting in a total of 207 answers (i.e. a response rate 
of 69.7% of the initial 297 companies). A randomly chosen middle manager from each of the 297 
companies was contacted by phone to collect answers to a reduced questionnaire. A total of 210 middle 
managers answered the questionnaire (i.e. a response rate of 70.7% of the initial 297 companies). To be 
able to test the validity of the answers, answers from two middle managers were collected from 57 
companies as a subsample of the 210 companies.  
General data on the companies of the entire population and the participating companies are available in 
the appendix. The 297 companies have been tested for non-response bias and collection method; none 
of the tests raised any concerns. 
The problem of common-method bias has been addressed on the basis of the recommendations of 
Podsakoff et al. (2003). The main approach for avoiding common-method bias is to use data from 
multiple sources. This is accomplished by collecting data from multiple respondents in each company 
and using external financial data collected from official databases as measures of performance. 
Additionally, in each article, a Harman’s single factor test is conducted on all the items used in the 
models and none of the tests gave cause for common–method bias concerns.   
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THE CONTENTS OF THE REST OF THE DISSERTATION 
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 develops a theoretical model that 
demonstrates how ESO, involvement in strategy and a participative leadership style are antecedents of 
psychological ownership among middle managers, and how they influence each other. The model 
suggests that the creation of psychological ownership is moderated by worker and job characteristics, 
which, in return, implies that the importance and effect of participative strategy processes among 
middle managers differ between employees and between sectors. The effect of psychological 
ownership on employee behaviour, employee attitudes and financial performance is also found to be 
influenced by the sector’s knowledge intensity and environmental dynamism, suggesting that in sectors 
with high knowledge intensity, the effect of creating psychological ownership among middle managers 
is greater. This is due to the important role played by highly motivated knowledge intensive employees 
in the creation of new ventures and difficulties of effective control and the risk of agency costs and 
slack, caused by job characteristics and the variety of tasks traditionally assigned to knowledge 
intensive workers. The contribution of the chapter lies in the development of a model combining the 
areas of ESO, involvement and leadership style; a model which views the concepts not as sources of 
increased performance, but as antecedents of psychological ownership. The model hereby combines the 
literature in a new way, creates new insights and directs future research. 
Chapter 3 tests the prevalence and antecedents of employee stock ownership in Denmark. As 
developed in the model in chapter 2, ESO is one of the antecedents of psychological ownership and the 
effect of psychological ownership on company performance is expected to be stronger in dynamic 
environments. This indicates that the use of ESO among companies should grow more prevalent in 
turbulent periods such as the current financial crisis. However, findings from the USA and Ireland have 
Page 29 
 
indicated that the prevalence of ESO has been reduced since the IT bubble burst in 2000. Similarly, the 
effect of psychological ownership on company performance is expected to be higher in knowledge 
intensive sectors indicating that the use of ESO would be expected to be higher in these sectors. The 
model also indicates that the use of ESO is more prevalent in companies with high middle manager 
involvement in strategy processes born out of the middle managers’ desire for some kind of profit 
sharing as an incentive for engaging in participative strategic actions. The paper reports of an overall 
increase in the prevalence of ESO in Danish companies but finds that only the prevalence of narrow-
based schemes (less than 50% of the employees covered by the scheme) has increased, while the use of 
broad-based schemes (more than 50% of the employees covered by the scheme) has decreased. The 
paper contributes to our knowledge be reporting that the antecedents of ESO are determined by the type 
of ESOP.  
Companies employing an ESOP covering only top management are mainly small companies with a 
traditional view on strategy as a process controlled and executed by top management. In contravention 
of theory-based recommendations, they combine the narrow-based scheme with individual bonuses. 
According to a number of scholars, it is recommended to combine narrow-based incentives with broad-
based schemes to motivate employees to both contribute to the long-term development of the company 
and to excel in their individual job functions. Companies employing broad-based schemes covering a 
majority of the employees also seem to complement the broad-based ESO scheme with group-based 
bonuses, also contradicting the recommendations from academia. 
The general analysis of companies using ESOPs indicates that the prevalence of ESO is higher in listed 
companies, which is in support of a number of similar findings (Pendleton et al., 2001). Adjusting for 
stock listing, the prevalence seems to be higher in a stable sector like construction with relatively low-
educated, low-paid employees, while lower in a dynamic sector like IT and telecommunication with 
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relatively high-educated high-paid employees. This finding also conflicts with the expectation that the 
prevalence would be high in dynamic industries with high-paid employees; an expectation borne out of  
the fact that such industries should see a greater effect of and need for employee initiatives and the fact 
that highly salaried employees would be more familiar with stock investments. 
Chapter 4 tests ESO, involvement and participative leadership style as antecedents of psychological 
ownership as well as their interrelations and interactions. Based on the model in chapter 2 and previous 
literature reviews, it was expected that all three variables would be direct antecedents of psychological 
ownership and that all interrelations would be significant and positive. The models were tested in 
structural equation models (SEM) and the model with the best good fit reported both participative 
leadership style and participation to be significant positive determinants of psychological ownership.    
Especially a participative leadership style was reported to have a strong and highly significant impact 
on the creation of psychological ownership. A participative leadership style was also found to be a 
strong positive predictor of the level of involvement, implying that a top management which conducts a 
leadership style that encourages, supports and expects involvement also experiences a high level of 
involvement among middle managers. ESO had no direct effect on the creation of psychological 
ownership, but was mediated by participation. This is in line with previous findings arguing that the 
effect of ESO is mediated by allowing employees to exercise the formal ownership rights like 
participation in decisions. A number of interactions between the three variables were tested but the tests 
failed to improve the fits of the model. The chapter contributes to our understanding of the creation of 
psychological ownership by testing the antecedents, interrelations and interactions of ESO, 
involvement and leadership style. The findings reveal that especially the leadership style conducted is 
capable of enhancing the creation of psychological ownership and that despite strong theoretical 
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arguments indicating involvement as an antecedent of psychological ownership, the present data find 
that only participation, not autonomy, is a determinant. 
Using the model tested in chapter 4, chapter 5 extends the model by testing the effect of psychological 
ownership on company performance. The model tests if ESO, middle management involvement in 
strategy and a participative leadership style have a direct effect on performance, if the effect is 
mediated by psychological ownership or both. The model in SEM demonstrated good fits and 
confirmed the findings in chapter 4 which indicated that participation and a participative leadership 
style are antecedents of psychological ownership, while ESO is mediated by participation. No direct 
effects of the three variables were found on company performance, signifying that ESO, middle 
management involvement and leadership style are mediated by psychological ownership. These 
findings provide the empirical support for the model in chapter 2, suggesting that the research areas of 
ESO, involvement in strategy and leadership style need to focus on the effect of the variables on the 
creation of internalised extrinsic motivation and especially psychological ownership. This finding also 
suggests that more research should be conducted into how ESO, involvement and leadership style can 
be combined with other activities which increase motivation and that the factors in themselves are not 
sufficient for successfully increasing company performance.            
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2. Involvement, leadership style and formal ownership as 
determinants of psychological ownership among middle 
managers: A behavioural model3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The increased knowledge intensity in work settings and environmental turbulence highlights the need 
for involving employees in strategic decisions to enable fast reactions to changing market demands or 
enhance sensemaking, commitment and loyalty among employees. Involvement may take the form of 
either participation in decisions or distribution of decision authority to the lowest possible relevant 
organisational level. Especially involvement of middle managers in strategy processes has been the 
target of increasing attention due to the unique position of middle managers being in close contact with 
top management as well as lower organisational levels (Nonaka, 1994). Researchers have addressed the 
phenomenon at both the organisational and the individual level. The first has tested the outcomes of 
involvement (i.e. Floyd and Lane, 2000; Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007) while the latter focuses on the 
social processes within which strategies are actually realised (Pettigrew, 1973, 1992; Whittington, 
2006). At the organisational level, middle management involvement has been linked to increased 
information sharing, commitment and loyalty (Currie and Procter, 2005; Pappas and Wooldridge, 
2007), better strategy implementation (Sillince and Mueller, 2007; Vilá and Canales, 2008) and 
enhanced innovation performance (Laine and Vaara, 2007; Mantere and Vaara, 2008). Despite the 
above-mentioned positive outcomes of middle management involvement, tests of the effects on 
                                                            
3 The current chapter corresponds to a single-authored article under review at Journal of Management Studies. The author 
would like to thank Professor Torben Juul Andersen and PhD fellow Stefan Linder for helpful comments during the 
development of the paper.  
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company performance are less consistent (Andersen, 2004; Meir, 2005). This lack of a consistent 
relationship between middle management involvement and company performance indicates a gap in 
our understanding of the strategy processes at the individual level. This gap is partly addressed in the 
strategy-as-practice (s-a-p) literature which views strategy as a social practice (Johnson et al., 2003; 
Whittington, 2006) and seeks a “better understanding of the microlevel processes and practices 
constituting strategy and strategizing” (Mantere and Vaara, 2008). The s-a-p literature has enriched 
our understanding of how different discursive practices enable or constrain participation (Jarzabkowski, 
2005) and how top management can legitimate participation or retain centralised decision power 
through the language of strategy (Knights and Morgan, 1991). While the potential positive effects of 
involvement have been addressed in a number of studies (Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007; Currie and 
Procter, 2005), other studies have found involvement to enhance food-dragging, sabotage and agency 
costs (Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Laine and Vaara, 2007). These diverse findings highlight a key 
challenge in middle management involvement: how to motivate middle managers to become involved 
in strategy processes and to be involved in the best interest of the company. 
In their article on self-determination theory (SDT), Ryan and Deci (2000) present how intrinsic 
motivation or internalisation of extrinsic motivation creates an alignment between company values and 
goals and individual values and goals. While intrinsic motivation comes from within, spurred by an 
impulse to complete the task for the task’s own sake, most job situation settings will be externally 
motivated. This calls for an increased focus on how to enhance internalisation of extrinsic motivation 
among middle managers. Internalisation has been found to increase if the task is perceived as 
meaningful, is prompted by significant others (persons or organisations) to whom the person feels 
attached or related and if the middle manager experiences autonomy and self-determination, creating a 
sense of relatedness to the company (Ryan and Deci, 2000).    
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The creation of relatedness implies an internalisation of the company which manifests itself in 
employees perceiving the company as a part of or partly belonging to themselves; this is often referred 
to as psychological ownership, psychological empowerment or organisational citizenship (Huang et al., 
2010; Pierce et al., 2001; Spreitzer, 1995). The concepts are partly overlapping and are found to 
facilitate the effect of employee stock ownership (psychological ownership), involvement of middle 
managers in strategy (organisational citizenship behaviour) and a participative leadership style 
(psychological empowerment) (Eby et al., 1999; Huang et al., 2010; Pierce et al., 2001; Spreitzer, 
1995). Formal ownership (ESO), involvement and feedback and support (a participative leadership 
style) are also found to be determinants of psychological ownership (Pierce et al., 2001). This suggests 
that all three concepts are mediated by the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of 
psychological ownership and highlights a gap in our understanding of how the concepts influence the 
creation of psychological ownership, how they interact and if ESO, involvement of middle managers in 
strategy and a participative leadership style in themselves increase company performance or only have 
an indirect effect through the possible creation of internalised extrinsic motivation and its effect on 
employee behaviour and attitudes.  
This article develops a model which explores that gap by proposing that involvement of middle 
managers in strategy processes potentially increases middle managers’ sense of psychological 
ownership, which has been found to be a strong predictor of company performance (O’Driscoll et al., 
2006). The model also argues that combining involvement with other determinants of psychological 
ownership, especially formal ownership and a participative leadership style, mediates the creation of 
psychological ownership and reduces the potential negative effects of involvement, such as foot-
dragging and sabotage (Guth and MacMillan, 1986). Thus, the model combines theory on both the 
Page 35 
 
organisational level and the individual level of involvement. Furthermore, the article proposes that 
involvement, and hence a focus on the creation of psychological ownership, is especially important in a 
dynamic environment and that sectors with highly educated workers or specific job designs support this 
creation and thereby enhance the positive effects of middle management involvement. The model only 
focuses on involvement of middle managers in strategy, ESO covering middle managers and a 
participative leadership style targeted at middle managers in order to combine the research streams of 
middle management involvement on the organisational level with the research stream dealing with how 
to motivate employees on the individual level. The authors call for further research in the area to extend 
the model to include involvement of all employees. Before introducing our model, we first review the 
literature on middle management involvement, formal ownership, participative leadership style and 
psychological ownership. 
 
INVOLVEMENT OF MIDDLE MANAGERS IN STRATEGY PROCESSES  
Involvement of middle managers has received increasing attention within strategy research and practice 
and a number of scholars have identified a trend among companies towards greater involvement of 
especially middle managers in strategy processes (Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Hickson, Butler, Cray, 
Mallory and Wilson, 1986; Imai, 1986; Mintzberg, 1990; Rhyne, 1986; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). 
While no consensus exists on how and how much middle managers should be involved, it is generally 
accepted that too little involvement could lead to poorly developed strategies (Floyd and Wooldridge, 
2000) or difficulties with implementation (Mintzberg, 1994). Involvement of middle managers can 
either take the form of allowing middle managers to participate in the strategy process and advocate 
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their ideas to top management, referred to as participation in decisions (Andersen, 2004), or take the 
form of distributing the strategic decision authority to middle managers, referred to as autonomy 
(Burgelman, 1984). Some of the arguments in favour of involving middle managers are difficulties 
with strategy implementation (Galbraith and Kazanjiam, 1986; Huy, 2002; Rouleau, 2005; Sillince and 
Mueller, 2007; Vilá and Canales, 2008) and an increasing rate of environmental change (Ansoff, 1979), 
while others refer to the growing importance of intrapreneurship for innovation and corporate success 
(Burgelman, 1984; Kuratko, Montagnor and Hornsby, 1990; Laine and Vaara, 2006; Ling, Floyd and 
Baldridge, 2005; Mair, 2005; Mantere, 2005; Mantere and Vaara, 2008; Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007;  
Quinn, 1985).  
The middle management perspective in strategy research emerged from the recognition of middle 
managers’ unique position of access to both top management and front-end managers. Middle 
managers thereby became essential as sources of organisational information to top management and 
agents of change distributing and facilitating information on and implementation of strategic initiatives 
from top management (Nonaka, 1994). As important sources of information to top management, 
middle managers’ championing or issue selling activities have attracted a substantial amount of work 
(Dutton, Asford, O’Neil and Lawrence, 2001, Ling, Floyd and Baldridge, 2005). Through issue selling, 
middle managers shape and influence the strategic agenda by choosing which information should be 
presented to top management. As sources of information, middle managers also act as facilitators 
encouraging lower level management and workers to participate in idea generation or experiments and 
thereby drive innovations (Rouleau and Balugun, 2010; Wooldridge et al., 2008). Middle managers, 
however, are only inclined to actively engage in the strategy process if they feel that their opinions and 
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arguments matter and that top management is willing to negotiate and compromise (Jarzabkowski and 
Balogun, 2009). 
While issue selling addresses the bottom-up information stream, middle managers also engage in a top-
down information stream in that they promote strategic change and help employees at lower 
organisational layers make sense of strategic change and initiatives (Conway and Monks, 2010; Huy, 
2002; Yang et al., 2010). Middle managers thereby act as agents of change and support strategy 
implementation by increasing information on and acceptance of the company strategy. Involving 
middle managers in the strategy process can build a shared understanding and acceptance of the 
company strategy, enhancing middle managers’ ability and commitment to support implementation of 
the strategy. Ketokivi and Castaner (2004) found that involvement increased motivation and 
commitment among middle managers and reduced the tendency to pursue subunit goals; thus, it 
brought in its train increased goal convergence and coordination between managers.  
Research on the effect of middle management involvement on strategy implementation, commitment 
and financial performance reveals strong evidence supporting smoother strategy implementation and 
increased information sharing (Kellermanns, Walter, Floyd, Lechner and Shaw, 2010; Wooldridge and 
Floyd, 1990) while the effect on financial performance is more limited. Mair (2005) found increased 
unit level growth in a large financial service firm due to middle manager strategic behaviour, while 
Wooldridge and Floyd (1990) in an analysis of 25 organisations found that middle manager 
involvement was associated with increased financial performance. A more diverse result was reported 
by Andersen (2004) who performed a cross-sectional analysis of 185 American corporations. He found 
that autonomous strategic actions in a dynamic environment lead to increased financial performance 
while participation was insignificant when testing for dynamism and combined effects. Additionally, he 
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did not succeed in finding any significant direct effects of participation and autonomy, indicating that 
the effects are limited in more stable environments. 
These less consistent findings of a relationship between involvement and company performance are 
supported by a number of studies addressing potential negative effects of participation and autonomy. 
Laine and Vaara (2007) reported how middle managers, due to a lack of acceptance of the company 
strategy, developed their own strategy and pursued their own goals, while Burgelman (1983, 1994, 
2005) in a number of articles reported how units at Intel continued to develop certain products in 
contravention of the overall strategy of the company. Guth and MacMillan (1986) also report how 
middle managers obstructed strategy implementation through foot-dragging and sabotage, while Meyer 
(2006) found that middle managers’ self-interest lead to destructive interventions causing strategy 
implementation to fail.    
The above-mentioned findings suggest that to better understand how to ensure a positive effect of 
middle management involvement, gaining a greater appreciation of the motivational aspects of 
involvement seems crucial. Mantere and Vaara (2008) found that different discursive practices either 
constrained or enabled participation. They discovered that mystification, disciplining and 
technologisation reduced or constrained involvement by creating the impression that strategy is 
confined to an inner circle and constrains the possibility to become involved due to organisational or 
technological routines. On the other hand, self-actualisation, dialogisation and concretisation were 
found to enable involvement. These findings suggest that to promote involvement, top management 
needs to conduct an encouraging leadership style that signals that involvement is not only accepted and 
appreciated but expected by all employees. These initiatives need to be combined with middle 
managers investing themselves in the company by reflecting on the organisation and their role in it; 
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hence, middle managers need to be committed to the company and accept and support company goals 
and needs above their own needs and wishes. Caramelli and Briole (2007) list three theoretical models 
of the effects of decision-making participation: a cognitive model, an affective model and a contingent 
model. 
The cognitive model of participation suggests that participation in decision-making enhances the flow 
and use of important information in organisations. Since workers and lower level managers are closer 
to the market, production, customers and the products, they typically have a better and more up-to-date 
knowledge of their environment than top management does.  By involving the employees in the 
decision-making process, decisions will be based on higher quality information and decisions will be 
more easily implemented if the employees feel an ownership to the decision (Miller and Monge, 1986). 
Including the employees in the decision-making clarifies expectations regarding instrumentalities 
(Mitchel, 1973) and provides the opportunity for employees to affect the reward system and thus make 
a better match between effort, performance and reward.  
The affective model of participation is based on the human relation school of management (Hertzberg, 
1966; Maslow, 1954; McGregor, 1960) and refers to the effect of participation on job satisfaction. 
When managers involve employees in the decision-making process and provide them with leverage and 
decision power, they automatically feel important, trusted and intelligent. This leads them to fulfil high 
level needs such as recognition, independency, respect, equality and self-esteem and creates higher job 
satisfaction and motivation (French, Israel and As, 1960). Participation may also lead to higher 
organisational commitment. The perception of control and influence encourages workers to identify 
themselves with company values and goals and to become more loyal and more active on behalf of the 
company (Styskal, 1980; Tannenbaum 1962). 
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The contingent model of participation stresses that the effect of participation in decision-making is 
determined by individual variables such as personality and values (White, 1978). The lack of trust 
between management and workers or a political perception of the worker-manager relationship may 
prevent a fruitful outcome of participation in the decision-making process and implementation of the 
decisions.  
Each of the three models highlights the need for motivation among middle managers to enhance the 
effect of involvement. However, it is also clear that although the need for motivation is recognised, the 
matter is either widely neglected or it is assumed that allowing middle managers to involve in strategic 
decisions automatically creates motivation. Based on self-determination theory, an internalisation of 
the extrinsic motivation will fail unless middle managers develop a sense of affinity with the company 
i.e. in the form of psychological ownership (Ryan and Deci, 2000). This requires the support from a top 
management who encourages involvement through clear organisational structures guiding involvement 
and feedback in the form of a participative leadership style. Involvement is also seen to be supported by 
allowing middle managers to gain a formal ownership to the company through an employee stock 
ownership plan (ESOP), signalling an intention to include the middle managers and giving them access 
to a part of the company profit and influence. The following section will address how participative 
leadership style and employee stock ownership are interrelated with the inclusion of middle managers 
in the strategy process and how they all interact as determinants of psychological ownership   
 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
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More than 30 studies of employee stock ownership (ESO) have addressed the question of the effect of 
ESO on company performance (Kruse and Blasi, 1997; Kruse et al., 2008; McNabb and Whitfield, 
1988; Ohkusa and Ohtake, 1997; Smith et al., 1997). The literature on ESO generally limits the 
definition of ESO to stocks offered though an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) initiated by the 
company. The findings are divided between a positive relationship between ESO and company 
performance and neutral relationships; none of the studies found a negative relationship (Jones, Kalmi 
and Mäkinen, 2010; Kramer, 2010). The findings indicate that the effect of ESO is multidimensional 
and moderated by a number of factors: possibility to exercise the formal ownership rights (Klein, 1987; 
Long, 1977, 1978; Rosen and Quarrey, 1987), creation of psychological ownership (Klein, 1987), 
ownership expectations (Steers, 1977), management’s philosophical commitment to employee 
ownership (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and participation in decision-making (Long, 1977, 1978). On 
average, introducing an ESOP will improve productivity by 4-5% in the year of ESOP introduction and 
the increased productivity will remain at that level in subsequent years (Kruse, 2002; Logue and Yates, 
2001). The calculation is based on an average of identified performance effects based on 33 different 
articles (Kruse, 2002). Other studies have indicated a higher growth in the number of employees after 
adopting ESO, especially among companies with high levels of employee participation in decision-
making (Logue and Yates, 2001; Quarrey and Rosen, 1993; Winther and Marens, 1997). An analysis of 
all privately held ESO companies in 1988 indicates that introducing ESO also increases the survival 
rate of the companies (Kruse, 2002). Another study followed all public listed companies in the USA 
from 1983 to 1995 and concluded that ESO companies had a 20% higher survival rate compared with 
public listed companies not employing ESO. Similar results have been found in a long-term study of 
French worker cooperatives (Estrin and Jones, 1992). 
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The agency theory constitutes the main theoretical background for explaining the effects of ESO; it 
states that the interests of the utility-maximising employees are incongruent with those of the firm 
(Pendleton, 2006) and that there is a risk of discretionary behaviour, moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Eisenhardt, 1989; Holmstrom, 1979). It has been argued that collective incentive 
programmes like profit sharing or employee ownership can reduce the agency costs by aligning 
employee interests with those of the firm.  
A number of studies have analysed the effects of ESO on employee behaviour, commitment and job 
satisfaction (Beatty, 1994; Drago and Heywood, 1995; Jones and Pliskin, 1997; Kruse, 1996; 
McCarthy, Reeves and Turner, 2010), information sharing and bargaining costs (Cramton, Mehran and 
Tracy, 2010) while another body of analyses focus, as earlier mentioned, on the effect on company 
performance (Addison and Belfield, 2000, 2001; McNabb and Whitfield, 1998; Sesil et al., 2002). Still, 
the two areas are connected in the sense that the effect on employee behaviour triggers the effect on 
company performance by reducing or eliminating the agency costs and by increasing commitment and 
participation in decisions, thereby creating internalised extrinsic motivation. This indicates that it is not 
the expected financial bonus per se which aligns the interests of the middle managers with those of the 
company but the perception of being valued and allowed to participate in the decision-making process. 
This is also in keeping with findings reporting that the ownership share has either no effect on company 
performance or even a negative relation to commitment or performance (Kim, 2009; Pendleton, 2010a; 
Sauser, 2009). Yet, the potential positive effects on employee behaviour or attitudes are mediated by a 
number of factors:    
Possibility to exercise the formal ownership. Formal ownership is normally defined as the possibility 
to exercise three rights: a) the right to possess some share of the owned object’s physical being and/or 
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financial value b) the right to exercise influence (control) of the owned object and c) the right to 
information about the status of that which is owned (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan, 1991). Long’s 
analyses (1977, 1978) showed that the formal ownership alone only had a weak effect on job attitudes, 
such as job satisfaction and commitment, while perceived participation in decision-making and 
influence creating an internalisation of the company was a much stronger predictor of job attitudes. 
This indicates that if ownership is to have an effect on job attitudes, there must exist a psychological 
perception of ownership and thus influence on the company and the actions taken on the operational 
and strategic level (Hammer, Landau and Stern, 1981; Long, 1978). This is also congruent with the 
concept of controllability, indicating that employees need to feel that they can affect the measures used 
to calculate the bonus; otherwise the extrinsic incentive has no effect. The perception of influence and 
importance as a key variable is also in line with literature exploring the areas of sensemaking and 
empowerment as paths to internalised extrinsic motivation (Huang et al., 2010).  
The ownership expectations are closely related to the creation of psychological ownership. The 
cultural norm in most capitalist societies is that formal ownership is linked to equity possession, 
information and exercise of influence. If these expectations are not congruent with the actual 
experience, the psychological ownership is likely to become weaker than if there was complete 
congruency between expectations and experience. There can be a number of reasons for such 
incongruence between employee ownership and employee control (Blasi, 1988; Gunn, 1984; Russel, 
1988; Tannenbaum, 1983); one being that we traditionally accept that the “legitimate authority rest 
with property rights, which management either holds or represents” (Blasi, 1988, p. 217). This concept 
of “legitimate authority” may prevent formal ownership from creating a sense of psychological 
ownership and thus the expected effects on job attitudes, commitment and involvement.  Since the 
Page 44 
 
above concept places the authority with management, it is management’s responsibility to create a 
sense of legitimacy to employee involvement and mediate the creation of psychological ownership. 
This creation of legitimacy of employee involvement is highly dependent on management’s 
philosophical commitment to employee ownership i.e. “the extent to which management sees 
employee ownership as a part of the company’s overall culture, human relations policy and/or 
commitment to employees” (Rosen et al., 1986, p. 64). Hambrick and Mason (1984) have argued that 
management’s philosophical commitment to employee ownership plays a significant role in the 
creation of organisational systems that encourage employee participation and legitimise employee 
influence. Management’s commitment to the scheme is highly related to the reasons for introducing 
ESO. Caramelli and Briole (2007) list a number of reasons for implementing ESO: some companies 
want to benefit from advantageous tax structures or have other financial reasons, while others are more 
focused on the effect on the employees.  Klein (1987) found that the strength of management’s 
philosophical commitment to employee ownership was significantly connected to employee attitudes 
(satisfaction, commitment and turnover intentions). The interpretations of the analysis indicate that the 
more worker influence incorporated in the ESOP, the better are the results of the ESOP (Long, 1982; 
Rosen and Quarrey, 1987). Management’s attitude will affect the employees’ possibilities to 1) become 
owners 2) access information and 3) exercise influence.  The above-mentioned four factors: possibility 
to exercise the formal ownership rights, creation of psychological ownership, congruency with 
ownership expectations and management’s philosophical commitment to employee ownership may all 
lead to a higher level of employee participation in decision-making. Some studies indicate a higher 
level of employee participation in ESO companies (Conyon and Freeman, 2001; Dube and Freeman, 
2001; Tannenbaum, Kavcic, Rosner, Vianello and Wieser, 1974), while other studies indicate that ESO 
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does not automatically entail higher participation (Zwerdling, 1978; Hammer and Stern, 1980; Ivancic 
and Rosen, 1986, Toscano, 1983).  
As presented above, a number of similarities exist between the research stream of middle management 
involvement in strategy processes and the employee stock ownership literature. The effect of both 
involvement and ESO is mediated by a participative leadership style that encourages and supports 
involvement by legitimising and expecting middle management involvement. ESO is seen to increase 
middle management involvement and the effect of both concepts is considered to be highly dependent 
on the creation of a psychological ownership. The participative leadership style and the determinants 
and creation of psychological ownership and their effects on employee behaviour and organisational 
outcomes have received increasing attention in research streams of their own and will be presented in 
the following sections.    
 
PARTICIPATIVE LEADERSHIP STYLE 
A participative leadership style supports the involvement of employees in organisational decision-
making by consulting employees before decisions are made, by asking their opinions and taking them 
into consideration (Kaufman, 2001; Kim, 2002). This is done by creating a culture that signals that the 
opinion and participation of the employee is acknowledged, valued and expected (Emery, 1995; 
Stanton, 1993). The leadership style supports empowerment, defined as the delegation of the decision 
authority to the lowest level in the organisation capable of making a competent decision (Conger and 
Kanungo, 1988; Seibert, Silver and Randolph, 2004). The effect of a participative leadership style is 
argued to be based on either the motivational model or the exchange model (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002; 
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Spreitzer, 1995). The motivational model focuses on the motivation created by being allowed to 
participate in decision-making, thus assuming that participation in itself is motivating (Thomas and 
Velthouse, 1990), while the exchange model states that the experience of trust, confidence and respect 
from top management induces the employee to exhibit a higher level of work performance (Zallars and 
Tepper, 2003). Huang et al. (2010) found that middle managers were mainly motivated by the prospect 
of being able to influence decisions (motivational model), suggesting that the creation of motivation is 
crucial when middle managers participate in decision-making or have decision authority distributed to 
them. Spreitzer (1995) found that the effect of a participative leadership style was mediated by the 
creation of psychological empowerment defined as “an individual’s experience of intrinsic motivation 
that is based on cognitions about him- or herself in relation to his or her work role”. The construct is 
composed by four cognitions: meaning, competence, self-determination and impact (Conger and 
Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995) and it can be seen that involvement in strategic decision-making 
involves all four cognitions and therefore supports the creation of psychological empowerment.  
Although involvement of employees in the strategy process is a top management desideratum, it may 
still create systems and a culture that constrain involvement. In their analysis of 12 Nordic 
organisations, Mantere and Vaara (2008) found that mystification, disciplining and technologisation 
impeded involvement, while self-actualisation, dialogisation and concretisation promoted involvement.  
This suggests that top management needs to create systems where employees can see how they are able 
to participate, it needs to actively seek the opinion of the employee and engage in constructive 
controversy in the form of open-minded discussions of opposing positions (Ekaterini, 2010; Tjosvold, 
1998). To create such a culture, the employee must to feel safe and top management must be curious 
and make an effort to understand the position of the employee (Poon et al., 2001).  
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The effects of a participative leadership style are reported to be increased quality of decisions (Scully, 
Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1995), increased employee motivation (Locke and Latham, 1990), commitment 
(Armenakis, Harris and Mossholder, 1993; Yiing and Ahmad, 2009), satisfaction (Smylie, Lazarus and 
Brownlee-Conyers, 1996) and psychological empowerment (Eby et al., 1999). The effect on 
performance has been reported to be mediated by psychological empowerment (Careless, 2004; Seibert 
et al., 2004; Zhang and Bartol, 2010) suggesting that a participative leadership style and involvement 
alone will not increase performance; this requires that the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation 
of the employee is brought into the equation. 
When analysing the three research streams presented above, it becomes evident that they all have a 
strong theoretical foundation supporting the effect, while the empirical evidence of a performance 
effect seems more chequered. Similarly, they all seem to be mediated by the creation of internalised 
extrinsic motivation in the form of organisational citizenship behaviour, psychological empowerment 
and psychological ownership. This raises the question of whether the performance effect is caused by 
the creation of psychological ownership and whether ESO, involvement of middle managers in the 
strategy process and a participative leadership style are determinants of the creation of this internalised 
extrinsic motivation. In addition, there seems to be a close interrelation between the three concepts in 
the sense that they influence, moderate and enhance each other; this suggests that scrutiny into the 
combined effects is highly warranted. In the following section, the independent research stream of 
psychological ownership, its determinants and effects will be reviewed followed by development of a 
new behavioural model combining the research streams.   
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP 
The concept of psychological ownership has been investigated within the contexts of consumer 
behaviour (Belk, 1988), child development (Isaacs, 1933; Kline and France, 1899), philosophy 
(Heidegger, 1927; Sartre, 1943) and organisations (Dirks, Cummings and Pierce, 1996; Pierce, Kostova 
and Dirks, 2001; Pierce, Jussila and Cummings, 2009; Pratt and Dutton, 2000; Van Dyne and Pierce, 
2004; Wagner, Parker and Christiansen, 2003). Pierce et al. (2003, p. 86) define it as “the state in which 
individuals feel as though the target of ownership or a piece of that target is “theirs””. When middle 
managers experience psychological ownership, they will act as if the organisation were theirs and 
therefore act in the best interest of the company. Psychological ownership in organisations is thus 
linked to increased organisational commitment (O’Driscoll et al., 2006; Pendleton, 1998; VandeWalle 
et al., 1995), stewardship (Dirks et al., 1996; Pierce et al., 2003) and enhanced company performance 
(O’Driscoll et al., 2006; Pierce and Rodgers, 2004). The theoretical foundation of psychological 
ownership is rooted in five human motives that drive people to become psychologically attached to an 
organisation, an idea or a number of other objects. The five motives are: a) efficacy and effectance, b) 
self-identity, c) having a place, d) territoriality and e) accountability (Avey et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 
2003).   
Efficacy and effectance address the human need to feel in control and capable of fulfilling a specific 
task (Bandura, 1977). Since ownership is the ultimate control of an object, humans are drawn towards a 
feeling of ownership; the more important it is to be able to control the object or to complete the task, 
the greater is the desire to gain ownership. Since the capability to successfully complete job related 
tasks is important to many people, the drive towards gaining psychological ownership of a work place 
or an organisation is expected to be high. Self-identity is created through the interaction with others and 
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viewing oneself from the perspective of others (Dittmar, 1992; Mead, 1934) and is partly created by the 
objects which we own or control and the meaning and importance ascribed to them by society 
(McCracken, 1986; Mead, 1934; Pierce et al., 2003). By controlling objects generally accepted as 
important, people create a self-identity based on control and power driving middle managers towards a 
sense of psychological ownership of the company. Having a place or belongingness is based on the 
need for feeling safe and having a territorial core or reference point around which people structure their 
daily lives (Porteus, 1976; Weil, 1949, 1952). Kron (1983) referred to having a place as having a home, 
a place of refuge and one’s roots, stating that humans need to create feelings of ownership towards an 
object to feel safe and achieve a sense of belongingness. Territoriality combines the need for control 
with belongingness and addresses the human need for not only having a sense of ownership, but for 
having the feeling that ownership is accepted by other humans. By “communicating ownership to 
potential threats and the social unit as a whole” (Avey et al., 2009) employees experience acceptance 
by the surrounding society in terms of the feeling of ownership to the object. Accountability is “the 
implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings and actions to 
others” (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999, p. 255). Accountability is based on the human need for respect and 
being considered important and valued. By feeling ownership towards an object, people gain control 
and therefore need to be included in decisions regarding the object, increasing the level of 
accountability.  
The creation of psychological ownership is supported by organisational settings, worker and job 
characteristics and their influence on the employee’s personal experience of the job. Pierce et al. (1991) 
found that equity possession, information sharing and influence supported the creation of psychological 
ownership. These findings suggest that both formal ownership like ESO and involvement are 
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determinants of psychological ownership. As stated above, ESO needs to be combined with 
involvement and the possibility to exercise formal ownership rights in order to create a sense of 
ownership, indicating that the combined effect is higher than the sum of its parts. A number of analyses 
also indicate that the company cannot achieve the motivation and participation effect without financial 
participation, as referred to in Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein (2003, p. 176): “telling employees to take 
ownership of their jobs rings hollow if management doesn’t offer actual financial ownership or some 
share in the improved performance… without wealth sharing in some form, it feels like the company is 
just trying to con you into working harder”. These findings suggest that involvement in itself or ESO in 
itself is not enough to create psychological ownership but needs to be combined somehow. 
Worker characteristics are also found to mediate the creation of psychological ownership. Kuvaas 
(2006) reported that highly educated workers more easily developed psychological ownership due to 
interesting work and organisations that appreciate their work effort. It was also reported that highly 
educated workers with high base salaries were more motivated by involvement and intrinsic incentives 
than by bonuses and other extrinsic motivation systems. Similarly, Gagné and Deci (2005) reported that 
intrinsic motivation created through autonomy, trust and involvement had a higher impact on 
commitment and job efforts than extrinsic motivation. Pierce et al. (2001, 2003) found that the personal 
sense of control of the target, intimately knowing the target and investing oneself in the target all were 
pathways to the creation of psychological ownership. This means that formal ownership, distributing 
authority, trust and a participative leadership style all are pathways to psychological ownership. Pierce 
et al. (2009) found that job characteristics like skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy 
and feedback supported the perception of control and willingness to dedicate oneself to the task, 
thereby facilitating the creation of psychological ownership.  
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Pierce et al. (2009) similarly found that the need for and effect of psychological ownership among 
middle managers were higher in knowledge intensive sectors owing to the fact that the characteristics 
of the “product” in these sectors are based on highly specialised knowledge or because the “product” is 
specialised knowledge. Knowledge intensive workers also maintain a certain control over (ownership 
to) key resources in the company indicating a need for delegation and involvement and a possibility of 
exercising control and influence by the workers (Grant, 1996).  
While most of the literature on the effect of psychological ownership has focused on the possible 
positive effects, Brown et al. (2005) stress that territorial behaviour caused by psychological ownership 
can be both functional and dysfunctional. The dysfunctional territorial behaviour materialises when 
employees engage in defensive actions to defend or regain control of the organisation. Dysfunctional 
defensive territoriality can sabotage strategy implementation or prevent development and innovations if 
they challenge existing power structures. The positive effects of psychological ownership mainly 
address the effect on employee behaviour while only a few analyses test the effect on company 
performance.  
O’Driscoll et al. (2006) tested the mediating effect of psychological ownership on 239 New Zealand 
workers reporting that less structured work environments mediated by psychological ownership 
increased employee citizenship behaviour and organisational behaviour. Thus, they deduced that the 
work environments need to allow employees to take initiatives to support the effect of psychological 
ownership. Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) tested 800 workers from three different companies and found 
that the creation of psychological ownership improved employee attitudes like organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction and organisation-based self-esteem, organisational citizenship behaviour 
and company performance. Conceptual research by Pierce et al. (2001, 2003) suggests that 
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stewardship, personal sacrifice and risk, promotion of organisational change and caring and protective 
behaviour towards the organisation all are enhanced by the creation of psychological ownership. While 
the behavioural effects of psychological ownership are addressed in a number of studies mentioned 
above, only a few studies have tested the direct effect on company performance. Van Dyne and Pierce 
(2004) tested the effect of psychological ownership on employee performance in three field samples 
from the USA. A positive correlation was reported between psychological ownership and employee 
performance, but no significance was found in the model when accounting for demographic controls. 
The review of the literature on middle management involvement in strategy processes, employee stock 
ownership, participative leadership style and psychological ownership has revealed a number of 
overlaps and similar theories that can complement and enrich our understanding of all four areas. 
Below, we develop our model which combines the areas and discuss the implications of the model. 
    
A BEHAVIOURAL MODEL OF INVOLVEMENT, LEADERSHIP STYLE AND FORMAL 
OWNERSHIP 
In this section, we formulate our model and provide theoretical and empirical evidence to support its 
propositions. The model is based on the review of the literature on employee stock ownership, 
involvement of middle managers in strategy and the participative leadership style. The review reveals 
that despite a strong theoretical foundation in all three streams supporting the importance and effect on 
company performance, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. The review also demonstrates that all 
concepts are mediated by the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation i.e. in the form of 
psychological ownership. This raises the question of whether the positive performance effect is a result 
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of the introduction of ESO, the involvement of middle managers in strategy or the adoption of a 
participative leadership style, or whether it is caused by psychological ownership whose determinants 
count, among others, the former concepts. The review also found that all three concepts are interrelated 
and that the effects of one concept are moderated by the other two. This suggests that future research 
should include all three areas and not be limited to one or two due to expected interaction and 
moderating effects. The review on psychological ownership finds that this partly independent research 
stream has argued that ESO, involvement and leadership style are important but not the only 
determinants of the concept. The creation of psychological ownership has been found to be moderated 
by worker and job characteristics while the effect on company performance is enhanced by knowledge 
intensity and environmental dynamism; indeed, this enriches our knowledge of the effects of the three 
determinants and becomes the lodestar for future research in all three areas.      
While some of the arguments and evidence used apply to involvement of all employees or employee 
stock ownership plans covering all employees, the focus of the model is restricted to middle managers; 
that is, the involvement of middle managers in strategy processes, middle management participation in 
ESOPs and top management’s participative leadership style addressing middle managers. Similar types 
of relationships may exist at lower hierarchical levels in the organisation and the authors call for further 
research extending the model to cover the behavioural effects of involvement and formal ownership on 
all employees. 
 In the foll
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incentive system should support internalised extrinsic motivation due to difficulties measuring the 
effect of strategic initiatives and the long-term perspective of the initiatives. Such an incentive can be 
achieved by allowing middle managers to gain formal ownership of the company through an ESOP if 
introduced in a way that allows middle managers to exercise formal ownership rights (Pierce et al., 
1991). Research has shown that middle and top management are more willing to participate in an 
ESOP than employees at lower levels because of their investment experience and more diversified 
portfolios (Markowitz, Blasi and Kruse, 2010; Pendleton, 2010b). Blasi et al. (2003) also found that 
middle managers might regard top management’s attempt to involve middle managers in the strategy 
process in an effort to infuse them with a feeling of ownership to and responsibility for the entire 
organisation as half-hearted if it at the same time denies them access to a part of the profit. It can 
therefore be seen that companies involving middle managers and middle managers being involved alike 
will be motivated to introduce ESO. Companies wanting to involve middle managers may also have a 
higher prevalence of ESOPs including middle managers due to a more democratic view on 
management and ownership and an ambition to distribute the wealth more equally. They may pursue an 
objective of agency cost reduction by creating both an economic incentive to act in the best interest of 
the company and enhance internalisation of extrinsic motivation by signalling that “this is our 
company” supporting relatedness and a sense of ownership. Middle managers being involved in 
strategy processes can similarly be expected to demand a part of the profit to compensate for an 
expected extra workload due to participation (Conway and Monks, 2010).  
Proposition 1a: Companies involving middle managers in strategy processes more often employ 
employee stock ownership plans covering middle managers. 
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Introduction of an ESOP can be motivated by a desire to distribute wealth more democratically, tax 
reasons or the wish to reduce agency costs and align the interests of the middle managers with the 
interests of the firm (Buchele, Kruse, Rodgers and Scharf, 2009). A number of studies have shown that 
the effect of ESO on company performance is highly dependent on the company’s willingness to allow 
middle managers to participate in strategic decisions (Kruse, 2002; Quarrey and Rosen, 1993) 
suggesting that companies employing ESO are more willing to allow middle managers to participate in 
strategic decision-making. Middle managers owning a part of the company will also expect to be able 
to exercise the formal ownership rights: possession of shares, access to information about the company 
and influence on decisions (Pierce et al. 2001). 
Proposition 1b: Companies with employee stock ownership plans covering middle managers more 
often involve middle managers in strategic decisions-making.  
 
Employee stock ownership and leadership style 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that management’s reason for introducing ESO highly affects the 
performance implications of the plan. If the reason was to benefit from tax advantages or if the 
introduction was based on the assumption that ESO in itself would increase company performance by 
eliminating agency costs or increase commitment, the ESOP had no effect on commitment or company 
performance. The introduction needed to be prompted by a wish to involve middle managers in the 
decision-making process, thereby conducting a leadership style that encourage, appreciate and expect 
middle management involvement. Klein (1987) found that a participative leadership style combined 
with the introduction of an ESOP was significantly connected with the creation of increased employee 
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satisfaction, commitment and financial turnover. If the ESOP is introduced based on a wish to have a 
more equal distribution of wealth, it could be triggered by a democratic culture in the company. This 
would imply that the leadership style conducted would be democratic, suggesting a participative 
leadership style. 
Proposition 2a: Companies with employee stock ownership plans covering middle managers more 
often exercise a participative leadership style. 
When a participative leadership style leads to empowerment of middle managers, decision authority is 
distributed to the lowest possible level in the organisation capable of making a competent decision, 
usually the middle management level (Seibert et al., 2004). This requires that middle managers are 
motivated and aligned to act in the best interest of the company. This motivation and alignment can be 
accomplished by allowing middle managers to gain formal ownership of the company through an 
ESOP. This would satisfy the need for an incentive system that matches the long-term perspective of 
strategic actions, covers the performance of the entire company and signals that middle management 
contribution is valued. Since middle managers are mainly motivated by having the opportunity to 
influence the company and feeling trusted, as referred to in the motivational model (Spreitzer, 1995), 
combining involvement with formal ownership can be expected to facilitate the creation of 
psychological empowerment. Allowing middle managers to acquire ownership of the company can also 
underpin the sincere wish to involve middle managers and ensure that involvement is not constrained 
by mystification (Mantera and Vaara, 2008). It can therefore be expected that companies employing a 
participative leadership style more often allows middle managers to gain formal ownership of the 
company. 
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Proposition 2b: Companies exercising a participative leadership style more often have employee stock 
ownership plans covering middle managers.     
 
Leadership style and involvement 
The leadership style conducted by top management to support involvement highly affects the level of 
middle management involvement in strategy. Without top management support and willingness to 
involve middle managers, involvement of middle managers will mainly be informal and ad-hoc. 
Research at the individual level of strategy processes reveals that it always takes place in a specific 
social context and therefore is socially structured (Hendry, 2000; Wittington, 1993), suggesting that the 
participative leadership style should be tailored to the specific culture and the employees in the 
company. The possibility to successfully motivate middle managers to involve themselves in the 
strategy process highly depends on tradition, routines and the strategic discourse established by top 
management (Mantere and Vaara, 2008). The leadership style must allow middle managers to 
understand the goals of the organisation and the role which they play in achieving these goals. The 
leadership style should support dialogue allowing middle managers to advocate different views and an 
accepting environment for differences of opinions, theoretically in an atmosphere of equality, but as a 
minimum devoid of restraints and fear of penalties. The top management should establish clear 
processes and practices that ensure “meaningful social and organizational actions” (Mantere and 
Vaara, 2008) without setting up routines that constrain involvement. Mantera and Vaara (2008) found 
that if middle managers did not communicate clearly how and why middle managers should participate, 
participation would be impeded. This included clear rules on which decisions could be influenced, 
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when decision authority was distributed and at what point in the process middle managers were to be 
included. However, structures could also restrain involvement if they were unclear, bureaucratic or 
perceived as pseudo procedures devoid of any real influence; in the terminology of Mantera and Vaara 
(2008) referred to as disciplining. If top management is able to conduct a participative leadership style 
that allows and supports middle management involvement in strategic decision-making and creates a 
culture where middle managers perceive that their contribution is valued, cared for and expected, the 
company will experience increased involvement of middle managers. 
Proposition 3a: Companies with a top management exercising a participative leadership style have a 
higher level of middle management involvement in strategic decision-making.      
The fact that top management’s willingness to involve middle managers in strategy processes affects 
the level of involvement may seem clear, but involvement of middle managers can also be seen to 
affect the leadership style conducted. If companies want to involve middle manager in strategic 
decisions, they might encounter middle managers who do not want to get involved, who pursue own 
goals based on involvement or who are less committed than expected. This can prompt an evaluation of 
procedures, incentive systems, communication or organisational structures with a view to developing a 
more participative leadership style adapted to the specific context in the company. Thus, involvement 
of middle managers in strategy processes can be seen to transform the leadership style conducted into a 
participative leadership style more suitable for the context. 
Proposition 3b: Companies involving middle managers in strategy processes more often exercise a 
participative leadership style.     
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Creation of psychological ownership 
The creation of psychological ownership is based on the human need for efficacy and effectance, self-
identity, belongingness, territoriality, accountability and a personal experience of control, intimately 
knowing the target and investing oneself in the target (Pierce et al., 2001, 2003). While involvement, 
formal ownership and a leadership style that supports involvement and is based on trust and feedback 
all can be seen as determinants of psychological ownership, none of them are able to create it alone. As 
discussed above, each concept enhances and is dependent on the two others suggesting that all three 
need to be employed contemporaneously to create psychological ownership. It can also be seen that 
none of the three concepts can positively affect company performance by itself. Mantere and Vaara 
(2008) found that middle management involvement was only successfully implemented if middle 
managers understood the goals of the company and their role in achieving these goals. This self-
actualisation called for profound personal reflection concerning one’s role, identity and future in the 
organisation. This suggests that involvement of middle managers in strategy processes affects company 
performance through the creation of psychological ownership. Klein (1987) found similar relations of 
ESO stating that introducing ESO in itself had no performance effect; only through the creation of 
psychological ownership. Additionally, a participative leadership style that fails to involve middle 
managers or even constrains involvement can hardly be expected to positively affect company 
performance. The model presented in this article thus combines research in middle management 
involvement, ESO and psychological ownership by proposing that middle management involvement in 
strategy, ESO and a participative leadership style have no direct effect on company performance but 
have an impact through the creation of psychological ownership. Psychological ownership has been 
related to increased performance but more strongly to employee behaviour and attitudes. Further 
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research into the indirect effect of psychological ownership on company performance through 
improved employee behaviour and attitudes is highly warranted.   
Proposition 4a: Employee stock ownership, middle management involvement in strategy processes and 
a participative leadership style combined create a higher level of psychological ownership among 
middle managers than employing the three areas separately. 
Proposition 4b: The effect of employee stock ownership, middle management involvement in strategy 
processes and a participative leadership style on company performance is mediated by psychological 
ownership.                 
      
Moderating effects on the creation of psychological ownership 
The possibility to create psychological ownership depends on a number of worker and job 
characteristics enhancing or constraining the creation. As reported by Kuvaas (2006), highly educated 
employees develop psychological ownership more easily indicating that companies in knowledge 
intensive sectors are more likely to benefit from middle management involvement and employment of 
ESOPs. It can be argued that knowledge intensive sectors are more inclined to encourage middle 
management involvement and accustomed to competing in a more turbulent environment which 
necessitates innovations and strategic responsiveness. Knowledge intensive companies that succeed in 
creating psychological ownership through a successful combination of involvement, ESO and a 
participative leadership style are able to gain vital competitive advantages. As suggested by Pierce et 
al. (2009), job characteristics like skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback 
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all mediate the creation of psychological ownership. These job characteristics can be regarded as parts 
of organisational settings caused by the leadership style or seen as sector or company characteristics 
that mediate the creation. 
Proposition 5a: The creation of psychological ownership among middle managers is moderated by the 
educational level of middle managers. 
Proposition 5b: The creation of psychological ownership among middle managers is moderated by the 
job characteristics of middle managers. 
The importance of participation and autonomy should increase as environmental dynamism increases 
the need for strategic responsiveness (Andersen, 2004). In dynamic environments, the ability to adapt 
to changing conditions and respond to changed marked demands becomes crucial. By successfully 
implementing middle management involvement, top management will more rapidly receive 
information and ideas from frontline managers and will be able to implement responses by having 
middle managers facilitate the change (Wooldridge et al., 2008). By engaging in autonomous strategic 
actions, the responsiveness increases even further due to the distributed decision authority allowing 
middle managers to act without former approval by top management.  
Additionally, the effect of psychological ownership on company performance tends to be enhanced in 
sectors with high knowledge intensity. In these sectors, the “product” will be based on or consist of 
knowledge, often within the employee, and the competitive advantage is highly dependent on the 
employees’ willingness to develop, apply, share and distribute this knowledge in the best possible 
manner. This willingness is enhanced by a high level of psychological ownership and thus moderates 
the effect of psychological ownership on company performance.   
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Proposition 5c: The effect of psychological ownership among middle managers on company 
performance is significantly higher in dynamic environments. 
Proposition 5d: The effect of psychological ownership among middle managers on company 
performance is significantly higher in sectors with high knowledge intensity. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The model outlined here offers important theoretical insights by combining the research streams on 
employee stock ownership, involvement of middle managers in strategy and participative leadership 
style. The model synthesises the findings by revealing that the effects of the concepts all are mediated 
by the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation. Ryan and Deci (2000) found in their self-
determination theory that internalisation of extrinsic motivation is based on a need for competence, 
autonomy and relatedness. Based on this framework of motivation and the research on psychological 
ownership, the model contributes to our understanding of how ESO, involvement of middle managers 
in strategy and participative leadership style interact in the creation of psychological ownership. The 
model creates a theoretical frame that explains why all of the three research streams have failed to 
produce conclusive findings when testing the effect on company performance and why all find that the 
effect is mediated by the creation of organisational citizenship behaviour, psychological empowerment 
or psychological ownership; each representing internalised extrinsic motivation prompted by a sense of 
relatedness to the company.  
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The model also enriches our understanding of how different worker and job characteristics moderate 
the creation of psychological ownership. Kuvaas (2006) found that highly educated employees more 
easily develop psychological ownership on account of the fact that they engage in more interesting 
work and that their organisations appreciate their work. This emphasises that the focus on middle 
managers, who in general will be more educated than the average employee, can be expected to 
generate psychological ownership if applied correctly, and thereby create a competitive advantage over 
companies who do not have this focus. The model also implies that job characteristics like skill variety, 
task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback support the creation of psychological 
ownership (Pierce et al., 2009). This gives insights into which type of employee that most easily 
develops psychological ownership and how to develop middle management jobs which feature tasks 
that involve the mentioned characteristics. 
Finally, the model conceptualises that the effect of psychological ownership on company performance 
will be moderated by the knowledge intensity in the sector and the environmental dynamism. This 
implies that the need for and effect of internalised extrinsic motivation are higher in knowledge 
intensive sectors, since the “product” is often based on or consists of knowledge and tied to the middle 
managers’ willingness to develop, apply and share this knowledge. Similarly, highly dynamic 
environments call for a high responsiveness to environmental change based on middle managers either 
reporting changes in market conditions to top management and participate in decisions or on middle 
managers making rapid autonomous strategic decisions. 
The model spawns a number of questions and relationships to be further explored and refined in future 
research. Firstly, the model provides a new framework that combines the research conducted within the 
areas of employee stock ownership, involvement of middle managers in strategy and the participative 
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leadership style with the motivational theory based on self-determination theory and psychological 
ownership. A further investigation of the combined effects of the three concepts and how they create 
internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of psychological ownership seems highly warranted. A 
more sophisticated understanding of how the three areas interrelate and affect each other at the 
individual level would enrich our understanding of the micro level processes and practices of strategy 
and strategising as addressed in the strategy-as-practice literature (Whittington, 2006). This would 
contribute to our understanding of how different people in different contexts are motivated differently 
and react differently to involvement, leadership style and the possibility to own a share of the company.  
The model also gives voice to the need for a further understanding of how different worker and job 
characteristics can moderate the creation of psychological ownership and how this moderation might be 
determined by the mix of the three determinants. The model thereby calls for both a theoretical 
refinement and an empirical testing of different work settings, cultures and different mixes of the three 
concepts. A better understanding of the creation of psychological ownership and how other factors 
might influence, enhance or restrain the creation would further sophisticate the model and develop a 
number of moderating or mediating effects.                     
The model assumes that psychological ownership has a direct effect on company performance despite 
the few and inconsistent findings of such an effect while the effect on employee behaviour and attitudes 
has been tested in a number of analyses. Research needs to be conducted to test if a direct effect exists 
or if the effect is only indirect; that is, mediated by the positive effect on employee behaviour and 
attitudes. If only an indirect effect exists, more research should be instituted into the importance of the 
different behaviour and attitudes in terms of company performance and the previously reported positive 
effects of middle management involvement, ESO and a participative leadership style. 
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The model only addresses involvement and formal ownership of middle managers and their creation of 
psychological ownership. Further research is called upon to extend the model to address involvement 
of all employees and investigate if the creation of psychological ownership is supported by 
involvement, formal ownership and leadership style at lower organisational levels as well. 
CONCLUSION 
In response to strategy scholars’ (e.g. Wooldridge et al., 2008) request for more research on the effect 
of middle management involvement on company performance, we present a model that combines the 
research streams on middle management involvement in strategy processes, employee stock ownership 
and psychological ownership. We propose that middle management involvement, formal ownership 
and a participative leadership style combined support the creation of psychological ownership and only 
through this creation affect company performance. The model thereby contributes to our understanding 
of the effect of the three concepts by creating a framework which combines the research streams with 
the motivational theory imbedded in the self-determination theory and the theory on psychological 
ownership. This enables us to present theoretical insights that offer an explanation to the inconclusive 
findings of earlier research and to direct future research toward a combined and motivational approach 
to the three areas.    
Hence, the model carries a need for further research into the creation of psychological ownership and 
into how the three determinants can be supported by other factors, thereby fine-tuning our capability to 
measure and define the concept. Psychological ownership has been found to promote positive 
employee behaviour and attitudes and further inquiry into the direct and indirect effects of 
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psychological ownership through this positive change in behaviour and attitudes seems highly 
warranted.  
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3. The prevalence and antecedents of Employee Stock 
Ownership in Denmark4 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of employee stock ownership has increased dramatically since the 1980s in the USA and the 
1990s in the EU. Sharing ownership often takes the form of an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) 
initiated by the company. The growth in companies employing ESO is driven both by government 
incentives or legislation and by a company wish to align the interest of the employee with the interest 
of the firm, improving commitment, employee performance and reducing opposition to company 
reforms (McCarthy, Reeves and Turner, 2009). Government initiatives support an increased use of 
ESO through tax incentives, privatisation programmes or through legislation forcing companies to 
share ownership with employees. These initiatives are spurred by a desire to share wealth, increase 
equality and support democracy at the workplace and in society in general (Buchele, Kruse, Rodgers 
and Scharf, 2009; McCarthy et al., 2009). Companies might introduce ESO as a means to reduce 
agency costs by reducing slack or sub-optimisation in the economic literature, or by improving 
employee attitudes and thereby increasing company performance in the organisational literature (Jones, 
Kalmi and Mäkinen, 2010; Kramer, 2010).  
Whereas the effects of introducing ESO have been analysed empirically for a number of different 
geographical locations and types of ESO (Blasi et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2010; Kalmi, Pendleton and 
                                                            
4 The chapter corresponds to a single-authored article submitted to Economic and Industrial Democracy, which was returned 
with instructions to revise and resubmit and which is currently under revision. An earlier draft of the article was presented at 
the 2010 EURAM conference in Rome and the author would like to thank the participants at the conference for helpful 
comments. The author would also like to thank Professor Torben Juul Andersen and PhD fellow Stefan Linder for helpful 
comments in the development of the article.   
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Poutsma, 2005), analyses of the prevalence and antecedents of different kinds of ESO companies are 
either limited to the USA, restricted to stock listed companies, failing to distinguish between different 
kinds of ESO or are based on data collected before the dramatic changes of the last decade.      
The prevalence of ESO in the USA has been analysed in a number of studies (Blasi et al., 2003; 
Buchele et al., 2009; Kruse et al., 2008) and continues to be so by the National Center for Employee 
Ownership (NCEO). Among the few studies looking at ESO use outside a US context are the PEPPER 
I, II and III studies conducted by the European Commission and the investigation by Pendelton et al. 
(2001) based on the CRANET data. Since 2007, the European Federation of Employee Share 
Ownership (EFES) has conducted an annual survey of employee stock ownership mainly based on 
stock listed companies with a market value exceeding 200 million euro. The different surveys report 
significantly different antecedents and shares of prevalence, mainly due to varying definitions of what 
constitutes an ESO employing company and/or because the investigators have chosen to focus on 
company types who traditionally have high ESO prevalence. Some studies define an ESO employing 
company as a company with more than one employee receiving payments from an ESOP (Sengupta et 
al., 2007), other studies distinguish between narrow and broad-based schemes with a cut-off point 
stating that 50% employees must be covered by the scheme (Pendleton et al., 2001, Robinson and 
Zhang, 2005). A number of studies address the characteristics of wholly employee-owned companies 
(Kramer, 2010; Pendleton, 2010a; Sauser, 2009) or the characteristics of the employees participating in 
the schemes (Pendleton, 2010b). 
The above-mentioned diversity in definitions, scopes and methods underlines that an analysis of the 
present prevalence of ESO employing companies among all companies and the antecedents of 
companies employing different kinds of ESO is highly warranted. While the use of ESO is supported 
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by strong tax incentives in USA, legislation in France and affected by a privatisation plan in the new 
EU member states, the government influence in Denmark may be considered neutral. This allows us to 
analyse how the prevalence is affected by the financial crisis in a setting where only market trends and 
company and employee wishes to introduce and participate in an ESOP influence the prevalence. It 
also provides for a better understanding of the antecedents of companies employing different kinds of 
ESOPs based on the assumption that only companies which expect to benefit from the plan or have 
other characteristics supporting an ESOP will ultimately introduce the plan.   
The current paper will contribute to our knowledge of the prevalence and antecedents of ESO by 
conducting a large-scale cross-sectional survey among the 500 largest companies in Denmark. In doing 
so, the survey covers all companies with more than 235 employees and thus both medium-sized and 
large companies from a number of different sectors. The analysis will investigate the antecedents and 
prevalence of companies with ESO schemes covering only top management, schemes covering both 
top and middle management and broad-based schemes covering a majority of all employees. The paper 
finds that the prevalence of ESO companies in Denmark has increased since 2000 to a total of 31% of 
all companies with more than 235 employees employing some form of ESOP. But while the narrow-
based schemes covering less than 50% of the employees have increased, the use of broad based 
schemes has declined. This suggests that the financial crisis and the concomitant significant capital 
losses at the financial markets have increased the risk averseness among employees without 
management responsibilities. The findings also reveal that companies employing different kinds of 
ESO schemes have different antecedents. While stock listing is an antecedent of all types due to the 
reduced costs of introducing an ESOP as a stock listed company, companies with schemes covering 
only top management have a strong focus on centralised planning and are more prone to use individual 
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bonuses. This suggests that these companies have a traditional view on management and strategic 
processes as hierarchical, top-down processes initiated by and lead by top management. It was expected 
that companies employing schemes covering middle management would have a proclivity to involve 
middle management in strategy processes due to a recognition of the importance of middle 
management involvement as addressed in the middle management literature (Wooldridge et al., 2008). 
However, this was not the case suggesting that formal ownership among middle managers is no 
guarantee of a higher level of middle management involvement. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, 
companies with broad-based schemes have a higher use of group bonuses. While some scholars would 
recommend supplementing broad-based ESOPs with more individual bonuses, the current survey 
reveals that companies are not inclined to do so. ESO has been argued to reduce agency costs by 
aligning the interest of the employee with the interest of the firm and companies employing a broad-
based scheme are therefore more willing to distribute strategic decision authority to middle managers 
and presumably also to employees at lower organisational levels.   
The paper is structured as follows: First, it summarises and reviews the existing literature on ESO 
usage and ESO antecedents. This basis allows for identifying the factors that can be hypothesised to 
impact ESO adoption among firms. Afterwards, it describes the method used for collecting and 
analysing the empirical data. Next, the paper presents the results achieved. Finally, it closes with a 
discussion of the results and conclusions for further research. 
 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
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The introduction of ESO in companies, especially broad-based schemes, has been supported by a 
number of government initiatives to increase equality by sharing wealth, consolidate a democratic 
company leadership style or based on a political desire to move towards employee-owned companies 
(Buchele et al., 2009). In a number of countries, ESO employing companies have enjoyed the support 
of tax incentives like the 401k plan in the USA, while France, among other countries, forces companies 
to share ownership with the employees through legislation. ESO has also been promoted in a number of 
the former Eastern European countries through post-1989 privatisation plans, selling a large number of 
public owned companies to the employees. In other countries like Denmark, the government is more 
neutral in the matter of ESO. Companies receive no tax benefits from introducing ESO, employees 
have the possibility of purchasing shares at a discount price, but have to keep them for at least 5-7 years 
before capital gains are tax free. Any dividends paid to the employee or if the shares are sold before the 
5-7 year holding period are taxed as normal capital gain tax. In some countries, unions also advocate 
ESO as a means to gain company influence, while some argue that ESO is introduced by the companies 
to avoid union influence by aligning worker and owner interests. In Denmark, unions have showed no 
particular interest in ESO; they have signified that in general they are not against ESO while stressing 
that it cannot replace traditional salaries. Companies might want to introduce ESO as a measure to 
reduce agency costs by aligning the interest of the employee with the interest of the company, or as a 
part of a democratic leadership style and culture creating a sense of ownership among employees 
which, in return, increases commitment, loyalty and citizenship behaviour (McCarthy et al., 2010; 
Pierce et al., 2001). 
Definitions of Employee Stock Ownership (ESO) and Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) are 
used in a variety of ways throughout the literature. Distinctions are made between who initiates the 
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scheme, the employee or the company, and whether the scheme is individual or collective. Some 
scholars also make a distinction between schemes covering a certain share of employees and schemes 
covering different organisational levels. Finally, some studies define ESOPs based on the share of the 
company owned by the employees and on the inclusion or exclusion of different kinds of profit-sharing 
plans, stock options or warrants.   
In listed companies, employees are free to buy stocks in the company and exercise their normal 
ownership rights, while in unlisted companies, trading of company shares can be limited and restricted 
by stockowner agreements limiting the circulation of stocks. Since individual stock purchase in listed 
companies is random and usually not registered by the companies and stock ownership in unlisted 
companies is always initiated by the company or a limited group of owners, research is usually 
conducted on ESO initiated by the company either freely or restricted by government laws and set up 
with the explicit intension of providing employees with an additional source of income related to 
enterprise results (Pendleton et al., 2001). ESO can be individual, where the shares are owned by the 
individual employee, or collective, where an employee benefit trust is set up to hold the company 
stocks and exercise the ownership rights through a trustee (Poutsma et al., 1999).  
The share of employees covered by the scheme can either define the level of coverage by the 
percentage of employees covered by the scheme or the groups of employees covered by the scheme. 
Sengupta et al. (2007) use both a broad definition of ESO including all companies with more than one 
employee receiving payments from an ESOP and a more rigorous measure, initially used by Robinson 
and Zhang (2005), requiring a majority (60% to 100%) of the non-managerial employees participating 
in the scheme. Pendleton et al. (2001) define two kinds of ESO; a narrow-based and a broad-based type 
of which the latter theoretically covers the entire workforce. Pendleton et al., (2001) however, set the 
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coverage percentage at 50% since most schemes never have 100% coverage at any given time because 
participation in the scheme requires a minimum employment period. The purpose of narrow-based 
schemes is to attract and keep key employees in the company and  they are therefore defined as 
schemes covering less than 50% of the employees. Kabst et al. (2006) make a distinction between 
different employee groups covered by the scheme, namely management, white-collar and blue-collar 
employees. 
Hammer and Stern (1980) differentiate between the number of shares owned by the employees and 
they also distinguish between ESOPs based on different employee groups testing the effect on 
perception of ownership.  
Depending on the purpose of the ESOP, it can be argued that similar or enhanced effects could be 
reached by different kinds of incentives like profit sharing, stock options, stock based pays or warrants 
and some scholars have investigated inclusive ESO definitions and different or combined effects of 
different schemes (Pendleton et al., 2001; Kabst et al., 2006; Robinson and Wilson, 2006).  
 
Prevalence of ESO 
The prevalence of ESO has been analysed several times during the last two decades using a number of 
different definitions of ESO. The analyses have been restricted to specific countries and specific sectors 
and some restrict the survey to large companies or listed companies. The prevalence in the USA has 
been tested in a large number of different surveys; Kruse et al. (2008) list 15 different analyses 
conducted since 1993 both on employee and firm level. Freeman and Rogers (1999) report that 24% of 
US employees participated in an ESOP in 1994/95 while Kruse (1998), using NLSY (National 
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Longitudinal Survey of Youth) data, finds that in 1993, 21% of US employees owned company stock. 
Kruse et al. (2008), using the GSS surveys from 2002 and 2006, find that 21% and 18% of US 
employees owned company stock in 2002 and 2006 respectively, while Buchele et al. (2009) using the 
same data find that 29% of full-time employees with more than one year of employment owned 
company shares through an ESOP .  
In the European Union, the PEPPER II study, looking at the situation in the “old” EU member states in 
1995/96, reported rather low usage rates in the EU: The UK was at the top with 11% of its companies 
using ESO and at the bottom were France (1%), Sweden (1%), Italy (2%), Portugal (2%), Germany 
(3%), Ireland (3%), The Netherlands (3%) and Denmark (5%) (Blasi et al., 2003). It should be noted, 
however, that the ESO definition in PEPPER II was restricted to schemes open to all employees similar 
to the definition of broad-based schemes. Higher values were obtained by a later study conducted in 
1999/2000 on the use of share ownership schemes in companies across 30 countries including 14 EU 
member states (Pendelton et al., 2001). This study states that the use of ESO in the 14 member states 
has increased to 31%; with wide variation among the individual member states, however. The UK was 
still at the top with 45% (of companies with more than 100 employees) and Portugal (5%), Austria 
(9%), Italy (15%), Spain (19%), Germany (20%) and Denmark (21%) were at the bottom. The numbers 
are not directly comparable with the PEPPER II figures, though, as the 1999/2000 survey included both 
narrow-based and broad-based schemes. The PEPPER III report analysed the use of ESO in the new 
member states in the eastern and central part of Europe and found that while a majority of companies 
became employee-owned after 1989, the percentage has dropped to an average of 38% across the 
countries examined (PEPPER III, 2006). This still exceeds the percentages of the “old” member states 
reported in the 1996 PEPPER II report and in the 1999/2000 analysis based on the CRANET data. In 
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studies comparable to the US studies, Del Boca et al. (1999) and Jones and Kato (1995) reported that 
between 15% and 33% of employees in France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan were covered by 
employee stock ownership schemes. On a more recent note, the European Federation of Employee 
Share Ownership (EFES) has since 2007 prepared a yearly report on the development of ESO in EU 
mainly restricted to listed companies. EFES reports that 86% of all listed companies in EU has some 
kind of ESOP and that the percentage is growing (Mathieu, 2009). In China, Tseo (1996) and in Russia, 
Blasi et al. (1997) reported a low yet growing level of ESO. 
The prevalence of (broad-based) ESOPs can be found to have a cyclical pattern which is partly 
determined by the environment of the financial markets. In the USA, ESOPs experienced a rapid 
growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s, whereas Kruse (2008) reports a decline in the use of broad-
based ESO schemes from 2002 to 2006, i.e. after the dot-com bubble burst in 2000. A similar effect 
was seen after the stock market crash of 1929 (D’Art and Turner, 2006). In the EU, an ESOP increase 
has been reported in most countries between 1991 and 2000 (Pendleton et al. 2001) and among listed 
companies from 2007 and 2009 (Mathieu, 2009), while D’Art and Turner (2006) found a decline in 
Ireland from 2000 and onwards based on a broad sample of companies indicating the same cyclical 
pattern affected by the financial crisis and the increased risk awareness among employees.  
 
Characteristics of ESO companies 
The findings on the characteristics of ESO companies are diversified in significance, methodology and 
definitions. Among the aspects reported are the importance of size (Pendleton, 1997; Wächter and 
Koch, 1993, Weyer, 1978; Poutsma et al., 2006), listing (Pendleton et al., 2001), sector (Poutsma and 
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Huijgen, 1999; Festing et al., 1999; Gaugler et al., 1983), union density (Cheadle, 1989; Festing et al., 
1999; Kabst et al., 2006; Heywood et al., 1997), workforce specialisation and skills (Pendleton, 1997; 
Kabst et al., 2006), age (Pendleton et al., 2001; Poole and Jenkings, 1990), participative organisations 
(Wächter and Koch, 1993; Becker, 1993; Mez, 1991; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987) and geographical 
market (Festing et al., 1999).  
Firm size: Poutsma et al. (2006) tested the use of a number of incentives in listed companies in Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and found an increased use of broad-based ESO 
schemes in large companies. Pendleton et al. (2001) also reported an increase in the use of broad-based 
schemes in the “old” EU member states but with large differences from country to country; in some 
countries, no or even a negative size effect was found. The former (no size effect) was found in the use 
of narrow-based schemes. Kruse et al. (2008) used the GSS 2002 and 2006 surveys to analyse US firms 
and found that while only 9% of small companies used ESO, 37% of large companies (more than 1,000 
employees) had an ESO scheme. The theoretical argument of the positive size effect can be found in 
the agency theory which argues that as firm size increases, information asymmetries about work 
processes and monitoring costs may increase as well which in return may encourage management to 
organise work and production most efficiently by introducing ESO. The conflict of interest between the 
two parties and the asymmetric distribution of information allow for pre- and post-contractual agency 
problems; hidden characteristics leading to adverse selection ex ante and hidden actions by the agent 
resulting in moral hazard ex post (Holmstrom, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989). Some authors have suggested 
that collective incentive programmes like profit sharing or employee ownership may reduce the agency 
costs by aligning employee interests with those of the firm (Baiman, 1990; Lambert, 2001). Equally, 
the larger the company, the higher is the risk of a “free rider” effect, suggesting that the individual 
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incentive effect of ESO is reduced in large organisations while, on the other hand, monitoring by 
colleagues will increase in order to reduce the free rider risk. 
Stock listing: A number of studies have found a positive connection between stock listing and ESO 
(Pendleton et al., 2001; Kabst et al., 2006). The costs of introducing and maintaining an ESO 
programme are much smaller in a listed company since the trading and the valuation of the stock can be 
executed in an efficient market and the company is able to buy the necessary stocks needed for the 
scheme. In unlisted companies, the company must create the market place itself, set the rules for 
trading, valuate the stocks and create the necessary funds to handle the trading. Especially in a 
financially turbulent period, it can be difficult to set a fair and continued market price and avoid insider 
stock trading. 
Workforce unionisation: Kabst et al. (2006) reported a positive connection between union density and 
ESOPs in companies in terms of both white-collar and blue-collar employees. The opposite finding was 
reported by Festing et al. (1999) who found a significant negative effect of union density among the 
examined companies in Germany, France, Great Britain and Sweden. The theoretical union density 
factor argumentation is twofold: One is based on the argument that ESO schemes are introduced by the 
company to avoid influence of the union and reduce the worker/employer conflict (Ackers et al., 1992; 
Gates, 1998), while the second argument propounds that strongly unionised companies are more likely 
to adopt ESO plans for the purpose of increasing union and worker influence on the company and 
partly distributing the surplus of the company to its workers (Cheadle, 1989; Festing et al., 1999; Kabst 
et al., 2006; Heywood et al., 1997; Kruse, 1996). 
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Sector: The sector and the level of workforce skills and specialisation are highly correlated. Poole 
(1989) found that broad-based ESO schemes were more common in the financial sector than in the 
service and retail sector. Pendleton et al. (2001) argued that financial participation would be more 
widespread in the financial sector due to the wider knowledge of the characteristics of the schemes and 
more generally in sectors with a high concentration of non-manual employees who may be more 
familiar with the use and concept of stock savings. In sectors and work situations where individual 
output and performance are difficult to measure because of the complexity and interdependency of 
work tasks (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Ben-Ner et al., 2000), the use of ESO could prove more 
prevalent. This has been observed in advanced manufacturing companies and in some service and 
creative companies (Fama, 1991, Pérotin and Fakhfakh, 1993).    
Firm age: The use of ESO has been argued to be higher in young and growing companies where it is 
instrumental in supporting the need for commitment and growth in the company (Poole and Jenkings, 
1990). Young companies also use ESO to reduce labour costs or as a tool for attracting key employees 
who would normally demand a high salary but who may be persuaded by a combination of a (low) 
salary and part ownership. While Poole and Jenkings (1990) reported a negative age effect, Pendleton 
et al. (2001) found no age effect but pointed out that due to the company size restriction in the survey, 
young and small companies (like IT companies who often use ESO) were excluded from the survey. 
Employee participation: Participative companies have been found to be more inclined to adopt ESO as 
a measure for increasing worker motivation and participation (Wächter and Koch, 1993; Becker, 1993; 
Mez, 1991; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987). A number of analyses indicate that the company cannot achieve 
the motivation and participation effect without financial participation as referred to in Blasi, Kruse and 
Bernstein (2003:176): “telling employees to take ownership of their jobs rings hollow if management 
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doesn’t offer actual financial ownership or some share in the improved performance… without wealth 
sharing in some form, it feels like the company is just trying to con you into working harder”.  
Internationalization: Festing et al. (1999) found that companies with export activities used ESO to a 
higher extent than companies only addressing the domestic market. 
 
Although previous research on ESO usage and its antecedents has already increased our understanding 
of the phenomenon considerably, some gaps remain as the following discussion will show. 
Firstly, whereas the positive effects of ESO have been analysed empirically for a number of different 
geographical locations, the use and antecedents of ESO have in general received less attention and are 
mainly analysed in terms of the US market (Blasi et al., 2003, Buchele et al., 2009) and stock listed 
companies (Mathieu, 2009). Since our understanding of the ESO phenomenon can be said to be partial 
at best, lacking in understanding of usage and antecedents outside the US context, this situation calls 
for further investigation. 
Secondly, most of the existing research on the prevalence of ESO outside a US context is dated by now 
due to the cyclical pattern of the use of ESO. Given that the use of ESO plans is often considered to 
increase growth, profitability and survival rates of firms and given that differences in ESO adoption 
rates therefore may impact the competitive balance between different countries, the lack of more recent 
evidence on ESO usage in the “old” EU member states is even more dissatisfying. 
Thirdly, the findings of the antecedents of ESO employing companies are mostly based on one 
definition of ESOP and fail to diversify between different types of ESO schemes. It seems relevant to 
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investigate if there are differences between companies employing ESO schemes covering only top 
management, companies with schemes including middle management and schemes covering the 
majority of the employees. 
Thus, it is of high importance to gain insights into the current prevalence of ESO usage and to further 
our understanding of the antecedents of adoption/non-adoption by companies. The present paper 
therefore presents a set of hypotheses on ESO usage and tests these on the basis of empirical data 
collected in one of the “old” EU member states, namely Denmark. By analysing Denmark, any change 
in prevalence and the antecedents of the different types of ESOPs can be argued to be unaffected by 
government legislation and thereby influenced only by the market, the perception of the employees and 
the willingness and perception of effectiveness among companies.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
The prevalence of companies employing ESO schemes has increased in Denmark during the 1980s and 
1990s according to the PEPPER I and II reports (1991 and 1996) and the CRANET survey 
(1999/2000). The survey indicated an increase from 5% to 21% from 1991 to 1996, while the 
development steadied from 1996 to 2000. Among large listed companies, the ESO prevalence has 
increased from 82% (2007) to 89% (2009). From 1996 to 2000, share schemes for management 
increased from 19% to 22%, professional staff share schemes remained at 17% while both clerical and 
manual personnel experienced a decline in the percentage from 17% to 16% for clerical and from 12% 
to 10% for manual personnel (Pendleton et al., 2001). According to the PEPPER II report, it is the 
objective of the European Commission to increase the use of ESO and to encourage the member states 
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to reduce legislation that might impede or prevent implementation of ESO schemes. The report also 
raises the question of whether an increase in the use of ESO restricted to subgroups of the company 
workforce is a desirable policy due to the fact that it will “increase rather than reduce exiting 
inequalities of income and wealth” (Pendleton et al., 2001: p. 12). 
Pendleton (2010a) found that higher-income employees were more willing to participate in an ESOP 
due to a more comprehensive knowledge about investments and a more diversified portfolio 
(Markowitz et al. 2010). Similarly, employees and especially (low-paid) employees without managerial 
responsibilities tend to avoid participating in ESOPs in financially turbulent times. This was reported 
after the 1929 depression and is reported by D’Art and turner (2006) with respect to the Irish market. 
This indicates that risk averseness increases during a financial crisis. It can thereby be seen that 
companies are more inclined to introduce broad-based ESOPs to increase commitment and effort and 
this trend is supported by the EU indicating an increase in the use of ESOP. The legislation in Denmark 
can on the other hand be considered neutral toward ESO and lower level employees has become more 
risk averse due to the financial crises indicating a decrease in the use of ESO among lower level 
employees. This indicates that a general increase in the use of ESO can be expected to increase 
commitment and loyalty among employees, but these schemes will only be narrow schemes covering 
top and middle management due to a greater willingness to participate among these employee groups. 
Hypothesis 1a: The prevalence of ESO employing companies has increased in Denmark since 2000. 
Hypothesis 1b: The prevalence of broad-based ESO schemes has declined in Denmark since 2000. 
Seeing that it has been based on a number of different definitions of ESO, research on the antecedents 
of companies employing an ESOP has produced diverse findings. Based on a broad definition of an 
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ESO employing company as presented by Sengupta et al. (2007), any company with more than one 
employee receiving payments from an ESOP is considered an ESO employing company. The majority 
of the theory on ESO is rooted in the agency theory (Pendleton, 2006; Holmstrom, 1979; Eisenhart, 
1989) which propounds that the interests of the utility-maximising employees are not congruent with 
those of the firm (Pendleton, 2006) and that employees run the risk of discretionary behaviour, moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Holmstrom, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989). In the literature, collective 
incentives such as ESO have been seen as an alternative to individual incentive programmes and are in 
some studies found to be a weaker incentive due to the risk of allowing for free-riders and the fragile 
connection between the individual performance and the financial gain. A broad incentive like an ESOP, 
however, has been advocated in companies where the individual employee performance is costly to 
monitor because of the type of job design or work organisation (Cheadle, 1989; Kruse, 1996; Jones, 
Kato and Pliskin, 1997) or where individual incentives are costly to operate (Jones and Pliskin, 1997).  
Additionally, other studies suggest that knowledge intensive sectors such as the financial, IT and 
telecommunication or biotech sectors more often use ESO because these sectors employ more educated 
workers with higher salaries and more knowledge about investments and have a job content where the 
individual motivation and commitment is a key competitive factor (Pendleton et al., 2001; Poole, 
1989). 
Hypothesis 2a: The use of employee stock ownership plans is higher in knowledge intensive sectors. 
A number of studies have tested the effect of being listed on the use of ESO (Pendleton et al., 2001) 
and reported that while 21% of Danish companies in general used ESO, 33% of the listed companies 
had an ESO scheme. Out of the 33% of the listed companies having an ESO scheme, 76% were broad-
based schemes while only 70% of the companies in general used broad-based schemes. The EFES 
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survey reported that 89% of the large stock listed companies in 2009 had an ESOP and that the share 
was growing (Mathieu, 2009). Kabst et al. (2006) tested the use of ESO in Britain, France and 
Germany and found that stock listing was a significant indicator of ESO use. Listed companies are in a 
position to more easily and cost efficiently introduce and maintain an ESOP due to the existence of a 
market place for the shares. Consequently, the company escapes establishing their own fund to for 
handling stock trading and a valuation system that can be questioned and maybe abused. The 
shareholders of a listed company might also be more willing to introduce an ESOP to reduce agency 
costs, since the majority of owners are unable to closely monitor the daily activities of the company. In 
small and medium-sized or family-owned companies, the founder or majority shareholder will 
traditionally be in close contact with the company as CEO or as president of the board.  
Hypothesis 2b: The use of employee stock ownership plans is higher in listed companies. 
While introducing an ESOP is expected to reduce agency costs by aligning the interest of the employee 
with the interest of the company, some scholars have argued that due to the lack of controllability, the 
financial incentive of an ESOP is weak. Offhand, this could trigger the introduction of an individual 
based incentive in order to create controllability and thereby a direct connection between the individual 
actions and outcomes and the incentive. However, this may prove difficult in sectors where the 
individual performance is difficult to measure or where the tasks are multidimensional (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991; Kaplan and Norton, 1996). It can be argued that combining a broad-based group 
incentive like an ESOP with individual incentives could reduce some of the distortion effects 
(Prendergast, 1999). Distortion effects arise when employees have multiple tasks with different levels 
of measurability and the use of ESO will encourage the employees to focus on a broader range of 
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outcomes and factors than incorporated in an individual incentive program focusing on short-term 
financial and output goals.  
Hypothesis 2c: Companies using individual incentives more often employ stock ownership plans. 
While ESO in large and established firms can be used to reduce agency costs, young and growing 
companies might use ESO to attract and retain key employees in that the stocks offered could act as a 
compensation for the lack of a high salary. This would allow the company to both attract highly 
qualified employees and at the same time reduce costs, saving money for growth and investments. This 
is supported by the findings of Poole and Jenkings (1990) who reported that the prevalence of ESO was 
higher in young and growing companies. Pendleton et al. (2001) found the same effect, arguing that the 
introduction of ESO increased employee commitment, supported company growth and attracted high 
quality workers without dramatically increasing the salaries.  
Hypothesis 2d: Young companies more often employ employee stock ownership plans. 
The above hypothesis relates to the broad definition of ESO employing companies (Sengupta et al., 
2007). Still, there are large differences between the different schemes applied in the companies. Some 
schemes only cover a few or all top managers, some schemes cover top and middle managers but not 
employees at lower organisational levels, while others cover the majority of employees. In a number of 
recent analyses, a differentiation is made between narrow-based schemes and broad-based schemes 
(Mathieu, 2009; Robinson et al., 2005). The distinction is made between schemes covering a majority 
of the employees (broad-based) and schemes covering a limited share of the employees (narrow-based). 
Robinson and Zhang (2005) established that more than 60% of the non-managerial employees were to 
be covered by the scheme in order for it to be labelled a broad-based scheme, while others have set the 
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cut off point at 50% of all employees. Some studies have made distinctions between management, 
white and blue-collar employees (Kabst et al., 2006), while other make distinctions between 
management, professional staff and clerical and manual personnel (Pendleton et al., 2001). It can be 
expected that the antecedents of ESO employing companies depend on the definition and kind of ESO. 
While the narrow-based schemes signal a focus on retaining key personnel and stress the importance of 
these employees, broad-based schemes indicate a more democratic leadership style or a culture 
focusing on involvement and commitment. A broad-based scheme covering more than 50% of all non-
managerial employees owning stocks in the company can be expected to include all schemes directed 
at a majority of the employees since most schemes never have a 100% coverage at any given time. 
Some schemes also require a minimum employment period of 1 year before stocks are offered to the 
employee. The narrow-based schemes thus encompass all schemes covering less than 50% of the 
employees. These schemes are mostly covering much less than 50%, since findings suggest that 
schemes are either very narrow or very broad (Pendleton et al., 2001). The narrow schemes can be 
divided into two types of plans; one type covering only top management and one type covering both 
top and middle management. The two types represent different views on management and can therefore 
be expected to be present in companies with differing characteristics. This will be further discussed 
below. 
Hypothesis 3a: The antecedents of an ESO employing company depend on the type of ESOP employed.    
Companies employing an ESOP which covers only top management can be expected to have a 
traditional view on managerial processes and organisational structures; initiatives are typically 
launched by top management and lower level employees are only involved to a limited degree. This 
mirrors an increased focus on centralised planning and a view on strategy as a normative or prescriptive 
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process primarily defined and conducted by top management (Ansoff and McDonell, 1990; Chandler, 
1962; Porter, 1980, 1985). Planning will include vision and mission formulation, detailed budgeting 
and a structured process in developing, implementing and evaluating strategic plans. 
Hypothesis 3b: Companies with a higher focus on centralised planning more often employ ESO 
schemes covering only top management. 
Companies with ESOPs covering both top and middle management but few or none of the non-
managerial employees are anticipated to have recognised the importance of middle manager 
participation in strategy processes. The unique position of middle managers, being a beachhead 
between top management and lower level employees, allows them to act as agents of change, 
facilitating implementation of strategic actions (Wooldridge et al., 2008) and through issue selling, they 
are able to shape and influence the strategic agenda by choosing which information should be presented 
to top management (Rouleau and Balugun, 2010; Wooldridge et al., 2008). Involvement of middle 
managers can either take the form of allowing middle managers to participate in the strategy process 
and advocate their ideas to top management, referred to as participation in decisions (Andersen, 2004), 
or take the form of distributing the strategic decision authority to middle managers, referred to as 
autonomy (Burgelman, 1984). A key problem in involvement of middle managers is how to motivate 
them to participate and to do so in the best interest of the firm. This motivation and alignment of 
interests can be achieved through ESO. Companies introducing ESOPs covering both top and middle 
management can be expected to be more prepared to involve middle managers in strategic actions. 
Hypothesis 3c: Companies involving middle managers in strategy processes more often employ ESO 
schemes covering only top and middle management. 
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When companies choose to employ ESOPs covering all or the majority of employees, it can be based 
on a number of reasons. Some stock listed companies use ESOPs solely as a part of the salary and the 
scheme has no influence on the leadership style conducted or equality and wealth sharing in the 
company. Other companies introduce the scheme based on a political wish to share wealth and 
ownership but with no implications for the leadership style. Finally, some companies (probably the 
majority) introduce an ESOP covering the majority of employees to reduce agency costs and increase 
commitment and loyalty. This can be based on a wish to create a culture that involves employees in 
decision-making, that focuses on empowerment of employees and is supported by a participative 
leadership style supporting and encouraging employees to see the company as “ours”. The arguments 
of introducing the plan can also feature combinations of the three above-mentioned motivational 
factors. Empowerment is defined as delegating the decision authority to the lowest level in the 
organisation capable of making a competent decision (Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Seibert, Silver and 
Randolph, 2004; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). The concept of empowerment is very similar to the 
concept of autonomy in the middle management literature measuring the degree of decision authority 
distribution. This suggests that companies employing ESOPs covering all employees more often 
distribute decision authority to lower level employees. While some would argue that decision authority 
in general could be distributed to non-managerial employees, the lowest level capable of making a 
competent strategic decision would often be the middle management level (Wooldridge et al., 2008). 
Hence, the distribution of strategic decision authority to middle managers can be seen as a proxy for the 
level of distributed decision authority to all employees. 
Hypothesis 3d: Companies that distribute strategic decision authority to middle managers more often 
employ employee stock ownership plans covering more than 50% of non-managerial employees.      
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METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION 
Data for the present study was collected through multiple sources by means of a cross-sectional mail 
survey as part of a larger research project and by collecting financial and industrial data from official 
national databases. The 500 largest Danish firms as measured by the number of employees listed in the 
KOB database (Koebmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau) were approached with a two-page survey 
instrument in late 2009. The 500 firms cover a broad set of industries, including basic material, 
manufacturing, utilities, retailing, financial services and other services. Besides the number of 
employees, the database also contains information about the companies’ financial figures from 2004 to 
2009, information about the companies’ main area of business, stock listing and founding year. 
To ensure content-related validity, all constructs and relationships are based on a theoretical foundation 
and all items are based on former tests used to measure the specific construct. To increase the content-
related validity, all questionnaires were pretested on a sample of 3 middle managers to test whether the 
items were intelligible, clear and precise which led to small linguistic adjustments. After the initial 
pretest, the questionnaire was pretested again on a group of 66 middle managers and 21 CFOs to test 
the validity of the constructs. None of the respondents in this pretest formed part of the final main 
survey. To further test the content-related validity, all constructs were tested in an exploratory factor 
analysis to ensure factor loadings exceeding 0.7 and similarly, an analysis ensured a Cronbach’s alpha 
exceeding 0.7. All tests supported a sufficient content-related validity.  
In a first step of the main study, the respective companies’ CFO or head of accounting was contacted 
by means of a personalised cover letter and a questionnaire instrument. The CFO was addressed as a 
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member of the top management team having access to knowledge about the strategy process and the 
knowledge of the finance department about the different ESO schemes; i.e. which employees own 
stock in the company and how large a share of the company do they own. About a week later, a second 
letter enclosed with the questionnaire was sent to those who had not yet responded to the initial letter. 
These two waves produced a total of 149 responses. In a third step, the remaining individuals who had 
not reacted to the mailed survey were contacted by phone and asked to participate in the survey. Out of 
these, 167 were willing to participate and responded to the questionnaire items over the telephone. 
Careful inspection for completeness and plausibility of the responses led to the elimination of 19 
answers (one firm had received and answered the questionnaire twice, one firm was in the process of 
liquidation, three firms had severely reduced the number of employees during the fall of 2009, thus no 
longer exhibiting the required number of employees, eight of the respondents were public companies 
and the remaining responses were severely incomplete or implausible). In conclusion, a total of 297 
answers from a broad set of industries were collected (i.e. a response rate of 59.4%).  
 
Measures 
The study builds, as far as possible, on existing scales from the literature.  
ESO usage: Following the different definitions of ESO usage found in the literature, multiple items 
were used to capture company practices. A binary item asked firms whether more than one employee 
owned stocks in the company. This item thus captures the broad definition of ESO use found in the 
literature (Sengupta et al., 2007). A second set of questions used a five-item scale (none, some, half, 
majority or all (value 1 to 5)) to measure the level of stock ownership among top management, middle 
management and non-managerial workers. The definition of ESO is based on previous definitions 
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considering a company with at least one employee receiving payment from employee share ownership 
schemes an ESO employing company (Sengupta et al., 2007) or it may be based on a more restricted 
definition requiring that a majority (60%-100%) of the non-managerial employees participate in the 
schemes for the company to be considered ESO employing (Robinson and Zhang, 2005). The 
characteristics of the companies using ESO in general, narrow-based or broad-based ESO are found to 
differ (Pendleton et al., 2001). We intend to initially use the Sengupta (2007) definition and thus 
include all companies in which at least one employee (not the CEO) receives payment from an ESO 
scheme to identify the general characteristics of ESO companies.  
The article will conduct more refined tests to analyse if any differences in characteristics can be found 
between companies employing narrow-based or broad-based schemes. It is presumed that companies 
with narrow schemes mainly focus on attracting and motivating key personal and might have a greater 
focus on planning or are located in sectors with traditional hierarchical organisational settings. 
Companies applying more broad ESO schemes can be expected to be operating in sectors where all 
employees need to be involved and motivated or form part of more participative cultures. A narrow 
scheme can be divided into schemes covering only top management and schemes covering both top and 
middle management.   
A total of four different definitions of ESO employing companies will be applied; 1) a broad-based 
definition covering all companies with more than one employee receiving payments from an ESOP, 1) 
a narrow scheme covering only top management, 3) a narrow scheme covering both top and middle 
management (and few or none non-managerial employees), and 4) a broad-based scheme covering 
more than 50% of all non-managerial employees and all or the majority of top and middle managers. 
Accordingly, the last type covers more than 50% of all employees and is therefore in keeping with the 
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definition of a broad-based scheme as used by a number of former studies (Pendleton et al, 2001; 
Robinson and Zhang, 2005).     
Stock listing: Information about whether a firm is listed or not was obtained from the KOB database 
(CD-DIRECT) which was also used for identifying respondents. It is a binary variable (no stock 
listing=0; stock listing=1). No differentiation was made in terms of whether the respective companies’ 
stocks were part of larger indices, like for instance the index of the 20 largest Danish firms (OMX 
C20).  
Firm size: Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of the total amount of assets (Aldrich and 
Auster, 1986). Other studies have used the log of the number of employees (Poutsma et al., 2006; 
Pendleton, 1997) or a dummy variable for large firms (more than 2,500 employees) (Cheadle, 1989).   
Sector: The respective standard industry code (NACE) digits for each of the firms in the sample were 
derived from the KOB database (CD-DIRECT). The digit codes were divided into 9 sectors. 
Respondents from sector 9 (public companies or organisations) were removed from the dataset and the 
two companies reported in sector 1 was merged into sector 2, leaving sector 2-8 for the analyses in the 
models. 
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Emphasis on formal planning: CFOs were asked to assess their organisations’ emphasis on formal 
planning using an existing five-item scale from the literature. This scale is inspired by a scale used by 
Andersen (2004) and Andersen & Nielsen (2009) and has exhibited good quality with prior datasets 
(Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84 in the Andersen & Nielsen 2009 dataset). Responses were collected using 7-
point Likert scales (1=no emphasis; 7=strong emphasis). For our dataset, the revised scale exhibited a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.753 and the factor analysis identified a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.012. 
Participation and autonomy: 7-point Likert scales were used on five different activities in relation to 
which the middle managers could be either involved in the decision (participation) or allowed to make 
decisions without prior approval by top management (autonomy). The five items are formerly used by 
Andersen (2004) and Andersen and Nielsen (2009) and have exhibited good quality. Initially, an 
explorative factor analysis was conducted on all ten items to test if one single involvement factor could 
be said to apply. The factor analysis reported three factors with eigenvalues above one, reporting two 
factors based on items 1-3 on participation and autonomy and a third factor based on items 4-5 on both 
TABLE 1: SECTORS BASED ON NACE CODES
Sector Sector number NACE codes
Raw material 1 0100 - 0999
Production 2 1000 - 3400
Electricity and supply 3 3500 - 3999
Construction 4 4000 - 4499
Transport 5 4500 - 5499
Information and telecomunication 6 5500 - 6399
Financial services 7 6400 - 6899
Service sector 8 6900 - 8399 + 
9000 - 9899
Public companies 9 8400 - 8999
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participation and autonomy. An analysis of items 4 and 5 revealed that they both were measuring 
internal strategic processes, while items 1-3 were measuring external or market orientated strategic 
actions. This combined theoretical and statistical evidence supported one factor based on items 1-3 on 
participation and one factor based on items 1-3 on autonomy. Items 4 and 5 are abandoned as 
recommended by Costello and Osborne (2005). The two factors had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.880 and 
0.858 respectively and high factor loadings on all five items.   
 
Use of reward systems for innovative and adaptive behaviour: Respondents were asked to indicate their 
company’s use of two types of rewards for innovative and adaptive behaviour: Individual-based 
financial rewards and group-based financial rewards. The two variables were registered as two dummy 
variables.  
Firm age: Firm age is calculated as the number of years passed since the company was founded. 
 
  
TABLE 2: FACTOR LOADINGS AND RELIABILITIES
Dimensions and variables n Cronbach's alpha Extracted variance Factor loadings
Planning 297.00 0.753 67.12%
Formulating company mission 0.812
Defining financial goals 0.792
Evaluating strategic goals 0.852
Participation in decisions 297.00 0.880 81.49%
Activities to increase market share 0.927
Sales to new segments or markets 0.942
Development of important new products 0.836
Autonomy (MM can make decisions alone without prior approval) 297.00 0.858 77.96%
Activities to increase market share 0.872
Sales to new segments or markets 0.913
Development of important new products 0.863
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Methods 
In keeping with previous research (e.g. Chen and Hennart, 2002) and due to the nature of the dependent 
variable, a binary logistic regression was applied to test the hypotheses. Each of the four dummies 
represents a type of ESO applying company with expected individual characteristics. The antecedents 
cannot be expected to progress as the share of employees covered by the ESOP increases from covering 
only a few key employees to covering the majority of all employees. 
This suggests that four individual logistic regressions should be conducted. The four logistic regression 
models were prepared (model 1-4) with each of the four dependent variables, ESO, narrow-based top 
management, narrow-based top and middle management and broad-based ESO, testing the models 
using all variables. Multicollinearity between two variables was tested in the correlation matrix with no 
set of variables having a correlation above 0.45 (except between the different types of ESO which do 
not occur in the same equation) and by calculation of VIF factors. Average VIF of the entire model was 
1.53 with a maximum VIF of 2.92 indicating no multicollinearity. 
A Harman’s single factor test was conducted to test for common method bias and it yielded five factors 
with an eigenvalue above 1 and an explanation rate of 10-30 % for each factor. Similarly, the data is 
collected from different sources as recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003) and the dependent variable 
is objective in the sense that the share of employees covered by the ESOP can be accurately measured. 
This raises no concern for common method bias. 
All constructs reported high factor loadings and Cronbach’s alphas above 0.7 ensuring good reliability 
of the constructs (Hair et al., 2006) (see table 2). The 297 respondents have been tested for non-
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response bias based on size, response time, growth rates and performance and none of the tests raised 
any concern.    
 
RESULTS 
Out of 297 companies, 103 companies employed ESO in the broad definition (more than one employee 
owning stocks in the company), implying that 34.68% of Danish companies are using ESO. This can be 
compared with a 5% share in 1991 (PEPPER I), a 21% share in 1996 (PEPPER II) and a 21% share in 
1999/2000 (Pendleton et al., 2001), supporting hypothesis 1a. Out of the 103 companies, 75 (73%) 
were narrow-based (44 (43%) covered only top management) and 31 (30%) covered both top and 
middle management) and 28 (27%) were broad-based. This also implies that 25% of all companies use 
a narrow-based ESO scheme while 10% use a broad-based scheme. This indicates a decline in the use 
of broad-based schemes from 15% in 2000 to 10% while narrow-based schemes have increased from 
6% to 25%, underpinning hypothesis 1b.  
 
The correlation matrix in table 3 shows a significant positive connection between the broad definition 
of ESO, narrow-based schemes covering both top and middle management and broad-based schemes 
and stock listing. This supports earlier findings (Pendleton et al., 2001; Kabst et al., 2006) suggesting 
TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 ESO 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 1
2 Narrow_top 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 .57 *** 1
3 Narrow-MM 0.10 0.36 0.00 1.00 .47 *** -.14 ** 1
4 Broad 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 .44 *** -.14 ** -.11 * 1
5 Age 55.27 46.98 3.00 385.00 .12 ** -.03 .02 .21 *** 1
6 Listed 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 .36 *** .00 .16 *** .43 *** .19 *** 1
7 Sector_2 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 -.05 .03 -.06 -.04 .10 * -.03 1
8 Sector_3 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 -.09 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.07 -.06 -.09 1
9 Sector_4 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 .13 ** .10 * .01 .07 -.06 -.01 -.19 *** -.03 1
10 Sector_5 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 .01 -.04 .08 -.03 .12 ** -.07 -.45 *** -.07 -.14 ** 1
11 Sector_6 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 -.09 -.02 -.06 -.06 -.07 .02 -.24 *** -.04 -.08 -.18 *** 1
12 Sector_7 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 .03 -.12 ** -.02 .21 *** .19 *** .23 *** -.23 *** -.03 -.07 -.17 *** -.09 1
13 Sector_8 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 .09 .10 * .07 -.05 -.01 -.02 -.30 *** -.04 -.09 -.22 *** -.11 ** -.11 * 1
14 Bonus individ. 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 .17 *** .12 ** .08 .04 .01 .03 .01 .02 -.11 * .02 -.03 -.03 .04 1
15 Bonus group 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 .12 ** .09 .03 .06 .10 * .03 .15 *** -.02 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.11 * -.06 .33 *** 1
16 Participation 0.00 1.00 -3.34 1.52 .08 -.05 .02 .17 *** .08 .17 *** -.04 .08 .06 -.11 * -.03 .10 .07 .15 ** .02 1
17 Autonomy 0.00 1.00 -1.62 2.56 -.02 -.06 -.02 .07 .00 -.01 -.03 .00 .09 .03 -.08 -.09 .09 -.02 -.11 * .44 *** 1
18 Planning 0.00 1.00 -3.47 1.39 .13 ** .12 ** .01 .06 -.01 .05 -.03 .03 .02 -.02 .01 .06 -.02 .14 ** .03 .31 *** .09 1
19 Size 13.43 1.61 9.24 19.28 .14 ** -.19 *** .11 * .34 *** .26 *** .43 *** .01 .04 -.10 * -.05 -.14 ** .55 *** -.18 *** .13 ** .01 .18 *** .04 .08 1
n  = 297.  Significance of correlations: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
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that listed companies are more inclined to use ESO than unlisted companies are on account of the 
reduced administrative costs of introducing an ESOP in a listed company. No significant connection 
was found between the narrow-based ESO schemes covering only top management and stock listing 
indicating that narrow-based schemes are more evenly distributed among companies. This is also 
supported by the significant negative correlation between the narrow-based ESO scheme covering only 
top management and size, indicating that small and medium-sized companies more often use schemes 
covering only top management.  
In the broad definition of ESO employing companies, the companies seem to be older than expected 
which is contradictory to the assumption that some companies would use ESO to attract and retain key 
employees; however, this can be explained with the significant correlation between age and stock 
listing and age and size. In addition, the use of ESO seems to be more prevalent in sector 4 
(construction); this is at variance with the supposition that ESO would be more prevalent in knowledge 
intensive sectors and specifically in the financial sector. Companies with ESOPs also seem to more 
frequently use other incentives like individual and group-based bonuses, most likely to complement the 
more weak economic incentive of a broad-based incentive like ESO. Companies employing ESO seem 
to place a greater emphasis on both participation of middle managers in strategy formulation and 
centralised planning; the two may be considered opposites but some scholars have advocated that a 
combination of participation and a centralised planning perspective distributing new ideas and setting a 
strategic direction increases company performance (Andersen, 2004). 
Companies with narrow ESO schemes covering only top management seem to be more widespread in 
sector 4 (construction) and sector 8 (service) and less so in sector 7 (finance). With a significant 
negative correlation between sectors 4 and 8 and size, the finding suggests that companies in these 
Page 98 
 
sectors are mainly small and medium-sized companies organised under joint ownership between a few 
people in the top management team, while companies in the financial sector more frequently are listed 
companies and therefore adopt broad-based schemes. The companies also seem to have a greater focus 
on individual incentives and centralised planning, suggesting that they might have a traditional view on 
management and strategy conceiving it to be a task led and performed by top management.  
Companies with ESO schemes covering both top and middle management are only significantly 
correlated with stock listing and size. This implies, contrary to expectations, that companies in which 
middle managers have gained a formal ownership are not necessarily more inclined to involve middle 
managers in strategic decisions. Yet, this is to be further investigated in the logistic regressions. 
Companies applying broad-based ESO schemes covering more than 50% of all employees are seen to 
be older, larger and more often stock listed. Large companies can be expected to have higher agency 
costs due to complex organisational structures and the risk of free riders; furthermore, stock listing is 
seen to reduce the costs of introducing an ESOP. Broad-based schemes also tend to be more prevalent 
in the finance sector (sector 7) which is in line with earlier findings (Poole, 1989). The introduction of a 
broad-based ESOP also testifies to a culture which encourages employee involvement and motivation 
and expects effort and initiatives by all employees. This is supported by a significant positive 
correlation between the broad-based scheme and participation. The measure only gauges the 
involvement of middle managers in strategy processes, but a culture focusing on empowerment would 
entail involving all employees in operational decisions and mainly middle managers in strategic 
decisions.      
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TABLE 4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Dependent variable
Dimensions and variables B Wald test B Wald test B Wald test B Wald test
Age 0.004 1.490 0.003 0.407 -0.003 0.284 0.008 * 3.727
Listed 2.165 *** 26.378 0.817 2.394 1.132 ** 4.655 2.096 *** 14.337
Sector 2 -0.371 0.578 0.152 0.065 -0.469 0.462 0.026 0.001
Sector 3 -20.345 0.000 -19.030 0.000 -19.172 0.000 -17.746 0.000
Sector 4 1.152 * 2.914 0.986 1.661 0.164 0.029 1.434 1.571
Sector 5 -0.097 0.037 -0.101 0.026 0.181 0.069 -0.011 0.000
Sector 6 -1.211 * 2.865 -0.581 0.515 -1.262 1.134 -0.082 0.004
Sector 7 -0.365 0.191 -18.021 0.000 -1.257 1.134 0.857 0.458
Bonus_individual 0.735 ** 5.308 0.800 ** 3.916 0.573 1.552 -0.307 0.303
Bonus_group 0.365 1.187 0.159 0.145 -0.076 0.025 1.153 * 3.701
Participation -0.051 0.086 -0.195 0.856 -0.004 0.000 0.415 1.718
Autonomy -0.097 0.328 -0.204 0.872 -0.143 0.361 0.259 0.848
Planning 0.253 2.532 0.402 * 3.610 -0.055 0.066 0.092 0.105
Size -0.080 0.395 -0.558 *** 8.481 0.150 0.839 0.236 1.465
Intercept -1.532 0.915 3.824 2.799 -4.825 ** 5.258 -8.486 *** 10.737
N
Chi-square
d.f.
Significance
Nagelkerne R2
Cox & Snell R2
Percentage correct
Significance levels: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
Dependent variable
Dimensions and variables B Wald test B Wald test B Wald test B Wald test
Age 0.004 1.478 0.002 0.234 -0.003 0.354 0.009 ** 4.268
Listed 2.168 *** 26.272 0.864 2.574 1.154 ** 4.764 2.069 *** 12.355
Sector 2 -0.368 0.560 0.240 0.159 -0.497 0.496 -0.276 0.081
Sector 3 -20.332 0.000 -19.111 0.000 -19.272 0.000 -17.759 0.000
Sector 4 1.193 * 3.069 1.155 2.129 0.104 0.011 1.461 1.561
Sector 5 -0.082 0.026 -0.172 0.074 0.280 0.160 -0.003 0.000
Sector 6 -1.213 * 2.872 -0.632 0.595 -1.272 1.130 0.114 0.007
Sector 7 -0.390 0.213 -17.905 0.000 -1.407 1.355 0.530 0.143
Bonus_individual 0.771 ** 5.823 0.969 ** 5.056 0.541 1.380 0.242 0.142
Bonus_group 0.386 1.313 0.179 0.180 -0.153 0.091 1.196 * 3.445
Participation -0.049 0.077 -0.275 1.493 -0.023 0.008 0.504 2.232
Autonomy -0.108 0.391 -0.194 0.745 -0.105 0.184 0.213 0.516
Planning 0.258 2.614 0.434 ** 4.114 -0.100 0.002 0.087 0.086
Size -0.082 0.409 -0.576 *** 8.922 0.191 1.253 0.262 1.544
G_Bonus X Autonomy 0.105 0.503 0.162 0.720 -0.224 0.989 0.172 0.384
I_Bonus X Planning -0.111 0.493 -0.148 0.500 -0.332 2.364 0.209 0.485
I_Bonus X Participation -0.056 0.124 0.271 1.797 0.023 0.011 -0.734 ** 5.749
Intercept -1.561 0.931 3.757 2.683 -5.257 ** 5.716 -9.681 *** 11.112
N
Chi-square
d.f.
Significance
Nagelkerne R2
Cox & Snell R2
Percentage correct
Significance levels: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
273 273 273 273
0.207 0.113 0.053
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
ESO Narrow Top management
Narrow top and 
middlemanagement
73.60
64.64 36.09 18.66
17 17 17
73.60 86.10 90.10
0.000 0.004 0.348
0.290 0.217 0.137
0.211 0.124 0.066
0.003
0.198
86.40
273
14.98
14
0.380
0.110
89.70
273
32.69
14
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ESO Narrow Top management
Narrow top and 
middlemanagement
273
63.47
14
0.000
0.285
Model 4
Broad ESO
273
59.54
14
0.000
0.412
0.196
91.60
Model 4a
0.215
91.90
Broad ESO
66.08
17
0.000
0.452
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The four models show great differences in the significant variables and a large difference in R² 
suggesting that the type of ESO plays a significant role in defining the antecedents of ESO and that the 
model describing the antecedents of a broad-based ESO scheme is more significant than the models 
describing the two types of narrow-based schemes or a more broad definition due to a higher variance 
in the characteristics of these companies. This underpins hypothesis 3a and suggests that when 
discussing the characteristics of ESO employing companies, the type of ESO needs to be included in 
the discussion. 
Model 3 and 3a is insignificant diminishing the quality of the conclusions that can be drawn on the 
basis of these models. The insignificance of the model is caused by the fact that only stock listing is a 
significant antecedent. When testing on the entire sample, the stock listed companies with either a 
broad scheme or a narrow scheme covering only top management is counted as a 0 (a non-narrow 
scheme covering both top and middle management). This reduces the explanatory power of stock 
listing. If the model is tested only on companies without ESO and companies with the narrow-based 
type covering top and middle management, the models become significant due to the explanatory 
power of stock listing (see table 5 in the appendix). 
Three of the models corroborate that ESO is more prevalent among listed companies due to the lower 
administration costs of the scheme supporting hypothesis 2b. The significance levels, however, indicate 
that there is a stronger connection between broad-based and broadly defined types of ESO and stock 
listing.  
It was expected that the use of ESO schemes would be more prevalent in some sectors like the finance 
or IT and telecommunication sector due to knowledge intensive jobs and wider investment knowledge. 
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None of the knowledge intensive sectors emerged significant. Sector 6 (IT and telecommunication) 
even had a significant negative B-value rejecting hypothesis 2a. Some scholars have argued that ESO is 
a weak economic incentive due to the lack of controllability and that it needs to be combined with an 
individual incentive to create both an individual economic incentive based on the core job tasks and a 
more broad incentive based on the long-term overall development of the company. Model 1 and 1a 
confirm that companies employing ESO schemes more often use individual incentives, thus supporting 
hypothesis 2c. However, the prevalence was expected to be higher in companies with broad-based 
schemes due to the lack of controllability among employees at lower organisational levels. Model 2 and 
4 though show that while companies with narrow schemes covering only top management more 
frequently use individual incentives, companies with broad-based schemes have a higher prevalence of 
group-based incentives.  
ESO has been argued to support growth and commitment among employees and it is often used to 
attract competent employees, especially in young companies (Pendleton et al., 2001). It was therefore 
expected that a significant negative connection would be found between age and ESO use. This is, 
however, not the case since only model 4 has a significant positive connection between age and the use 
of broad-based ESO schemes; this entails that hypothesis 2d is rejected. 
Companies with narrow-based schemes covering only top management place greater emphasis on 
centralised strategic planning which is in support of hypothesis 3b. This indicates a traditional view on 
top management’s role in strategy processes as a centralised top-down activity. Conversely, companies 
employing a broad-based scheme were expected, but not found, to practice a culture, which focuses on 
involvement and empowerment by distributing strategic decision authority to middle managers, thus 
rejecting hypothesis 3d. A similar connection was expected but not found in terms of narrow-based 
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schemes covering both top and middle management on the backdrop of the findings in the ESO 
literature propounding that the effect of introducing ESO is mediated by involvement of employees in 
the decision-making process (Wooldridge et al., 2008).  
Three interaction effects were tested in model 1a-4a to test the interaction between different incentives 
and involvement and planning. The models revealed that the interaction between individual bonuses 
and participation reduced the use of broad-based schemes. That is, companies tend to use individual 
incentives to motivate middle managers to participate in strategic decision-making instead of 
motivating them through formal ownership.   
 
DISCUSSION  
The present paper has revealed that since 2000, the use of ESO among Danish companies has increased 
from 21% to 35% of all companies with more than 235 employees. The prevalence of narrow-based 
schemes with less than 50% of the employees covered by the scheme has increased from 6% to 25%, 
while broad-based schemes have experienced a 15% to 10% decline. This can be compared with the 
EFES analysis reporting an increase in the use of broad-based schemes among listed companies 
(Mathieu, 2009). With a neutral government policy on ESO, the change in the use of ESO reflects a 
change in companies’ readiness to introduce ESOPs and the willingness among employees to 
participate. The findings suggest that top and middle managers are more prepared to invest in the 
company owing to the fact that they receive higher salaries, are more knowledgeable about investments 
and have a higher level of controllability due to their influence on company performance. The findings 
also suggest that the development is mainly driven by the employees’ willingness to participate in the 
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ownership. If the development was driven by a company wish to increase motivation and participation 
among employees, it would be expected that companies with narrow-based schemes also would involve 
middle managers in strategy processes more often. These conclusions are likewise supported by the 
decline in broad-based schemes. This decline can be explained by an increase in risk averseness among 
non-managerial employees. The financial crisis and the substantial capital losses on the financial 
markets have directed employees’ attention to the fact that money can be lost on stocks, even when 
bought at a discount. Thus, ESO is not simply a safe tax-free salary, but a risky investment with 
potential up and down sides. Consequently, the development in the prevalence of ESOPs in a neutral 
government setting is strongly affected by employees’ willingness to participate in the scheme which, 
in return, is influenced strongly by the development on the financial markets especially with respect to 
the non-managerial employees.  
The use of ESO has been argued to be more prevalent in knowledge intensive sectors like IT and 
telecommunication or in the financial sector due to a more comprehensive investment knowledge 
among the employees in these sectors. This is not supported by the present study. Despite a strong 
positive correlation between the finance sector and ESO employing companies, the connection is not 
significant when controlling for stock listing. This suggests that the higher prevalence in the finance 
sector reported in earlier studies (Pendleton et al., 2001; Poole, 1989) can be explained by a larger 
share of stock listed companies in this sector, indicating that the explanatory factor is stock listing and 
the appurtenant lower costs of administrating the scheme and not a greater knowledge of investments. 
The study even found a significant negative effect of sector 6 (IT and telecommunication) and the 
prevalence of the general broad-based definition of ESO employing companies; this rejecting 
hypothesis 2a. 
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Stock listing has been reported to be an antecedent of ESO in a number of studies due to lower costs of 
managing the scheme (Kabst et al., 2006). This is also supported by the present study regarding the 
broad definition of ESO, narrow schemes covering both top and middle management and the broad-
based schemes. It is, however, not a significant antecedent of companies employing a narrow-based 
scheme covering only top management. Juxtaposed with a significant negative effect of size on the 
prevalence of narrow-based schemes covering only top management, it can be seen that these schemes 
are mainly used in small and medium-sized companies. This can be explained by the fact that the SME 
sector is dominated by top management owned companies and to a great extent use ESO to attract and 
retain top management. This partly supports hypothesis 2b, but it also extends and sophisticates our 
knowledge of the effect of stock listing on the use of ESO. It also supports hypothesis 3a which 
advances that the antecedents of ESO employing companies depend on the definition of and type of 
ESO scheme employed by the company. This suggests that future analyses of the antecedents of ESO 
employing companies need to distinguish between the type of ESO and that the effect of introducing 
different types of ESO might be determined by the characteristics of the company and the external 
factors.  
The arguments for introducing ESO are often borne out of a political wish to share wealth based on a 
democratic leadership style and culture or out of a wish to align the interest of the employees with the 
interest of the company by increasing commitment and loyalty. This is also supported by research 
reporting that the effect of introducing ESO is mediated by involvement and the creation of 
psychological ownership among employees (Pierce et al., 2001, Pendleton, 1998). This would imply 
that ESO employing companies would practice a more democratic leadership style and more often 
involve employees in decision-making. The findings of the present study suggest that although 
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theoretical and empirical data indicate that the effect of ESOPs is mediated by involvement, companies 
seem to act differently. Especially companies with narrow-based schemes covering only top 
management are seen to have a greater focus on centralised planning and more frequently use 
individual bonuses. This, combined with the finding that they are mainly small and medium-sized 
companies, indicate that these companies have a traditional view on leadership and strategy processes 
an a central, top-down process that focuses on the tasks and motivation of top management and key 
employees. Companies with an ESO scheme covering both top and middle management could be 
expected to more often involve middle managers in strategic decisions prompted by a demand from 
middle managers to be able to exercise the traditional ownership rights. Yet, the findings of the survey 
imply that this is not the case. The model testing ESO schemes covering both top and middle 
management failed to find a significant higher prevalence of neither participation nor autonomy. Thus, 
despite the formal ownership, middle managers do not get involved and thereby do not realise the 
potential to exercise their ownership rights. Also companies employing a broad-based scheme covering 
more than 50% of the employees were not found to have a higher use of autonomous strategic actions. 
This indicates that despite a wish to practice a more democratic leadership style, companies are not 
more willing to grant employees formal ownership. Accordingly, these findings support hypothesis 3b, 
while rejecting hypothesis 3c and 3d. 
A number of interaction effects were tested in the model revealing that combining individual incentives 
with participation reduced the use of broad-based ESO schemes. This suggests that companies more 
often use individual incentives to motivate middle managers to participate in strategic actions and to 
reduce agency costs which is in keeping with the argument that ESO is a weak economic incentive 
inducing companies to employ a more direct and individual incentive. This, however, can support a 
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short-term focus of the middle managers and a focus on the measures of the incentive instead of a more 
broad-based focus on the long-term development of the company and the more intangible activities that 
might develop the company and increase its competitive advantages.  
 
Limitations and future research 
The contribution of these findings must be viewed in context. The sample encompasses large and 
medium-sized Danish companies and cannot be expected to automatically apply to small companies as 
well. The use of ESO in companies has been seen as a dynamic process (D’Art and Turner, 2006) 
indicating that the prevalence will change over time and that the findings of the present paper therefore 
merely mirror the current situation on the Danish market. A number of studies (Kabst et al., 2006; 
Logue and Yates, 1999; Mathieu, 2009; PEPPER II; Pendleton, 1997; Pendleton et al, 2001) showed 
large diversification between countries and regions, suggesting that the antecedents found in this study 
may only be valid in terms of the Danish marked since other antecedents can be expected in other 
countries and regions. 
The conclusions on involvement of employees in decision-making are limited by the use of 
involvement of middle managers in strategy as a proxy of the general level of empowerment. A wider 
analysis based on answers from a wide range of employees from the different companies might alter or 
refine the findings. The scope of the analysis is limited to testing the antecedents of companies 
employing schemes covering different organisational layers in the company. A more refined 
understanding might evolve by analysing the antecedents of companies employing ESO schemes 
covering different functions in the organisation. The analysis only tests the antecedents and prevalence 
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of traditional employee stock ownership, leaving similar incentives like stock options or warrants and 
characteristics of wholly employee-owned companies out of the equation.  
While a number of reasons exist for introducing ESOPs, the present analysis does not address the effect 
of the reasons for introducing the plan on the type of plan employed and the share of the company 
owned by the employees.  
As many of the presented earlier findings on antecedents of ESO companies are now dated, a more 
extensive analysis, focusing in particular on the issue of different types of ESO schemes, of the 
prevalence and antecedents of ESO companies viewed in the light of the current financial situation in 
other countries seems necessary. Such an analysis could better our understanding of how different 
national settings influence the prevalence of the different types of ESO and how employees’ 
willingness to participate is influenced both by governmental actions and changes on the financial 
markets.      
 
CONCLUSION 
The present paper has contributed to our knowledge on the prevalence of ESO employing companies in 
Denmark. The Danish context allows us to investigate how the prevalence is affected in a neutral 
governmental setting. The prevalence has increased from 21% to 35%, but while the narrow-based 
schemes have increased from 6% to 25%, the broad-based schemes have declined from 15% to 10% of 
all companies. This can be explained by increased risk averseness among non-managerial employees. 
The paper also increases our knowledge on the antecedents of ESO employing companies, highlighting 
that the antecedents depend on the type of ESO scheme applied.  
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While earlier findings have reported that knowledge intensive sectors and financial sectors more often 
used ESO to align the interest of the employees with the interest of the company or due to a higher 
knowledge of investments among employees in the financial sector, no positive connection could be 
found. A negative prevalence in the IT and telecommunication sector was reported, suggesting that the 
higher prevalence reported in earlier analyses can be explained by the larger share of stock listed 
companies in these sectors and the fact that the prevalence is neutral or negative when adjusting for 
stock listing. 
Despite multiple evidence favouring the view that the effect of ESO is mediated by involvement of 
employees in decision-making, the study reveals that none of the different types of ESO employing 
companies had a higher use of a democratic leadership style involving middle managers in strategic 
decisions. Companies with schemes covering only top management seemed to have a traditional view 
on leadership and strategy processes focusing on centralised planning and individual incentives. 
The paper hereby provides new insights into the prevalence and antecedents of ESO employing 
companies and directs future research into how governmental and market settings affect the prevalence 
of ESOPs and how the antecedents of ESO employing companies depend on the type of scheme 
employed.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Dependent variable
Dimensions and variables B Wald test B Wald test B Wald test B Wald test
Age 0.004 1.490 0.003 0.310 -0.008 1.375 0.009 * 2.973
Listed 2.165 *** 26.378 1.509 ** 6.429 2.205 *** 11.650 2.938 *** 19.985
Sector 2 -0.371 0.578 0.027 0.002 -0.777 1.163 -0.114 0.011
Sector 3 -20.345 0.000 -19.308 0.000 -19.737 0.000 -17.716 0.000
Sector 4 1.152 * 2.914 1.161 2.005 0.109 0.100 2.570 * 3.441
Sector 5 -0.097 0.037 -0.047 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.272 0.057
Sector 6 -1.211 * 2.865 -0.581 0.490 -1.463 1.376 -0.242 0.025
Sector 7 -0.365 0.191 -18.562 0.000 -1.427 1.168 0.589 0.142
Bonus_individual 0.735 ** 5.308 0.883 ** 4.527 0.678 1.865 0.173 0.072
Bonus_group 0.365 1.187 0.298 0.466 0.184 0.127 1.608 ** 4.946
Participation -0.051 0.086 -0.177 0.631 0.051 0.038 0.576 2.644
Autonomy -0.097 0.328 -0.166 0.493 -0.047 0.031 0.299 0.815
Planning 0.253 2.532 0.394 * 3.257 0.096 0.159 -0.099 0.091
Size -0.080 0.395 -0.426 ** 4.910 0.166 0.684 0.289 1.235
Intercept -1.532 0.915 2.026 0.749 -4.855 * 3.495 -10.560 *** 8.521
N
Chi-square
d.f.
Significance
Nagelkerne R2
Cox & Snell R2
Percentage correct
Significance levels: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
Dependent variable
Dimensions and variables B Wald test B Wald test B Wald test B Wald test
Age 0.004 1.478 0.002 0.217 -0.008 1.353 0.010 * 3.111
Listed 2.168 *** 26.272 1.565 *** 6.610 2.183 *** 11.002 2.876 *** 17.998
Sector 2 -0.368 0.560 0.099 0.025 -0.749 1.035 -0.294 0.066
Sector 3 -20.332 0.000 -19.337 0.000 -19.765 0.000 -17.663 0.000
Sector 4 1.193 * 3.069 1.290 2.351 0.200 0.033 2.577 * 3.445
Sector 5 -0.082 0.026 -0.117 0.032 0.070 0.009 0.297 0.065
Sector 6 -1.213 * 2.872 -0.659 0.604 -1.485 1.400 0.020 0.000
Sector 7 -0.390 0.213 -18.571 0.000 -1.336 0.988 0.252 0.023
Bonus_individual 0.771 ** 5.823 1.044 ** 5.623 0.697 1.976 0.791 1.103
Bonus_group 0.386 1.313 0.293 0.440 0.185 0.121 1.500 ** 3.884
Participation -0.049 0.077 -0.262 1.205 0.024 0.008 0.792 * 3.781
Autonomy -0.108 0.391 -0.137 0.299 -0.019 0.005 0.207 0.331
Planning 0.258 2.614 0.428 * 3.740 0.123 0.245 -0.163 0.225
Size -0.082 0.409 -0.452 ** 5.313 0.154 0.571 0.318 1.401
G_Bonus X Autonomy 0.105 0.503 0.122 0.375 -0.050 0.044 0.185 0.321
I_Bonus X Planning -0.111 0.493 -0.191 0.778 -0.270 1.281 0.204 0.350
I_Bonus X Participation -0.056 0.124 0.264 1.645 -0.021 0.007 -0.788 ** 4.511
Intercept -1.561 0.931 2.097 0.786 -4.769 * 3.232 -11.774 *** 9.124
N
Chi-square
d.f.
Significance
Nagelkerne R2
Cox & Snell R2
Percentage correct
Significance levels: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
273 218 205 204
0.207 0.138 0.122
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
ESO Narrow Top management
Narrow top and 
middlemanagement
73.60
64.64 35.39 28.05
17 17 17
73.60 83.00 86.80
0.000 0.006 0.044
0.290 0.242 0.233
0.211 0.150 0.128
0.003
0.223
81.70
205
26.63
14
0.022
0.222
87.80
218
32.45
14
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ESO Narrow Top management
Narrow top and 
middlemanagement
273
63.47
14
0.000
0.285
Model 4
Broad ESO
204
72.14
14
0.000
0.549
0.298
92.60
Model 4a
0.316
91.70
Broad ESO
77.38
17
0.000
0.582
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4. Determinants of psychological ownership – Leadership, 
involvement and formal ownership; new empirical 
evidence5 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of psychological ownership has been the subject of increased attention within the field of 
management research as a key to unlocking improved employee behaviour (Pierce, Jussila and 
Cummings, 2009), positive employee attitudes (Van Dyne and Pierce, 2004) and increased company 
performance (Van Dyne and Pierce, 2004). The importance of psychological ownership lies in its 
potential ability to reduce agency costs by aligning the interest of the employees with the interest of the 
company and having them make decisions that are in the long-term interest of the company (Avey, 
Avolio, Crossley and Luthans, 2009). Pierce, Kostova and Dirks (2003, p. 86) define it as “the state in 
which individuals feel as though the target of ownership or a piece of that target is theirs”. The 
concept has formerly been studied within the realms of child development (Isaacs, 1933) and 
philosophy (Heidegger, 1927) and was introduced to management studies through psychology and 
organisation studies (Kuvaas, 2006; Pierce et al., 2003). Due to the diverse research areas focusing on 
psychological ownership, a number of definitions and research methods have been used in the pursuit 
of capturing the concept, its determinants and effects. Pierce et al. (1991) developed a conceptual 
model of the effects of employee stock ownership on individual outcomes arguing that psychological 
ownership had a mediating effect. Van Dyne et al. (2004) tested 800 employees from three different 
companies and found that psychological ownership could be seen as a determinant of organisational 
                                                            
5 The chapter corresponds to a single-authored article submitted to the Journal of Organizational Behavior which is 
currently under review. An earlier draft of the article was presented at the 2009 SMS conference in Washington and the 
author would like to thank the participants at the conference for their helpful comments. The author would also like to thank 
Professor Torben Juul Andersen for helpful comments and PhD fellow Stefan Linder for collaboration in our joint survey.  
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commitment and job satisfaction, while O’Driscoll et al. (2006) reported a mediating effect of 
psychological ownership in the creation of organisational commitment and citizenship behaviour in an 
analysis of 239 New Zealand workers from seven different companies. Similarly in two discursive 
analyses, both Laine and Vaara (2007) and Mantere and Vaara (2008) stressed the importance of 
psychological ownership as a moderator in participative strategy processes. This diversity has enriched 
us with a number of conceptual, anecdotal and discursive analyses that view psychological ownership 
as a path to improved employee attitudes and behaviour (Pierce et al., 2009; Wagner et al., 2003), as 
mediating the effect of employee stock ownership on company performance (Hammer, Landau and 
Stern, 1981; Long, 1978; Pierce et al., 1991) or as moderating the effect of employee involvement 
(Laine and Vaara, 2007). Despite a number of research avenues addressing the determinants of 
psychological ownership (Kuvaas, 2006; Pierce et al., 2009), our knowledge of the effects of the 
different determinants of psychological ownership and their interrelations remains imperfect. To 
enhance our understanding of the effects, importance and interrelations of the different determinants, a 
broader cross-sectional analysis is warranted. This study endeavours to fill that gap by testing 
involvement in strategy processes, leadership style and formal ownership as determinants of 
psychological ownership in a cross-sectional analysis of 297 Danish companies. Involvement of middle 
managers in strategy processes can be seen either as allowing middle managers to participate in 
strategic decision-making, referred to as participation in decisions (Andersen, 2004) or as distributing 
the strategic decision authority to the middle managers, referred to as autonomy (Burgelman, 1984). 
The importance of involvement in strategy processes as a determinant of psychological ownership is 
reported by Pierce et al. (1991) who argue that the perception of influence supported the creation of 
psychological ownership. Pierce et al. (2009) also found task significance and autonomy to be 
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determinants of psychological ownership stressing the importance of involvement in strategic 
decisions.  
The leadership style conducted by top management can be seen to enable or constrain the creation of 
psychological ownership. Mantera and Vaara (2008) reported in a discursive analysis that while a 
discourse based on mystification, disciplining and technologisation constrained involvement due to 
reduced psychological ownership, a strategy discourse based on self-actualisation, dialogisation and 
concretisation promoted involvement and the creation of psychological ownership.  
Pierce et al. (2001) has conceptualised that formal ownership through an employee stock ownership 
plan (ESOP) as a determinant of psychological ownership is moderated by the possibility to exercise 
formal ownership rights, such as access to information about the company and exertion of influence on 
the company. Klein (1978) found in his intrinsic model that formal ownership in itself supported the 
creation of psychological ownership and not the size of the ownership share, indicating that it is not the 
potential financial reward that triggers the creation. This indicates that to increase psychological 
ownership in the organisation, the share of employees covered by the scheme is more important than 
the share of stocks open for purchase.  
The above-mentioned research streams reveal that despite a strong theoretical foundation explaining 
the potential positive effects of involvement of middle managers in strategy, a participative leadership 
style and introduction of an ESOP, the effects all seem to be mediated by psychological ownership. 
Psychological ownership can be seen as a state in which the goals and the success of the company have 
been internalised by the employee or as internalised extrinsic motivation as addressed by Ryan and 
Deci (2000) in their self-determination theory (SDT). This calls for a better understanding of how the 
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three areas can enhance internalised extrinsic motivation and their individual and combined effects on 
internalisation.  
This study tests the interrelated effects between the expected determinants and explores whether any 
combined effects can be reported. The study reveals that a participative leadership style and middle 
management participation in strategy alike are determinants of psychological ownership, with 
leadership style as the most significant and influential determinant. Furthermore, it reveals that formal 
ownership is an indirect determinant mediated by participation, and that autonomy has no direct or 
indirect effect on the creation of psychological ownership. It was also tested if any interaction effects 
could be found; however, neither of the interaction effects was successful in improving the model.  
In the following, the literature streams on ESO, leadership style, middle management involvement and 
psychological ownership will be presented, followed by a development of the model, hypothesis 
development, tests and finally, results and conclusion.           
 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
The research stream on employee stock ownership (ESO) is mainly rooted in agency theory (Eisenhart, 
1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976) arguing that by allowing employees to participate in the ownership 
of the company, the interests of the company and the employee are aligned. Despite the strong 
theoretical foundation, the empirical findings are less conclusive, pointing out a need for more research 
in the area (Kruse et al., 2008). The findings either indicate a positive or a neutral relationship between 
introducing an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and company performance and an analysis of 
33 articles on ESO calculated an average increase in productivity of 4-5% (Kruse, 2002). Despite the 
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foundation in agency theory and the argument that employees are motivated by the expected economic 
reward, the effect of ESO is seen to be mediated by a number of factors opposing this argument. The 
mediating effects have been found to be: (1) Possibility to exercise the formal ownership rights (Klein, 
1987; Long, 1977, 1978; Rosen and Quarrey, 1987), (2) creation of psychological ownership (Klein, 
1987; Pendleton et al., 1998), (3) ownership expectations (Steers 1977), (4) management’s 
philosophical commitment to employee ownership (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and (5) participation 
in decision-making (Jones, Kalmi and Mäkinen, 2010; Long, 1977, 1978).   
The formal ownership rights and ownership expectations are the rights to posses shares, exert influence 
on and receive information about the company (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan, 1991) and, in 
combination with participation in decision-making, they have been found to be some of the 
determinants of psychological ownership (Pierce et al., 1991). Management’s philosophical 
commitment to ESO addresses the reasons for introducing an ESOP and management’s readiness to 
include employees in the decision-making process. Caramelli and Briole (2007) found that some 
ESOPs are introduced due to tax benefits and other financial arguments, while others are introduced 
against the backcloth of a management focus on employee participation and a wish to increase 
commitment and loyalty. ESOP introduction prompted by the first category of reasons has been found 
to have no effect on company performance and employee attitudes, while introducing ESOPs based on 
the latter is seen to positively affect employee satisfaction, commitment and turnover intentions 
(Pendleton, 2010). It can be argued that management’s philosophical commitment to ESO corresponds 
to conducting a participative leadership style that encourages, supports and expects involvement and 
initiatives from employees at all organisational levels. Hambrick and Mason (1984) have argued that 
management’s philosophical commitment to employee ownership plays a significant role in creating 
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organisational systems that encourage employee participation and legitimate employee influence. 
While the ESO literature conceives the creation of psychological ownership as a factor that mediates 
the positive effect of ESO on company performance, Pierce et al. (1991) found formal ownership to be 
one of the determinants of psychological ownership. It can be argued that the effect of ESO on 
company performance is not mediated by the creation of psychological ownership but through its effect 
on the creation of psychological ownership. This theory is supported by the fact that the 
aforementioned mediating effects, namely the possibility to receive information about and exercise 
influence on the company and a participative leadership style, all support the creation of psychological 
ownership. Thus, the mediating effect of the factors does not manifest itself in the effect of ESO on 
company performance, but in ESO’s effect on the creation of psychological ownership. In the 
following sections, we will test if similar conclusions can be drawn by reviewing the literature on 
middle management’s involvement in strategy processes, the participative leadership style and the 
general research stream on psychological ownership.     
 
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT IN STRATEGY PROCESSES 
While participation in decisions in general is expected to produce higher company performance, 
participation in strategic decisions may be assumed to have a stronger impact on performance than 
participation in more operational decisions. Moreover, while involving all levels of employees in the 
decision-making process creates a higher performance, the effect of involving middle managers will, 
using the same argumentation as above, be greater than involving employees without management 
authority (disregarding involving top management based on the assumption that due to its 
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organisational power, it is always (if it wants to) involved in decisions). Hence, the greatest individual 
effect of involvement can be expected to be created by involving middle managers in strategic 
decisions. This can be realised either by allowing middle managers to advocate their ideas to the top 
managers and try to get them to incorporate these ideas in the overall strategy of the company, in the 
literature referred to as participation in decisions (Andersen, 2004; Ansoff, 1987; Bourgeois and 
Broadwin, 1984; Hart, 1992; Mintzberg, 1973) or by assigning the strategic decision-making authority 
to the employees, referred to as autonomy (Ansoff, 1987; Bourgeois and Broadwin, 1984; Burgelman, 
1984; Hart, 1992; Mintzberg, 1978; Nonaka, 1988). Arguments in favour of involving the employees 
are, among others, the difficulties with strategy implementation experienced by many firms (Galbraith 
and Kazanjiam, 1986; Huy, 2002; Rouleau, 2005; Sillince and Mueller, 2007; Vilá and Canales, 2008), 
an increasing rate of environmental change (Ansoff, 1979) and the growing importance of 
intrapreneurship for innovation and corporate success (Laine and Vaara, 2006; Ling, Floyd and 
Baldridge, 2005; Mair, 2005; Mantere, 2005; Mantere, 2008; Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007). The 
different research streams view middle management involvement either as a top-down or a bottom-up 
process. In the top-down process approach, middle managers act as facilitators supporting strategy 
implementation or encouraging lower-level managers or workers to participate in idea generation and 
thereby drive innovations (Wooldridge et al., 2008). In this connection, middle managers act as agents 
of change by furthering information about and acceptance of the company strategy. By involving 
middle managers in implementation of the strategy, Ketokivi and Castaner (2004) also found increased 
motivation and commitment among middle managers, a reduction in the pursuit of subunit goals and 
increased goal convergence and coordination between managers. The bottom-up stream addresses 
middle managers’ championing or issue selling activities (Dutton, Asford, O’Neil and Lawrence, 2001; 
Ling, Floyd and Baldridge, 2005). Through issue selling, middle managers are able to shape and 
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influence the strategic agenda, by choosing which information should be presented to top management, 
and promote ideas from lower organisational levels, increasing information sharing and strategic 
responsiveness (Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009; Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007; Wooldridge et al., 
2008).  
Despite the profusion of literature on middle management involvement, only a few analyses have 
addressed the effect on company performance and then only with inconclusive results. Meir (2005) 
found increased unit performance due to the strategic actions of middle managers in one large 
American company, while Andersen (2004) in a cross-sectional study of 185 American companies 
reported an interaction effect on autonomy, environmental dynamism and company performance, while 
no significant effect of participation was reported. Wooldridge et al. (2008) conclude in their literature 
review that although some evidence of a positive link between middle management’s involvement in 
strategy and performance exists, much more research on the individual effects of involvement is 
needed. Our understanding of the individual level of involvement is enriched by the s-a-p literature 
which views strategy as a social practice (Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 2006) and seeks a “better 
understanding of the microlevel processes and practices constituting strategy and strategizing” 
(Mantere and Vaara, 2008). The s-a-p literature has greatly contributed to our understanding of how 
different discursive practices enable or constrain participation (Jarzabkowski, 2005) and of how top 
management can legitimate participation or retain centralised decision power through the language of 
strategy (Knights and Morgan, 1991).  
While most scholars have addressed the expected positive effects of middle management involvement, 
a number of potential negative effects of involvement have been reported. Laine and Vaara (2007) 
report how middle managers, due to a lack of acceptance of company strategy, developed and pursued 
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their own strategy. In addition, Guth and MacMillan (1986) relate how middle managers obstructed 
strategy implementation through foot-dragging and sabotage, while Meyer (2006) found that middle 
managers’ self-interest lead to destructive interventions causing strategy implementation to fail. To 
prevent these potential negative effects of involvement and motivate middle managers to participate in 
the best interest of the company, a psychological sense of ownership needs to be created (Laine and 
Vaara, 2007; Mantere and Vaara, 2008).  
As presented above, the middle management perspective on strategy has addressed a number of 
potential positive effects of middle management involvement but it is lacking in conclusive empirical 
findings supporting the effect. This calls for further research on how middle managers are motivated to 
participate in the best interest of the company. The s-a-p literature has analysed strategy processes at 
the individual level in a number of case studies highlighting the importance of motivating middle 
managers through the creation of psychological ownership and the support of that creation by 
conducting a participative leadership style (Ekaterini, 2010; Zhang and Bartol, 2010; Whittington, 
2006). 
The article will continue by reviewing the literature on the participative leadership style and 
psychological ownership. Finally, it combines the theories from ESO, the middle management 
perspective, participative leadership literature and the literature on psychological ownership in a model. 
The model regards ESO, middle management involvement and a participative leadership style as 
determinants of psychological ownership and tests the direct and indirect effects of the three factors on 
the creation of psychological ownership.      
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PARTICIPATIVE LEADERSHIP STYLE 
Participative leaders support the involvement of employees in decision-making by consulting 
employees before decisions are made (Kaufman, 2001; Kim, 2002). Especially a participative 
leadership style supporting empowerment, defined as delegating decision authority to the lowest level 
in the organisation capable of making a competent decision, has been given pride of place (Seibert, 
Silver and Randolph, 2004). Management support for involvement in decisions (participation) and 
empowerment (autonomy) have both been proven to increase company performance through the 
creation of psychological empowerment (Spreitzer, 1995). Huang et al. (2010) found that especially 
middle managers experienced increased motivation through involvement, while lower-level employees 
were more motivated by the experience of trust from their superior. Despite an intention to motivate 
end involve middle managers, top management might still impede involvement through the leadership 
style conducted. Mantera and Vaara (2008) found that different leadership styles could both constrain 
or support involvement, notwithstanding a wish to involve middle managers. Top management may 
constrain involvement through mystification, disciplining and technologisation and thereby create the 
impression that participation in strategy processes is limited to an inner circle. To support involvement, 
top management should support middle managers’ self-actualisation, promote dialogue between 
organisational levels and create a structure and a culture in which middle managers are aware of how to 
participate and which not only allows for participation, but encourages and expects it (Mantere and 
Vaara, 2008). 
A participative leadership style can increase internalised extrinsic motivation among middle managers 
by creating meaning in the task, by supporting autonomy and by meeting the middle managers with 
trust, respect and feedback (Ryan and Deci, 2000). The leadership style thereby fulfils basic human 
Page 120 
 
needs and fosters a sense of relatedness, referred to in the literature as psychological empowerment. 
Psychological empowerment is composed by four cognitions: meaning, competence, self-determination 
and impact (Spreitzer, 1995). This underlines that by involving middle managers in strategic decisions, 
through participation or autonomy, the cognitions of competence and impact are normally met. Thus, 
the leadership style also needs to support the sense of meaning and self-determination experienced by 
the middle managers in order to honour all four cognitions. This requires access to information about 
the company and a willingness among top managers to engage in open-minded discussions of opposing 
positions on equal terms with the middle managers (Ekaterini, 2010). 
By creating systems that guide the middle manager in terms of how to participate and by creating a 
culture that supports and expects involvement through the leadership style conducted, the company can 
enhance the creation of psychological empowerment. Mediated by psychological empowerment, the 
participative leadership style has then been found to increase decision quality (Scullu, Kirkpatrick and 
Locke, 1995), commitment (Yiing and Ahmad, 2009) and company performance (Zhang and Bartol, 
2010).  
When analysing the research streams on ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and the 
participative leadership style, a number of similarities are found. They all have strong theoretical 
arguments supporting an expected positive effect on company performance, while the empirical 
findings of the effect are more diverse. They all address the need for involvement, top management 
support and an incentive like ESO to fulfil their potential. Empirically, all concepts are found to be 
mediated by the creation of an internalised extrinsic motivation referred to as psychological 
empowerment, citizenship behaviour or psychological ownership. This raises the question of whether 
the effect on performance is caused by involvement, leadership style and ESO or by their motivational 
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impact on the creation of psychological ownership. If the latter is the case, future research needs to 
address how the three areas create motivation and how they are interrelated.  
To further understand the concept of psychological ownership, the literature on the concept will be 
analysed. This allows us to create a model that combines the four areas and develop a number of 
hypotheses to be empirically tested. 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP 
Psychological ownership has been scrutinised for the purpose of finding a path to increased motivation 
and fulfilment of a number of human needs within the areas of consumer behaviour (Belk, 1988), child 
development (Isaacs, 1933), philosophy (Sartre, 1943) and organisations (Pierce, Jussila and 
Cummings, 2009; Pratt and Dutton, 2000; Van Dyne and Pierce, 2004; Wagner, Parker and 
Christiansen, 2003). Pierce et al. (2003:86) define it as “the state in which individuals feel as though 
the target of ownership or a piece of that target is “theirs””. If middle managers experience 
psychological ownership, they are expected to act as if the organisation was theirs and supposedly act 
in the best interest of the company. This underlines the importance of gaining an understanding of how 
psychological ownership is developed and enhanced through organisational settings, incentive systems 
and the leadership style conducted. The creation of psychological ownership has been found to improve 
employee behaviour, such as citizenship, personal sacrifice and promotion of organisational change, 
employee attitudes, such as commitment, job satisfaction and organisationally based self-esteem and 
financial performance (O’Driscoll et al., 2006; Pierce et al., 2009). 
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The creation of psychological ownership is rooted in five human needs: a) Efficacy and effectance, b) 
self-identity, c) having a place, d) territoriality and e) accountability (Avey et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 
2003). These needs are very similar to the three human needs which SDT identifies as precursors to 
internalised extrinsic motivation. The three human needs are competence (accountability), relatedness 
(self-identity, having a place and territoriality) and autonomy (efficacy and effectance) (Ryan and Deci, 
2000). The theories of psychological ownership can thereby be linked to the need theories addressing 
how to release the “natural processes of self-motivation and healthy psychological development” 
(Ryan and Deci, 2000). By combining the research streams on psychological ownership and SDT, it 
becomes evident that equity possession (ESO), involvement in strategy and a participative leadership 
style all can be seen as determinants of psychological ownership, and that the three areas have the 
potential to influence and enhance each other (Avey et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 2009; Ryan and Deci, 
2000). 
Pierce et al. (1991) found that equity possession, information sharing and influence supported the 
creation of psychological ownership, while Pierce et al. (2009) found that the creation was moderated 
by organisational settings, worker and job characteristics and the employee’s experience of influence, 
control and recognition. Pendleton et al. (1998) tested the determinants of psychological ownership in 
four wholly employee-owned bus companies and found that the number of shares owned and 
involvement were significant determinants of psychological ownership, the latter being the most 
influential factor; line-managers encouraging employees to communicate their views, however, was 
found to be insignificant. Highly educated employees and employees at higher organisational levels 
tend to develop a sense of psychological ownership more easily, indicating that middle managers, 
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especially in knowledge intensive sectors, are more susceptible to develop such organisational 
attachment (Kuvaas, 2006; Pierce et al., 2009).      
Pierce et al. (2009) also found that job characteristics like skill variety, task identity, task significance, 
autonomy and feedback promoted the perception of control and willingness to dedicate oneself to the 
task, ultimately leading to increased psychological ownership. 
The effect of psychological ownership is mainly tested on employee behaviour and attitudes. 
O’Driscoll et al. (2006) found that the creation of psychological ownership in less structured work 
environments increased employee citizenship, while Pendleton et al. (1998) reported a significant 
positive influence on commitment, behaviour and satisfaction. Similarly, in an analysis of 800 workers 
from three different companies, Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) reported of increased organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, organisation-based self-esteem and organisational citizenship behaviour. 
They were also successful in establishing a positive correlation between psychological ownership and 
employee performance. However, no significance was found in the model when controlling for 
demographic factors. 
Based on the literature on psychological ownership and SDT, it seems clear that when analysing the 
effects of ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and a participative leadership style, a 
better understanding of their motivational effects is very much in demand. While all the three areas can 
be theoretically argued to increase company performance, empirical evidence testifies to the fact that 
the direct effect is limited and mediated by the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation. The 
empirical evidence also shows that without this internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of 
psychological ownership, the effects of the three concepts can be neutral or even negative. The 
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motivational literature indicates that all three concepts are determinants of psychological ownership 
through the satisfaction of a number of human needs. This highlights the existence of a gap in our 
understanding of how the three concepts are interrelated, the size of any interaction effects and the 
individual and combined effects of the three concepts on the creation of psychological ownership. 
These gaps will be addressed and empirically tested in the next sections.  
 
MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Model development 
Combining the theoretical and empirical evidence from the research streams on ESO, involvement of 
middle managers in strategy and the participative leadership style, it appears that they all have strong 
theoretical foundations, while the empirical evidence is more diverse. Similarly, the effect of all three 
concepts seems to be mediated by the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of 
psychological empowerment, organisational citizenship behaviour or psychological ownership. Despite 
slightly varying definitions of the three motivational concepts, they all imply a motivational stage 
where the values and the goals of the company are internalised in the employee. When analysing the 
independent research stream on psychological ownership, a range of conceptual and empirical evidence 
provides support to the view that ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and a participative 
leadership style are determinants of psychological ownership (Mantera and Vaara, 2008; Pierce et al., 
2001, 2003; Pierce et al., 2009).  
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Hypothesis development 
Pierce et al. (1991) conceptualised that formal ownership was one of the determinants of psychological 
ownership. By allowing employees to gain formal ownership through an ESOP, the company 
acknowledges the importance of trusting the employee. The company thereby supports the notion of 
“having a place” as one of the roots to psychological ownership and the feeling of “relatedness” as one 
of the human needs addressed in SDT leading to internalised extrinsic motivation (Avey et al., 2009; 
Ryan and Deci, 2000). The motivational effect can be argued to be supported by the mere ownership 
(Klein, 1987), based on the perception that being a part owner per se will motivate employees to work 
harder and become more committed. Others argue that the motivational effect only materialises if the 
formal ownership is combined with the possibility to exercise formal ownership rights (Pendleton et al., 
2010). Thus, it may be argued that without formal ownership, the creation of psychological ownership 
is expected to be weaker as quoted by Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein (2003:176): “telling employees to 
take ownership of their jobs rings hollow if management doesn’t offer actual financial ownership or 
some share in the improved performance…without wealth sharing in some form, it feels like the 
company is just trying to con you into working harder”. Since especially middle managers are 
motivated by the experience of trust and confidence by being allowed to gain formal ownership and 
being able to influence the company by participating in decisions, it can be expected that the sense of 
psychological ownership in the company increases by the number of middle managers owning shares in 
the company. 
Hypothesis 1a: The more middle managers who own shares in the company, the higher will be the level 
of psychological ownership among middle managers.     
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Influence on decisions and task significance are reported to be determinants and moderators of 
psychological ownership implying that involvement of middle managers in the strategy process 
supports the creation of psychological ownership (Pierce et al., 1991; Pierce et al., 2009). In the middle 
management literature, involvement is seen both as participation in decisions (Andersen, 2004) and 
autonomy (Burgelman, 1984). Both meet some of the human needs creating internalised extrinsic 
motivation as defined in SDT and the needs supporting the creation of psychological ownership (Avey 
et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 2003; Ryan and Deci, 2000). By being involved, middle managers feel trusted 
by top management, they experience competence, control, influence and autonomy and with that, they 
develop a sense of relatedness and ownership to the organisation and the company.  
While participation in decisions still allows for top management to control and influence the process, 
potentially creating an experience of pseudo participation, autonomy distributes the decision authority 
to the middle manager and may be expected to promote a stronger feeling of trust, control and 
accountability. Accordingly, it can be expected that autonomy will have a stronger impact on the 
creation of psychological ownership than participation does. 
Hypothesis 1b: Companies which have middle managers participating in strategic decisions increase 
the level of psychological ownership among middle managers. 
Hypothesis 1c: Companies which have distributed strategic decision authority to middle managers 
increase the level of psychological ownership among middle managers. 
Creating a feeling of ownership to the company is highly dependent on the leadership style conducted. 
If top management is able to conduct a leadership style that includes feedback, communication and a 
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structure supporting middle manager involvement, the creation of psychological ownership is expected 
to be enhanced. The leadership style has a strong influence on the culture in the organisation and the 
perception of competence, accountability and influence among middle managers. To facilitate and 
enhance the creation of psychological ownership, top management needs to signal that involvement 
from middle managers is supported, appreciated and expected. Mantera and Vaara (2008) stated that 
this could be accomplished by providing intelligible information on how middle managers can 
participate, by increasing information sharing and by allowing for an open-minded eye-to-eye level 
discussion about plans and decisions. Additionally, the leadership style should support the personal 
development of middle managers by allowing them to extend their capabilities through interesting and 
challenging tasks.  Especially middle managers are found to be motivated by a participative leadership 
style and by being given the opportunity to influence the development of the company (Huang et al., 
2010); lower level employees, on the other hand, are more motivated by the experience of being trusted 
by their immediate superior.  
Hypothesis 1d: Companies with a top management employing a participative leadership style have a 
higher level of psychological ownership among middle managers. 
Hypotheses 1a-1d all state that ESO, involvement and participative leadership styles are determinants 
of psychological ownership. A number of interrelations and indirect effects can be expected to exist 
between the variables. Mantere and Vaara (2008) tested the effect of different strategic discourses on 
involvement of employees and found that mystification, disciplining and technologisation all 
constrained involvement. Mystification of the strategy process gives the employees the impression that 
strategy work has a special status (Hendry, 2000) and a difficult-to-grasp tenor and that it is only open 
to a select few (Fairclough, 2003). Disciplining can both constrain and facilitate involvement since 
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some discipline and structure are needed in strategy work; however, if the discipline and structures 
prevent involvement by stressing ranks and not viewing employees as resources of new ideas and 
potential, disciplining will constrain involvement. Similarly with technologisation; the use of reporting 
and evaluating systems like balanced scorecard (Mantera and Vaara, 2008) was found to alienate 
employees and reduce the willingness to involve. While these discourses typically constrain 
involvement, self-actualisation, dialogisation and concretisation were found to support involvement. By 
conducting a leadership style that supports the individual development of employees and 
communicating in a language that encourages involvement and in-depth reflections concerning the 
identity of the organisation and the employee’s role in it, managers are able to support involvement 
(Mantera and Vaara, 2008). Dialogisation refers to an integration of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches creating an organised social dialogue (Habermas, 1981) that increases information sharing 
and stresses the rights and the roles of all groups in the organisation. These rights and roles formalise 
that involvement is allowed, supported and expected by all groups and employees in the organisation. 
Concretisation is the positive side of disciplining setting the social grounding and the organisational 
settings that allow employees to understand how and why they should become involved in the strategy 
process. By conducting a leadership style that encourages, supports and expects involvement from 
middle managers, top management can increase the level of involvement in strategy among middle 
managers. 
Hypothesis 2a: Companies with a top management team conducting a participative leadership style 
have higher levels of middle management involvement in strategy processes. 
As previously stated, it can both be argued that employees with formal ownership through an ESOP 
would pursue a higher level of involvement by exercising their formal ownership rights and that 
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companies with a high level of involvement of middle managers have a higher prevalence of ESOP due 
to a demand for a piece of the action. While some studies have reported increased involvement in 
companies employing ESOPs (Conyon and Freeman, 2001; Dube and Freeman, 2001; Tannenbaum, 
Kavcic, Rosner, Vianello and Wieser, 1974), other studies indicate that introducing an ESOP does not 
automatically lead to higher involvement (Ivancic and Rosen, 1986; Toscano, 1983; Zwerdling, 1978). 
Since the reasons for introducing ESO can be manifold (Rosen et al., 1986), the mere introduction of 
ESOPs might not increase the level of involvement despite a wish to exercise formal ownership rights. 
This lack of involvement can be explained by the concept of “legitimate authority” that lies with top 
management (Blasi, 1988). Conversely, in companies with high middle management involvement in 
strategy processes, introducing ESOPs might be supported both by top and middle management. Top 
management would be encouraged to introduce ESOPs in order to entice middle managers to become 
involved in strategy processes in the best interest of the company and thus reduce potential agency 
costs. Middle managers would pursue formal ownership enabling them to profit from their efforts. It 
can therefore be argued that involving middle managers in strategy processes leads to a higher 
prevalence of ESOPs. 
Hypothesis 2b: Companies with high levels of middle management involvement in strategy processes 
have a higher prevalence of employee stock ownership among middle managers. 
Rosen et al. (1986) have argued that management’s philosophical commitment to employee ownership, 
i.e. “the extent to which management sees employee ownership as a part of the company’s overall 
culture, human relations policy and/or commitment to employees” (Rosen et al., 1986, p. 64), highly 
influences the effect which introducing an ESOP has on company performance. Klein (1987) found 
that the more involvement and worker influence incorporated in the ESOP, the higher was the effect on 
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employee attitudes like satisfaction, commitment and turnover intentions. Mason (1984) argued that 
companies which consider employee stock ownership to be a natural part of the overall culture more 
easily create systems that encourages employee participation and legitimates employee influence. As 
an overall conclusion of the findings, it can be seen that top managers who want to promote and 
encourage middle manager involvement in strategy are more willing to introduce ESOP as a natural 
part of the company’s culture and HR policy. It is also seen that ESOPs can be introduced to support 
and moderate the effect of middle management involvement. 
Hypothesis 2c: Companies with a top management team conducting a participative leadership style 
have a higher prevalence of employee stock ownership. 
The model and related hypotheses are shown in figure 1.  
 
DATA COLLECTION, MEASURES AND METHODS 
Data for the present study was collected by means of a cross-sectional mail survey as part of a larger 
research project. The questionnaire was initially tested on three middle managers to test how the 
questions were perceived. Subsequently, the questionnaire was tested on a sample not included in the 
main dataset of 87 managers from 57 firms to test the robustness of the constructs. The pre-tests raised 
no concerns. The 500 largest Danish firms as measured by the number of employees listed in 
“Kobmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau” were approached with a two-page survey instrument in late 
November 2009. The 500 firms cover a broad set of industries, including basic material, 
manufacturing, utilities, retailing, financial services and other services and employ at least 225 full-
time employees. In addition to the number of employees, the database also provides information about 
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the firms’ financial figures from 2004 to 2009, the industry code of their main business, stock listing 
and founding year. 
In a first step, the respective firm’s CFO or head of accounting was contacted by means of a 
personalised cover letter and a questionnaire instrument capturing ESO usage, involvement and 
autonomy, leadership style, individual and organisational psychological sense of ownership and some 
additional questions which serve control purposes in the present analysis (see below). About a week 
later, a second letter enclosed with the questionnaire was sent to the ones that had not yet responded to 
the initial mailing. These two waves of enquiry produced a total of 149 responses. In a third step in 
December, the remaining individuals who had not reacted to our mailed survey were contacted by 
phone and asked to participate in the survey. Out of these, 167 were willing to participate and 
responded to the questionnaire items on the phone. Careful inspection for completeness and plausibility 
of the responses led to the elimination of nineteen answers (one firm had actually received and 
answered the questionnaire twice, one firm was in the process of liquidation, three firms had severely 
reduced the number of employees during the autumn of 2009, thus no longer exhibiting the required 
number of employees, the remaining 14 responses were severely incomplete or implausible). Thus, a 
total of 297 answers from a broad set of industries were retained (i.e. a response rate of 59.4%).  
To increase the validity and reliability of the answers, a new questionnaire was sent by mail to heads of 
marketing/sales in the 297 companies in February 2010, a second letter was sent two weeks later to the 
non-respondents and finally, the remaining companies were contacted by phone, resulting in a total of 
207 answers (i.e. a response rate of 69.7% of the initial 297 companies). Similarly, a randomly chosen 
middle manager in each of the 297 companies was contacted by phone and asked to answer a one-page 
questionnaire, thus collecting answers from different organisational layers and retrieving multiple 
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answers from the companies. A total of 210 middle managers from the 297 companies answered the 
questionnaire (i.e. a response rate of 70.7% of the initial 297 companies).  
 
Measures 
To the greatest extent possible, the study builds on existing scales from the literature. Furthermore, all 
measurement instruments were pretested on a sample of managers from 57 firms (not included in the 
main dataset) prior to the main study resulting in a few linguistic improvements. 
ESO usage: The definitions of ESO employing companies are diverse throughout the literature. Some 
scholars use a broad definition stating that if more than one employee receives payment from an ESOP, 
the company is considered an ESO employing company (Sengupta et al., 2007). Pendleton et al. (2001) 
distinguish between narrow and broad-based schemes; the latter being schemes where more than 50% 
of the employees are covered by the scheme and the former are schemes covering less than 50% of the 
employees. It could also be argued that the share of the company owned by the employees could be 
used as a measure, indicating that the higher percentage of the company owned by the employees, the 
higher is the effect on the creation of psychological ownership. This, however, is rejected by Hammer 
and Stern (1980) who found that the size of the employees’ equity stake in the company had no 
influence on the level of motivation and commitment. This suggests that the more employees covered 
by the scheme, the higher is the effect on the creation of psychological ownership. Since the 
involvement in the strategy process focuses on top and middle management, the share of top and 
middle managers covered by the scheme will be measured using two five-item Likert scales measuring 
the share of top managers and middle managers holding a stake in the company (none, some, half, 
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majority or all (value 1 to 5)). A total score is then calculated by adding up the two values. A number 
of different combinations of the shares can be found, but in general, the share is seen to be in decline at 
lower organisational levels. This indicates that a combination of no top managers owning shares and all 
middle managers owning shares will not occur.  
Leadership style: Assessment of top management’s style of reaction to and climate for middle manager 
involvement was facilitated by an instrument for identifying leadership style and climate specifically 
developed for the present study on the basis of previous research conducted by Choi (2004). The 
instrument took the limited time available for top and middle managers to answer a questionnaire into 
account and therefore concentrated on the leadership climate for involvement/autonomous strategic 
action only – leaving aside other aspects of (more broadly defined) leadership style and climate in 
terms of individual work effort or work duration or the like. The resulting four-item measure asked 
middle managers to rate to which degree their superiors were open to their ideas and willing to let them 
experiment with new concepts or products on a 7-point Likert scale (1=fully disagree, 7=fully agree). 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.859 and the factor analysis identified a single factor with an eigenvalue above 
one (eigenvalue of 2.814). The confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the items loaded with 0.812 
to 0.864 on this factor (see table 1).  
Involvement in strategy processes: Involvement of middle managers in strategy processes can be 
realised by allowing middle managers to participate in strategic decisions (Andersen, 2004) or by 
granting middle managers the autonomy to make strategic decisions without prior approval by top 
management. The measurement of participation was based on five questions using a 7-point Likert 
scale previously used by Andersen (2004) exploring the frequency of middle management participation 
in different strategic actions. The measurement of autonomy examined the frequency of middle 
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manager autonomy in strategic actions based on the same five strategic decisions used for measuring 
participation. The autonomy items used a 7-point Likert scale measuring the frequency from never to 
always which is similar to a scale used by Andersen and Nielsen (2009). To test if the concepts could 
be considered one or two variables, a rotated explorative factor analysis was conducted on all ten items. 
The factor analysis returned three factors with an eigenvalue above one. Questions 1-3 on participation 
loaded on one factor measuring participation in market-oriented strategic actions, while questions 1-3 
on autonomy loaded on another factor measuring market-oriented autonomous strategic actions. 
Questions 4-5 on participation and 4-5 on autonomy loaded on the third factor measuring involvement 
in internal strategic actions. To strengthen the test, similar rotated factor analyses were conducted on 
the answers from the heads of marketing and the middle managers; these produced identical results.  
The two factors measuring involvement in market-oriented strategic actions will be applied on the 
grounds that the two items of internal strategic actions are found to theoretically differ from the market-
oriented items and can be eliminated as recommended by Costello and Osborne (2005).    
A confirmatory factor analysis of the three participation items exhibited a satisfactory Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.815, a single factor with an eigenvalue above one (eigenvalue=2.217) and factor loadings 
between 0.749 and 0.918. A similar confirmatory factor analysis of the three autonomy items also 
exhibited a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of 0.840, a single factor with an eigenvalue above one 
(eigenvalue=2.275) and factor loadings between 0.822 and 0.901 (see table 1). 
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Psychological sense of ownership: Four questions measuring both the respondents’ perception of 
psychological ownership to the company and the organisational level of psychological ownership were 
based on a former study by Dyne and Pierce (2004). A 7-point Likert scale (1=fully disagree, 7=fully 
agree) was employed. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.862 and factor analysis identified a single factor with an 
eigenvalue above one (eigenvalue of 2.829). Confirmatory factor analysis found that the items loaded 
with 0.767 to 0.926 on this factor. This indicates a strong connection between the respondents’ 
individual perception of ownership and the respondents’ perception of the entire organisation’s 
perception of ownership. The strength of the construct would have increased if more than two 
responses were obtained from employees at different organisational levels within the same company. 
This problem is partly addressed by measuring the respondents’ individual sense of ownership, of 
which they have a direct perception, and their perception of the organisation’s sense of ownership and 
by collecting two responses from two different organisational layers (see table 1). 
Control variables: The level of psychological ownership and the conception that the company is my 
company can be expected to increase concurrently with the period of employment. The tenure of the 
respondent is therefore used as a control variable. Successful companies are also more easily 
TABLE 1: FACTOR LOADINGS AND RELIABILITIES
Dimensions and variables n Cronbach's alpha Extracted variance Factor loadings Indicator reliability
Leadership style 295.00 0.859 70.34%
Top management activly seeks MM opinions about strategic issues 0.864 0.746
Top management is open to new idears and initiatives from all employees 0.832 0.692
Top management appriciates that MM experiments with new idears and products 0.812 0.659
Top management takes into account MM when significant decisions are made 0.846 0.716
Psychological ownership 296.00 0.862 70.71%
I feel this is MY company 0.926 0.857
The majority of employees feel that this is OUR company 0.806 0.650
I feel an ownership to and responsibility for the development of the company 0.767 0.588
I have a hard time seing this as MY company (reversed coded) 0.856 0.733
Participation in decisions (MM participate in the decisions of) 296.00 0.815 73.90%
Activities aiming at increasing market share 0.902 0.814
Sales to new segments or markets 0.918 0.843
Development of important new products 0.749 0.561
Autonomy (MM can make decisions alone without prior approval) 296.00 0.840 75.82%
Activities aiming at increasing market share 0.888 0.789
Sales to new segments or markets 0.901 0.812
Development of important new products 0.822 0.676
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internalised by the employees; consequently, a sector adjusted average ROA 2004-2008 is used as a 
proxy for past performance. The use of size as a control variable has been widely discussed and 
potential endogeneity problems have been used to argue against controlling for size. 
 
Methods 
To avoid common method bias, data from multiple sources will be applied as recommended by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003). The performance measure is based on financial data collected from an official 
national database, while involvement, ESO, leadership style and psychological ownership are based on 
answers from the CFO and the middle manager. This means that an average of two answers should 
represent the perception of the company; incontrovertibly, an increased number of answers from each 
company would have strengthened the analysis. 
The validity of the responses was tested by conducting a paired sample t-test on the leadership style 
responses provided by heads of sales/marketing in 207 of the initial 297 companies who returned the 
initial questionnaire. The test has been conducted both on the mean of the sum of the four questions 
and on each question. An average of the 199 paired companies measured 5.09 from the CFO and 
middle manager and 5.03 from heads of sales/marketing with std. dev on 0.07 and 0.09, respectively. 
This yields a significance level of 0.587 rejecting the hypothesis that any difference exists and thus 
providing evidence to suggest that the answers given by the CFOs and middle managers are 
representative for the company. All four questions in the construct were tested individually and turned 
out insignificant, again supporting the expectation that the initial answers were representative for the 
company. A factor analysis was also conducted on the 207 answers from the heads of sales/marketing 
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reporting only one factor with an eigenvalue above 1 (eigenvalue=2.607), a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.819 
and factor loadings between 0.748 and 0.850. Similar analyses were conducted on the items and 
averages of participation and autonomy but with less conclusive results. In terms of both participation 
and autonomy, the perception of the head of marketing is significantly higher than the perception of the 
CFO and middle manager.  
A test for non-response bias was conducted on sector, size, turnover, age, capital structure, legal form, 
employee growth and a number of other financial data comparing the 297 respondents with the 
population of the 500 largest companies in Denmark. None of the tests gave rise to concern. A Harman 
1 factor test was conducted on all items reporting five factors with variance explained between 6.0% 
and 34.0% which confirms the validity of the constructs. The correlation matrix in table two shows that 
all correlations are below 0.7 implying no cause for multicollinearity concern. A correlation matrix at 
the construct level is seen in the appendix (see table 2A), also raising no concern. To additionally test 
for multicollinearity, a number of OLS were conducted with psychological ownership as dependent 
variable and ESO, participation/autonomy, leadership style as independent variables. The variance 
inflation factors on all items were not higher than 1.9 and well below 9.5 (Kleinbaum et al., 1998; 
Lomax, 1992) suggesting no concern for multicollinearity. These findings will support the analysis of 
the fit indices on the measurement model. Adequate fit indices on the measurement model also predict 
no problems with multicollinearity. 
The hypothesis is tested in a Structured Equation Model (SEM) using AMOS SEM software in a two 
stage procedure recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). The first stage involves estimation of 
the measurement model using confirmation factor analysis to determine convergent and discriminant 
validity. The second stage involves comparing the theoretical model with the measurement model. 
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Based on the results of the test, the theoretical model will be used to provide path coefficients for the 
hypothesis test. Fit measures like Goodness of Fit Index (CFI) and Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 
will be calculated to test the model fit as recommended by Gerbing and Anderson (1992). Before 
running the model, a test of normality was conducted as recommended by Hult et al. (2006). All 
variables were significantly normally distributed within the 0.001 level using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test of normality. The model is tested on raw data from the survey imported from PASW 18 and tested 
in AMOS 18. Reliability and validity of the constructs have been tested earlier using confirmatory 
factor analysis, all reporting reliable Cronbach’s alphas and factor loadings above 0.7 as recommended 
by Fornell and Larcker (1981). The fit of the models was tested using Normed Fit Index (NFI), Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI) and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as recommended by Hult 
et al. (2006) and Gerbing and Anderson (1992). The Chi-Square test of model significance is 
disregarded due to large sample sizes (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). 
 
RESULTS 
Confirmatory factor analyses were used to test the validity and reliability of the constructs. Table 1 
displays the factor loadings, Cronbach’s alphas and Average Variance Extracted (AVE). With factor 
loadings between 0.75 and 0.93, adequate Cronbach’s alphas and AVE > 0.50 combined with a 
measurement model with good fit (CFI > 0.95 and RMSEA < 0.05), validity and reliability of the 
constructs seem to be achieved. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistic and correlation among all items 
and none of the correlations between items loading on different constructs reported correlations > 0.70, 
suggesting adequate discriminate validity. The measurement model tests the quality of the constructs 
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and with CFI=0.9905 and RMSEA=0.0336 on participation and CFI=0.9849 and RMSEA=0.0415 on 
autonomy, the construct shows good fit (Kline, 2005).  
 
The structural model is used to test the structures among latent variables and does not test for causality. 
To ensure the validity of the model, all models should be derived from theory. The models are 
presented in table 3. To ensure that more appropriate models are not overlooked, the models in between 
the models in table 3 are tested by only removing or adding one relationship at a time. The first model 
tests the three variables of leadership style, involvement and ESO as determinants of psychological 
ownership. The fit indices on both participation and autonomy showed good fit (CFI>0.95; 
RMSEA<0.08). In the participation model, the direct effect of ESO was insignificant and the fits 
improved by removing this relationship. In the autonomy model, the direct effect of autonomy on 
psychological ownership was insignificant and the fits of the model improved by removing this 
relationship. This indicates that these direct effects should be removed and that ESO might be a 
determinant of psychological ownership but that the effect is expected to be moderate.   
In model 2, the direct effect of autonomy/ESO on psychological ownership was replaced with a path 
from autonomy to ESO in an attempt to assess the argument that companies with a high level of middle 
management autonomy in strategy have a higher prevalence of ESO. The model showed better fits and 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1 Participation1 4.96 1.25 1.00 7.00 1
2 Participation2 4.77 1.38 1.00 7.00 .81 *** 1
3 Participation3 4.67 1.42 1.00 7.00 .48 *** .52 *** 1
4 Autonomy1 3.56 1.48 1.00 7.00 .49 *** .50 *** .31 *** 1
5 Autonomy2 3.22 1.47 1.00 7.00 .41 *** .50 *** .26 *** .74 *** 1
6 Autonomy3 2.84 1.33 1.00 7.00 .18 *** .23 *** .40 *** .57 *** .60 *** 1
7 Leadership style1 5.04 1.27 1.00 7.00 .35 *** .35 *** .27 *** .18 *** .15 ** .18 *** 1
8 Leadership style2 5.51 1.11 1.00 7.00 .28 *** .26 *** .28 *** .14 ** .16 *** .12 ** .63 *** 1
9 Leadership style3 4.97 1.16 1.50 7.00 .32 *** .36 *** .33 *** .28 *** .24 *** .24 *** .57 *** .59 *** 1
10 Leadership style4 4.85 1.13 1.00 7.00 .27 *** .29 *** .26 *** .22 *** .15 ** .22 *** .68 *** .57 *** .58 *** 1
11 Psyc ownership1 5.68 1.11 1.00 7.00 .34 *** .34 *** .27 *** .19 *** .11 * .08 .53 *** .48 *** .43 *** .51 *** 1
12 Psyc ownership2 5.04 0.98 1.00 7.00 .32 *** .30 *** .28 *** .17 *** .11 * .08 .46 *** .48 *** .40 *** .45 *** .68 *** 1
13 Psyc ownership3 5.78 0.89 2.00 7.00 .33 *** .32 *** .27 *** .18 *** .13 ** .08 .41 *** .34 *** .30 *** .42 *** .63 *** .48 *** 1
14 Psyc ownership4 6.25 0.96 1.00 7.00 .26 *** .25 *** .22 *** .26 *** .16 *** .17 *** .41 *** .40 *** .41 *** .42 *** .78 *** .56 *** .51 *** 1
15 ESO 0.00 1.00 -0.57 2.71 .09 .14 ** .09 .07 .06 .05 .09 .02 .09 .06 .13 ** .07 .10 * .11 * 1
16 ESO_Lead. Style 0.08 0.95 -5.11 5.27 -.04 -.01 .01 -.02 -.05 -.04 -.08 -.05 -.06 -.03 -.05 -.02 .03 -.07 .18 *** 1
17 ESO_Autonomy 0.07 1.01 -4.08 5.73 -.10 * -.08 -.09 -.01 .03 .00 -.04 .00 -.05 -.05 -.04 .02 -.07 -.06 .15 ** .17 *** 1
18 ESO_Particip. 0.12 0.88 -4.44 2.77 -.17 *** -.15 *** -.08 -.15 ** -.15 ** -.02 .01 -.08 -.04 .05 -.06 -.05 -.04 -.07 .24 *** .51 *** .35 *** 1
19 Lead_Autonomy 0.26 1.17 -3.45 6.07 -.12 ** -.11 * -.10 * .01 .07 .02 -.22 *** -.21 *** -.16 *** -.16 *** -.20 *** -.17 *** -.10 -.18 *** -.04 .05 .02 -.01 1
20 Lead_Particip. 0.42 1.31 -4.73 11.29 -.18 *** -.15 *** -.11 * -.12 ** -.10 -.08 -.20 *** -.22 *** -.22 *** -.17 *** -.23 *** -.11 * -.05 -.22 *** -.01 .06 -.01 -.02 .63 *** 1
21 Tenure 9.28 6.68 0.10 35.00 .10 * .06 .03 .09 .05 .07 .09 .14 ** .12 ** .08 .23 *** .11 * .20 *** .21 *** .09 -.05 .03 -.06 .10 * -.01 1
22 Past performance 0.00 0.99 -4.79 4.02 .08 .00 .07 .02 -.04 .00 .06 .03 .05 .05 .03 .10 * .08 .08 .13 ** .06 -.07 .08 -.02 -.02 .12 ** 1
n  = 297.  Significance of correlations: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
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still reported good fit. Similarly, a path from ESO to participation was added suggesting that companies 
with a high share of middle managers owning stocks in the company have a higher level of middle 
management participation in strategy. This model also showed improved fits.   
In model 3, a path from leadership style to involvement is added to examine the argument that 
companies with a top management which conducts a leadership style that promotes and encourages 
middle management involvement also achieves higher middle management involvement.             
 
Model 3 reported good fit on all participation and autonomy indices (CFI/NFI/TLI > 0.95 and RMSEA 
< 0.05).  
In model 4, a path from leadership style to ESO was added suggesting that companies conducting a 
participative leadership style have a higher prevalence of ESO. Fits on the model reported good fits and 
the test of delta χ² shows no significant difference between the fits indicating that both models have the 
same fit on the data. Since the regression coefficient on the added path from leadership style to ESO 
was reported to be insignificant, model 3 will be preferred. Four interaction effect variables were 
calculated by multiplying the standardised variables; tenure and past performance were used as control 
variables. None of the interaction effects improved the fits of the model. Past performance, measured as 
TABLE 3: Structural Equation Models (AMOS)
Participation/autonomy
Model and description χ² Δχ² df NFI Delta2 TLI CFI RMSEA χ² Δχ² df NFI Delta2 TLI CFI RMSEA
0: Measurement model 65.34 49 0.9637 0.9907 0.9849 0.9905 0.0336 74.01 49 0.9574 0.9852 0.976 0.9849 0.0415
1: All three direct effects 121.45 52 0.9325 0.9603 0.9395 0.9597 0.0672 94.38 52 0.9457 0.9748 0.9617 0.9744 0.0525
2: Two direct effects and INV->ESO 118.58 52 0.9341 0.9619 0.9420 0.9613 0.0658 93.19 52 0.9463 0.9756 0.9628 0.9752 0.0517
3: Direct effects and two indirect 69.58 *** 51 0.9613 0.9894 0.9835 0.9892 0.0351 75.19 *** 51 0.9567 0.9857 0.9777 0.9854 0.0400
4: Direct effects and three indirect 67.15 50 0.9627 0.9902 0.9845 0.9900 0.0340 74.02 50 0.9574 0.9858 0.9774 0.9855 0.0403
5: Model 3 + interaction ESO_Lead 86.97 62 0.9554 0.9858 0.9788 0.9855 0.0369 110.87 62 0.9375 0.9715 0.9574 0.9710 0.0516
6: Model 3 + interaction ESO_INV 108.33 62 0.9411 0.9739 0.9611 0.9735 0.0502 92.59 62 0.9472 0.9819 0.9730 0.9816 0.0408
7: Model 3 + tenure 83.78 62 0.9541 0.9877 0.9816 0.9874 0.0344 89.79 62 0.9491 0.9837 0.9756 0.9834 0.0389
Significance levels: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
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DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
The present paper has contributed to our knowledge in a number of areas. Within the different research 
traditions, the terms involvement, participation and autonomy have been used in a variety of ways, 
including measuring different degrees of influence on the individual’s own work setting and company 
decisions. This paper has highlighted that by using the middle management literature distinction 
between participation and autonomy, different effects emerge. The participative leadership style’s 
effect on participation and autonomy is divergent, indicating that when top management exercises a 
participative leadership style, it is more inclined to let middle managers participate in the decisions than 
to distribute decision authority. It may seem natural that top management wants to maintain control 
with decisions, but it runs the risk of becoming a decision bottleneck with reduced decision speed as a 
consequence.   
Formal ownership was expected to be a determinant of psychological ownership, but the paper fails to 
find a significant direct effect; in fact, the paper demonstrates that ESO only increases psychological 
ownership when mediated by participation; this implies that hypothesis 1a is rejected. This is in 
keeping with earlier findings suggesting that ESO is mediated by involvement (Klein, 1987; Pendleton, 
2010) but the view is sophisticated by the finding that the effect is mediated by participation but not by 
autonomy, thus supporting hypothesis 1b while rejecting hypothesis 1c. This is somehow surprising 
since it would be expected that autonomy would enhance the perception of influence on the company 
and the experience of trust from top management. The distribution of decision power might create 
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independent sections in the company, alienating the middle managers from the rest of the company and 
creating a sub-focus on a division or a department.  
Mantera and Vaara (2008) reported how the leadership style conducted could constrain or impede 
involvement and thereby influence the creation of psychological ownership. This paper finds that the 
leadership style conducted is the most influential determinant of psychological ownership and in doing 
so, it confirms hypothesis 1d. This underlines that despite the importance of specific organisational 
settings, such as involvement, as determinants of psychological ownership, the culture created by and 
the communication and signals from top management are the most important determinants of 
psychological ownership. 
A participative leadership style aims to support and encourage involvement for which reason it is 
expected that conducting such a leadership style would increase both participation and autonomy. This 
relationship is indeed highly significant and supports hypothesis 2a. The effect is though strongest on 
participation with a standardised beta of 0.44 in contrast to 0.28 on autonomy. ESO was found to 
enhance participation but not autonomy implying that hypothesis 2b is rejected, while a participative 
leadership style was found not to increase the use of ESO implying that hypothesis 2c is rejected.    
  
Implications for research 
The study enriches our understanding of the concept of psychological ownership. As one of the first 
large-scale cross-sectional studies, the paper quantifies the effects of three of the determinants of 
psychological ownership. This allows for a more sophisticated discussion of the different determinants 
and their effects. Additionally, the paper makes a distinction between participation and autonomy and 
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finds that while participation seems to be a determinant of psychological ownership, autonomy is not. 
This calls for a future exploration of the different motivational effects of participation and autonomy 
and a more distinct development of the concepts.  
In the literature, most articles have been focusing on one of the three determinants, occasionally 
controlling for one or two of the others. This study finds that all three concepts, ESO, involvement and 
participative leadership style, are interrelated and that all three must be combined in order to 
successfully pursue internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of psychological ownership.  
By highlighting the importance of the motivational effects of the concepts, a better understanding of the 
individual level factors is highly warranted. Kuvaas (2006) found that highly educated people more 
easily developed psychological ownership, while Pierce et al. (2009) analysed the importance of job 
characteristics. This suggests that individual and job related factors as well as sector specific 
characteristics play a significant role in the creation and effect of psychological ownership, and the 
author calls for future research in the area.     
 
Implications for practice 
The paper indicates that companies, who plan to introduce an ESOP or want to involve middle 
managers in strategy, need to focus on how to support internalisation of extrinsic motivation in the 
form of psychological ownership. The paper demonstrates that companies need to combine formal 
ownership with participation and a participative leadership style and that a positive outcome is 
determined mainly by the leadership style conducted and the ability to create psychological ownership.  
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This implies that companies, when planning to involve middle managers in strategy, especially need to 
focus on the leadership style conducted and ensure that the signals, procedures and cultures all support 
involvement through self-actualisation, dialogisation and concretisation (Mantera and Vaara, 2008). 
The reported indirect effect of ESO mediated by participation also suggests that by combining 
participation with an incentive like ESO, the company is able to project that the contribution from 
middle managers is important and middle managers become motivated to participate in the best interest 
of the company spurred by both the potential economic reward and the experience of trust and 
confidence from top management. 
 
Limitations and future research 
The present study suffers from a number of limitations. The study is cross-sectional and does not 
examine if the effects are consistent across different sectors. Furthermore, it focuses on involvement of 
middle managers; the effect of involving employees on other organisational levels and the creation of 
psychological ownership among all employees would enrich our understanding of the concepts and 
their relationships. The paper only focuses on the effect of ESO on the creation of psychological 
ownership and motivation; replacing or combining ESO with other incentives could refine our 
understanding of the effects.  
The study is limited to Danish companies and different effects could be expected in other countries and 
cultures due to different traditions of involvement, management attitudes and educational levels. Thus, 
it would be highly relevant to conduct a longitudinal cross-country analysis to reveal if the effect is 
consistent across cultures.   
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The measurement of especially psychological ownership is linked to the individual and the proxy of the 
average level of psychological ownership in the company based on only two respondents from each 
company limits the robustness of the measurement. A large number of respondents at different 
organisational layers from each company would have boosted the reliability of the analysis and 
conclusions.            
 
CONCLUSION 
The present paper has tested three determinants of psychological ownership, ESO, involvement of 
middle managers in strategy and participative leadership style. Based on survey among 297 of the 500 
largest companies in Denmark, the paper concludes that a distinction needs to be made between 
participation and autonomy and that only the first is a determinant of psychological ownership. ESO 
has been conceptualised as a determinant of psychological ownership but the effect seems to be 
mediated by participation. Despite the direct and indirect effects of participation and ESO, the most 
significant determinant of psychological ownership is a participative leadership style. This highlights 
the importance of conducting a leadership style that encourages and supports involvement and signals 
that the contribution of middle managers is needed, appreciated and expected.    
This paper is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first to quantify the effects of the determinants 
of psychological ownership based on a large-scale cross-sectional survey. The study quantifies the 
effects of the three determinants and highlights the need for combining ESO, involvement and 
leadership style in the pursuit of psychological ownership. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 2A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS CONSTRUCT LEVEL
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Participation 0.00 1.00 -3.30 1.89 1
2 Autonomy 0.00 1.00 -1.77 2.79 .49 *** 1
3 Leadership style 0.00 1.00 -3.43 1.95 .42 *** .26 *** 1
4 Psyc. Ownership 0.00 1.00 -4.15 1.57 .40 *** .20 *** .61 *** 1
5 ESO 0.00 1.00 -0.57 2.71 .12 ** .07 .08 .12 ** 1
6 ESO_Lead. Style 0.08 0.95 -5.11 5.27 -.02 -.05 -.06 -.04 .18 *** 1
7 ESO_Autonomy 0.07 1.01 -4.08 5.73 -.11 * .01 -.04 -.05 .15 ** .17 *** 1
8 ESO_Particip. 0.12 0.88 -4.44 2.77 -.16 *** -.12 ** -.02 -.07 .24 *** .51 *** .35 *** 1
9 Lead_Autonomy 0.26 1.17 -3.45 6.07 -.13 ** .04 -.22 *** -.20 *** -.04 .05 .02 -.01 1
10 Lead_Particip. 0.42 1.31 -4.73 11.29 -.17 *** -.11 * -.24 *** -.18 *** -.01 .06 -.01 -.20 .63 *** 1
11 Tenure 9.28 6.68 0.10 35.00 .07 .08 .13 ** .22 *** .09 -.05 .03 -.06 .10 * -.01 1
12 Past performance 0.00 0.99 -4.79 4.02 .05 -.01 .06 .09 .13 ** .06 -.07 .08 -.02 -.02 .12 ** 1
n  = 297.  Significance of correlations: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
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5. Management attitudes to middle management 
involvement and formal ownership as determinants of 
psychological ownership6 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Extrinsic motivation spurred by incentives like employee stock ownership (ESO) and intrinsic 
motivation driven by involvement have been seen as potential sources to higher company performance. 
The argument of incentives is mainly rooted in agency theory, aligning the interests of employees with 
the interests of the company, while the argument of involvement is founded on higher consensus, 
increased information sharing and improved dynamic capabilities. In most of the literature, it is 
assumed that economic incentives or involving employees per se lead to higher performance. Despite 
the theoretical arguments supporting the effect of incentives and involvement, the empirical findings 
are rather unclear and call for a more thorough understanding of the effects on the micro level. In 
recent years, increased attention has been paid to the creation of psychological ownership (e.g. 
O’Driscoll et al., 2006; Van Dyne and Pierce, 2004; Pierce et al., 2009) and it has been argued that the 
positive effect of ESO is mediated by the creation of psychological ownership (Pendleton et al., 1998; 
Sesil et al., 2002) while involvement has been identified as one of the determinants of psychological 
ownership (Pierce et al., 2009). As the economic incentive of ESO decreases at lower organisational 
levels due to a minimal effect on the economic reward of making an extra effort, agency theory 
becomes less useful as an explanation to the ESO effect. Furthermore, Hammer and Stern (1980) find 
that the size of the employees’ equity stake has no influence on motivation and commitment, indicating 
                                                            
6 The chapter corresponds to a single-authored article presented in an earlier draft at the 2010 SMS conference in Rome and 
the author would like to thank the participants at the conference for helpful comments. The author would also like to thank 
Professor Torben Juul Andersen for helpful comments and PhD fellow Stefan Linder for collaboration in our joint survey.  
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that the positive effects of ESO on company performance are prompted by the creation of 
psychological ownership and the effects on job attitudes and commitment and not an expected 
economic reward.  
In the involvement literature, especially involvement of middle managers in strategy processes has 
been the subject of growing attention (e.g. Jarzabkowski and Balugan, 2009; Pappas and Wooldridge, 
2007; Currie and Procter, 2005). The potential positive effects of involving middle managers in the 
strategy process have been proven to be easier strategy implementation (Conway and Monks, 2010; 
Vilá and Canales, 2008), higher responsiveness to environmental change (Ansoff, 1979) and middle 
managers acting as a source of new innovations due to their close contact with the market and front-end 
managers (Mantare, 2008; Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007; Yang et al., 2010). The involvement of 
middle managers in strategy processes can also be seen to greatly facilitate the creation of 
psychological ownership. Kuvaas (2006) found that highly educated workers more easily developed 
psychological ownership due to interesting work and job influence, while Pierce et al. (2001, 2003, 
2009) found that task significance, autonomy and feedback all constitute paths to psychological 
ownership. This suggests that by involving the (more) educated middle managers in the significant task 
of strategy-making and allowing them to exercise influence on their job would lead to the creation of 
psychological ownership.  
Psychological ownership in organisations has been seen to mediate citizenship behaviour and 
performance (e.g. O’Driscoll et al., 2006; Van Dyne and Pierce, 2004; Pierce et al., 2003), job 
satisfaction and organisational commitment (O’Driscoll et al., 2006; VandeWalle et al., 1995) and 
stewardship, personal sacrifice and risk, and caring and protective behaviour toward the company 
(Dirks et al., 1996; Pierce et al., 2003). This article argues that the positive effects of ESO, a 
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participative leadership style and involvement of middle managers in strategy processes are not 
prompted by the economic incentive effects of ESO or the fact that involvement in itself creates more 
innovations or better strategy implementation, but evolve from the possible creation of psychological 
ownership and its positive effects on job attitudes, loyalty and commitment.            
The level of involvement, autonomy, feedback and perception of control at the middle management 
level is generated by a top management leadership style that encourages and supports involvement and 
autonomy, allowing middle managers to experiment with new ideas and accepting and communicating 
that errors are to be expected in a dynamic organisation which needs to constantly innovate and change 
(Choi, 2004). This article tests the effect of ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and a 
participative leadership style on the creation of psychological ownership and company performance in 
297 of the top 500 Danish companies. The paper uses structural equation to test both the direct effect of 
ESO, involvement and leadership style on company performance and the indirect effect by testing the 
three factors as determinants of psychological ownership and psychological ownership’s effect on 
company performance. The tests reveal that no direct effect of ESO, involvement and leadership style 
can be found when including psychological ownership as an explanatory factor indicating that, in 
themselves, neither ESO nor involvement nor a participative leadership style are able to drive higher 
company performance but only have an effect through the creation of psychological ownership.  
The study also finds that psychological ownership is a strong predictor of company performance and 
significantly reports that an increase in psychological ownership boosts company performance with 
12%. This paper’s contribution lies in its augmentation of our understanding of the effects of ESO and 
involvement of middle managers by suggesting that the concepts per se have no direct effect on 
company performance but may be seen as determinants of psychological ownership. The findings also 
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underline the importance of psychological ownership as a significant mediating source to company 
performance.  Based on the results, the author calls for more research on combining involvement of 
middle managers and ESO with other initiatives supporting the creation of psychological ownership. If 
involvement and ESO primarily work through the creation of psychological ownership, the possible 
positive effects such as increased information sharing, innovations and improved strategy 
implementation can be expected to be moderated by organisational settings, worker and job 
characteristics and the personal experience of the job; all determinants of psychological ownership.   
The paper starts with a review of the existing literature on employee stock ownership, involvement of 
middle managers in strategy, the participative leadership style and the concept of psychological 
ownership, followed by hypothesis development, a method section and a discussion and conclusion 
section. 
 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
The use of ESO in companies has increased over the last three decades from only a few companies in 
the 1970s to a reported 24% of all American workers being covered by an employee stock ownership 
plan (ESOP) in 1999 (Rogers, 1999). Based on agency theory, ESO is found to align the interest of the 
employee with the interest of the company increasing effort, commitment and loyalty (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Pendleton, 2010). It has been discussed if the effect of formal ownership through an 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is caused by the mere ownership, the intrinsic motivation of 
exercising formal ownership rights like involvement and information, or the potential economic reward 
of the stocks (Klein, 1987; Pendleton, 2010). A majority of the research supports the intrinsic 
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motivation theory, while only a few analyses support the other two. This suggest that the performance 
effect of ESO is somehow linked to the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation as discussed in the 
self-determination theory (SDT) developed by Ryan and Deci (2000).   
The effect of ESO on company performance has been tested in 33 different studies (Blasi et al., 2003) 
reporting positive as well as neutral findings. On average, productivity is improved by 4-5% in the year 
of ESOP introduction and the improvement is sustained in the following years. The effect of ESO on 
company performance is moderated by 1) the possibility to exercise formal ownership rights, 2) 
management’s philosophical commitment to the plan, 3) employee participation in decision-making 
and 4) the creation of psychological ownership. The formal ownership rights refer to possession of 
shares, influence on the company and access to information (Klein, 1987; Long, 1977; Pierce, 
Rubenfeld and Morgan, 1991), while management’s philosophical commitment to the plan addresses 
management’s willingness to grant employees access to influence on jobs and decisions (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). All four of the moderating factors stress that when introducing ESO in a company, the 
expected positive effect on company performance is created not through a reduction of agency cost due 
to an economic incentive, but mediated by increased involvement, information sharing and allowing 
employees to exercise control and influence on their own tasks as well as on more general company 
procedures and strategic actions.    
 
INVOLVEMENT OF MIDDLE MANAGERS IN STRATEGY 
Involvement of middle managers in strategy processes has been the subject of growing attention due to 
the middle managers’ unique access to both top management and front-end managers. The importance 
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of middle managers in strategy processes was recognised by Mintzberg and Waters (1985) defining 
realised strategy as the combined effect of deliberate strategy by top management and emergent 
strategic actions performed by middle managers. The effect of middle management involvement is 
considered multidimensional and may consist of increased issue selling activities (Conway and Monks, 
2010; Ling, Floyd and Baldridge, 2005; Yang et al., 2010), middle managers acting as agents of change 
(Huy, 2002), increased innovation (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999), easier strategy implementation 
(Boyett and Currie, 2004; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009) and 
increased company performance (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990; Mair, 2005). However, the potential 
effects of middle management involvement are not purely positive as they are seen to increase the risk 
of foot-dragging and sabotage (Guth and MacMillan, 1986), destructive interventions (Meyer) and 
opportunism (Sillince and Mueller, 2007). Moreover, only a few large-scale empirical analyses have 
tested the effect of involvement on company performance and with varying results. Meir (2005) found 
increased business unit performance due to middle managers’ strategic actions, but only used one large 
company as test unit, while a cross-sectional analysis by Andersen (2004) on 185 American companies 
unearthed an interaction effect of autonomy and environmental dynamism on company performance, 
while no significant effect of participation was reported. Wooldridge et al. (2008) conclude that even 
though some evidence is found to support a positive organisational performance caused by middle 
management involvement, much more research is needed to understand the relationships and the 
motivational effects on the individual level of the phenomenon.  
The previously discussed concepts of ESO and middle management involvement can be found to 
potentially increase company performance if middle managers are motivated to act in the best interest 
of the company. Earlier research is mainly based on the assumption that introducing ESO or involving 
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middle managers in strategy processes created the desired extrinsic or intrinsic motivation in itself even 
though the empirical evidence of the expected effects on company performance was more ambiguous. 
This indicates that implementing ESO or involvement needs to be combined with actions that increase 
middle management motivation and create a perception of “this is my company” measured as 
psychological ownership. The motivation to get involved and the internalisation of extrinsic motivation 
are highly dependent on the leadership style conducted which has the potential to both support and 
constrain the willingness to get involved (Mantera and Vaara, 2008). This highlights the need for a 
participative leadership style that supports, encourages and expects involvement. 
 
PARTICIPATIVE LEADERSHIP STYLE 
A participative leadership style supports the involvement of employees in organisational decisions by 
consulting them before decisions are made (Kaufman, 2001). Additionally, the leadership style 
encourages empowerment in that it distributes the decision authority to the lowest possible level 
capable of making a competent decision (Seibert, Silver and Randolph, 2004). This is accomplished by 
creating a culture and an organisational setting which make provision for, value and expect the opinion 
from and participation of the employee (Emery, 1995). Especially middle managers are found to be 
motivated by involvement (Hyang et al., 2010) due to the possibility to influence their own work 
settings and the development of the company. 
The participative leadership style is reported to increase decision quality ons (Scully et al., 1995), 
increase employee motivation and commitment (Locke et al., 1990; Yiing and Ahmad, 2009) and 
enhance psychological empowerment (Eby et al., 1999). The effect on company performance is found 
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to be mediated by psychological empowerment (Zhang and Bartol, 2010) highlighting the need for 
internalised extrinsic motivation. 
Spreitzer (1995) defines psychological empowerment as “an individual’s experience of intrinsic 
motivation that is based on cognition about him- or herself in relation to his or her work role”.  The 
construct is composed by four cognitions: Meaning, competence, self-determination and impact 
(Conger et al., 1988; Spretizer, 1995) and it can be seen that involvement in strategic decisions meets 
all four.  
Despite a desire to involve middle managers, top management might still restrain involvement due to 
an organisational setting that creates obstacles for involvement, unclear rules on how to participate or 
systems that only allow employees with specific skills to participate (Mantera and Vaara, 2008). To 
avoid this, rules and the systems alike need to be clear, flexible and easy to understand by all 
employees. Additionally, top management needs to actively seek the opinions of the employees and 
engage in constructive controversy in the form of open-minded discussions of opposing positions 
(Ekaterini, 2010). This can only be done in a safe environment which has clear rules of participation 
and which is built on a relationship based on trust and respect. 
When analysing the three research streams presented above, it emerges that despite a strong theoretical 
base, the empirical evidence of the performance effects is more diverse. Similarly, the performance 
effects of all three concepts seem to be mediated by internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of 
organisational citizenship, psychological empowerment or psychological ownership. This raises the 
question whether the effect of the three concepts is caused by the potential creation of psychological 
ownership. To further analyse this relationship, a better understanding of the concept of psychological 
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ownership and the motivation of middle managers seems warranted and will be addressed in the 
following section.      
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP 
The concept of psychological ownership has been investigated within consumer behaviour (Belk, 
1988), child development (Isaacs, 1933; Kline and France, 1899), philosophy (Heidegger, 1927; Sartre, 
1943) and within organisations (Dirks, Cummings and Pierce, 1996; Pierce, Kostova and Dirks, 2001; 
Pratt and Dutton, 2000; Van Dyne and Pierce, 2004; Wagner, Parker and Christiansen, 2003; Pierce, 
Jussila and Cummings, 2009). Pierce et al. (2003:86) define it as “the state in which individuals feel as 
though the target of ownership or a piece of that target is “theirs””. Psychological ownership has been 
linked to a number of positive effects like increased organisational commitment (O’Driscoll et al., 
2006; VandeWalle et al., 1995), stewardship (Dirks et al., 1996; Pierce et al., 2003) and increased 
company performance (Pierce and Rodgers, 2004; O’Driscoll et al., 2006). The research on 
psychological ownership explores three main areas: the roots of psychological ownership, defined as 
the human motives for creating a feeling of psychological ownership toward an object or an idea, the 
organisational and personal determinants and the organisational effect of increasing the level of 
psychological ownership.  
The roots of psychological ownership are found in five human motives that describe the human need of 
creating a sense of ownership toward an object or an idea. Pierce et al. (2003) define three: a) Efficacy 
and effectance, b) self-identity and c) having a place, while Avey et al. (2009) add d) territoriality and 
e) accountability. 
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Efficacy and effectance focus on the human need to feel in control and capable of successfully 
completing a specific task (Bandura, 1977). By creating a sense of ownership, people feel that they 
gain total control of the object and thereby increase the possibility of successfully completing any task 
related to the object (Dittmar, 1992). 
Self-identity is created through the interaction with others and viewing oneself from the perspective of 
others (Dittmar, 1992, Mead, 1934); it is partly created by the objects which we own or control and the 
meaning and importance ascribed to them by society (McCracken, 1986; Mead, 1934; Pierce et al., 
2003). “Thus, it is through our interaction with our possessions, coupled with reflection on their 
meaning, that our sense of identity, our self-definition, are established, maintained, reproduced and 
transformed” (Dittmar, 1992, p. 86; Pierce et al., 2003). Thus, people need to feel ownership to and 
exercise control of objects valued by society to create self-identity.  
Having a place or belongingness is based on the need for feeling safe and having a territorial core or 
reference point around which people structure their daily lives (Porteus, 1976; Weil, 1949, 1952). Kron 
(1983) referred to having a place as a home and a place of refuge and ones roots stating that humans 
need to create feelings of ownership toward an object to feel safe and achieve a sense of belongingness.  
Territoriality is closely related to belongingness and encompasses actions taken to protect territories 
and to “communicate ownership to potential threats and the social unit as a whole” (Avey et al., 2009). 
Territoriality is addressed by Brown et al. (2005, p. 577) stating that “Organizational members can and 
do become territorial over physical spaces, ideas, relationships and other potential possessions in 
organizations” and refers to a human need for experiencing acceptance by the surrounding society in 
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terms of the feeling of ownership to the object. Thus, territoriality is seen as both a root to 
psychological ownership and a potential behavioural outcome of the concept. 
Accountability is “the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, 
feelings and actions to others” (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999, p. 255). Accountability is based on the 
human need for respect and being considered important and valued. By feeling ownership toward an 
object, people gain control and therefore need to be included in decisions regarding the object, 
increasing the level of accountability.  
The five human motives from the research stream on psychological ownership are closely related to the 
three needs addressed by Ryan and Deci (2000) leading to internalised extrinsic motivation. These 
needs are competence (accountability, self-identity), relatedness (having a place, territoriality) and 
autonomy (Efficacy and effectance). This allows us to draw on the findings from self-determination 
theory (SDT) in order to gain a deeper understanding of how middle managers get motivated and how 
they internalise the goals and the success of the company and thereby create psychological ownership. 
The determinants of psychological ownership found in the literature can be divided into organisational 
settings, worker and job characteristics and the personal experience of the job. The organisational 
settings are addressed by Pierce et al. (1991) who state that equity possession, information sharing and 
influence on the organisation promote the creation of psychological ownership. While the formal equity 
possession in itself has been found not to create psychological ownership, the combination of formal 
ownership with the experience of exercising the expected ownership rights: 1) the right to posses some 
shares of the object’s physical being and/or financial value 2) the right to exercise influence on the 
object owned and 3) the right to information about the status of the object (Pierce et al. 1991) has been 
Page 161 
 
found to create psychological ownership. Klein (1987) demonstrated that it is not the share of the 
company owned by the employee that creates employee attitudes like psychological ownership; just 
owning some stocks (combined with experienced ownership expectation) has an effect. No significant 
effect was found between the share owned and employee attitudes. Information sharing and influence 
on the organisation were also found to mediate psychological ownership, based on Long’s (1978) 
findings suggesting that influence on (participation in) decision-making increased the perception of 
influence among employees, in turn affecting employee attitudes and behaviour. These observations are 
also in keeping with the roots of psychological ownership suggesting that efficacy (control) and 
accountability (being included in the decision process) are the human experiences that promote the 
creation of psychological ownership; this hints that the three organisational determinants need to be 
combined in order to create psychological ownership. 
The worker and job characteristics are addressed by Kuvaas (2006) reporting that highly educated 
workers more easily develop affective unit commitment without bonus pay due to the creation of 
intrinsic motivation caused by interesting work content and appreciative organisations valuing the 
employees’ work efforts. Pierce et al. (2009) extended the job characteristic model by testing the effect 
of the characteristics of the job design on the creation of psychological ownership. Kuvaas (2006) 
tested the effect of base pay on affective commitment and found that highly educated employees with 
high base pays had a higher intrinsic motivation and affective commitment than low-educated 
employees with low base pays. He also found that variable pay to highly educated employees did not 
affect company performance while the high base pay had a significantly positive effect on company 
performance, indicating that highly educated employees (i.e. knowledge workers) are more motivated 
by intrinsic motivation like autonomy, self-regulation and trust than by extrinsic motivation like 
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variable pay. Similar findings were reported by Gagné and Deci (2005). The above findings imply that 
the creation of psychological ownership prompted by autonomy, trust and involvement is mediated by 
the educational level of the employees; this suggests that sectors with high task complexity and 
knowledge intensity are able to create a sense of psychological ownership more easily. It can also be 
argued that the need for creating psychological ownership is higher in specific sectors. Pierce et al. 
(2009) extended the job characteristic model by testing the effect of the characteristics of the job design 
on the personal experience of control, intimate knowing and investment of oneself. They found that 
skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback all supported one or more of the 
three personal paths to psychological ownership. At the individual level, Pierce et al. (2001, 2003) 
found that the experience of exercising control of the target of ownership, coming to know the target 
intimately or through an investment of one’s self in the target lead to the creation of psychological 
ownership. Thus, they found that specific organisational settings and worker and job characteristics can 
be controlled by the company to support the personal experiences leading to the individual creation of 
psychological ownership.  
While most of the recent literature has been focusing on the positive effects of psychological 
ownership, the work of Brown et al. (2005) sophisticates our view on the effects by introducing 
territorial behavioural effects as an effect of psychological ownership. These behavioural effects can be 
seen as both functional (positive) or dysfunctional (negative) depending on whom they are directed at 
and when and how they are applied. Brown et al. (2005) describe territorial behaviour as: 
“Communication of the boundaries of one’s territory to others, behavior to maintain an attachment to 
an object and behavior to defend the territory”. Especially the defensive behaviour may prompt 
dysfunctional actions, both as anticipative defensive actions meant to prevent an infringement and 
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reactionary defensive behaviour to attack the infringement and regain the territory. Particularly when 
the employees’ self-identity is defined by the object of ownership and the employees have “invested 
themselves” into the object, the defensive behaviour can become destructive from the organisation’s 
point of view. While the explorations of the negative effects of psychological ownership are limited 
and call for further investigation, the positive effects have been addressed in a number of ways. 
O’Driscoll et al. (2006) tested the effect of work environment structure on 239 New Zealand workers 
and their managers and found that less structured work environments mediated by psychological 
ownership increased employee citizenship behaviour and organisational commitment. Using three case 
studies involving more than 800 employees, Van Dyne (2004) found a positive effect on employee 
attitudes (organisational commitment, job satisfaction and organisation-based self-esteem) and work 
behaviour (performance and organisational citizenship).Other positive effects have been conceptualised 
by Pierce et al. (2001, 2003) linking stewardship, personal sacrifice and risk, promotion of 
organisational change and caring and protective behaviour toward the target of ownership with 
psychological ownership. While the behavioural effects of psychological ownership are addressed in a 
number of studies mentioned above, only a few studies have tested the direct effect on company 
performance. Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) tested the effect of psychological ownership on employee 
performance in three field samples from the USA. A positive correlation was reported between 
psychological ownership and employee performance, but no significance was found in the model when 
accounting for demographic controls. 
In conclusion, the roots to psychological ownership are generally based on five human motives 
(efficacy and effectance, self-identity, having a place, territoriality and accountability), while the 
determinants studied are companies’ organisational settings (equity possession, information sharing 
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and influence), worker and job characteristics (skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy 
and feedback) and the personal experience of the job (control, intimate knowing and investment of 
self). The effects of psychological ownership can be found to be either negative or positive leading to 
destructive territoriality actions or increased commitment, job satisfaction, loyalty and company 
performance. This calls for further individual-level research into the process of creating psychological 
ownership as a mediating factor increasing the positive effects of ESO, involvement of middle 
managers in strategy and a participative leadership style.  
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The main theoretical background explaining the effect of ESO is found in agency theory, where the 
interests of the utility-maximising employees are not congruent with those of the principal (Pendleton, 
2006) and where employees might engage in discretionary behaviour, moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Holmstrom, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989). It has been argued that collective incentive 
programmes like profit sharing or employee ownership can reduce the agency costs by aligning 
employee interests. A number of studies have analysed the effect of ESO on employee behaviour, 
commitment and job satisfaction (Beatty, 1994; Drago and Heywood, 1995, Kruse, 1996; Jones and 
Pliskin, 1997) while another body of analyses focus on the effect on company performance (McNabb 
and Whitfield, 1998; Addison and Belfield, 2000, 2001; Sesil et al., 2002). The two areas are connected 
in the sense that the effect on employee behaviour is seen to affect company performance by reducing 
or eliminating the agency costs and increasing commitment and participation. In the literature, 
collective incentives like ESO have been seen as an alternative to individual incentive programmes and 
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are in some studies found to be a weaker incentive due to the risk of free riders and the weak 
connection between the individual performance and the pay. However, the collective incentives have 
been advocated in companies where the individual employee performance is costly to observe because 
of the type of job design or work organisation (Cheadle, 1990; Kruse, 1996; Jones, Kato and Pliskin, 
1997) or if individual incentives are costly to operate (Jones and Pliskin, 1997). Some studies have 
analysed the combined effect of individual and collective incentives and found that a combination of 
the two might reduce some of the distortion effects (Prendergast, 1999). Distortion effects arise when 
employees have multiple tasks with different levels of measurability; the use of ESO will encourage the 
employees to focus on a broader range of outcomes and factors than incorporated in an individual 
incentive programme which focuses on short-term financial and output goals (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996). 
While most extrinsic motivational instruments demonstrate a positive connection between the 
motivational effect and the size of the possible reward, analyses of ESO have shown that the size of the 
employees’ equity stake in the company had no influence on the level of motivation and commitment 
(Hammer and Stern, 1980). This suggests that it is not the possible financial reward that generates the 
effect of employee stock ownership plans. Instead, it is the psychological sense of ownership, the 
experience of trust from the employer and the possibility to influence one’s own work situation which 
create the motivation, loyalty and desire to participate. A number of analyses find that the company is 
unable to achieve the motivation and participation effect without the financial participation, as referred 
to in Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein (2003:176) “telling employees to take ownership of their jobs rings 
hollow if management doesn’t offer actual financial ownership or some share in the improved 
performance… without wealth sharing in some form, it feels like the company is just trying to con you 
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into working harder”. It is therefore seen that ESO, if combined with the possibility to exercise formal 
ownership rights, increases the creation of psychological ownership. This leads to the development of 
hypothesis number 1: 
Hypothesis 1: Employee stock ownership increases the level of psychological ownership among middle 
managers. 
Influence, autonomy, educational level of the employees and task significance were found to be some 
of the determinants of psychological ownership (Kuvaas, 2006; Pierce et al., 1991; Pierce et al., 2009) 
indicating that involvement of middle managers in strategy processes may be expected to have a high 
impact on the creation of psychological ownership due to involvement and high task significance. 
Earlier theoretical and empirical analyses of the effect of involving middle managers in the strategy 
process have reported easier strategy implementation in firms with middle managers acting as agents of 
change (Rouleau, 2005; Sillince and Mueller, 2007; Vilá and Canales, 2008) or increased 
intrapreneurship due to middle managers’ close contact with customers, front-end managers and easy 
access to top management (Mantere, 2008; Laine and Vaara, 2007; Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007). 
Despite the reported positive effect of middle management involvement, research has failed to deliver 
strong proof of the effect on company performance implying that we need to increase our knowledge of 
the individual level of involvement. A key problem is how to motivate middle managers to become 
involved in strategic processes and to do so in the core interest of the company. Guth and MacMillan 
(1986) reported increased foot-dragging and sabotage due to involvement while other scholars have 
demonstrated increased occurrence of destructive interventions or opportunism (Mair, 2005; Sillince 
and Mueller, 2007). The use of economic incentives or even promotions can be argued only to have a 
limited effect due to the long-term perspective of the actions and the lack of possibility to identify the 
Page 167 
 
outcome. To create a positive effect of involvement, the company needs to create internalised extrinsic 
motivation among middle managers encouraging them to act as if the company was theirs, i.e. create a 
sense of ownership. This sense of ownership can be expected to develop by not only allowing middle 
managers to be involved in the strategy process, but by doing it through a leadership style that signals 
that middle management involvement and the implied participation and autonomous actions are not 
only accepted, but expected, appreciated and supported by top management. Pierce et al. (2009) find 
that feedback from top management is instrumental in creating an intimate association between 
employees and their jobs and that distributing decision authority to the employees creates a sense of 
autonomy that supports both a feeling of control and investment of oneself in the work, all of which 
support the creation of psychological ownership. Management attitudes toward involvement and 
autonomy can therefore be seen as a formal distribution of decision authority and a support of 
employees’ autonomous decisions. This is enhanced by an attitude signalling acceptance of the fact that 
a significant part of all decisions will fail or be less successful than expected and that it is better to have 
tried and failed, than to have never tried at all. Such a management style will increase the employees’ 
sense of importance and the trust experienced from top management. In addition, this increases the 
employees’ self-identity in that they sense that they are considered important and given responsibilities 
and increases the feeling of territoriality within the job. The effect of a leadership style that supports 
participation and autonomy can then be expected to mediate the creation of psychological ownership on 
the individual level by supporting the individual experiences of involvement and importance. This 
leads to hypothesis number 2: 
Hypothesis 2: Middle managers employed in companies with a leadership style that supports and 
encourages involvement and autonomy have a higher level of psychological ownership. 
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Involvement in strategic decisions increases the perception of influence, control and accountability and 
has been found to be a route to increased motivation (Pierce et al., 2009). The literature on 
psychological ownership and SDT alike stresses the importance of involvement as a determinant of 
psychological ownership and internalised extrinsic motivation (Avey et al., 2009; Ryan and Deci, 
2000). Involvement in strategy is also argued to be instrumental in easing strategy implementation 
(Vilá and Canales, 2008) and increasing innovations and entrepreneurship in companies (Mantera, 
2008; Pappas and Wooldridge, 2007). Based on the latter, involvement can be expected to increase 
company performance and a number of analyses have tested this relationship. Despite strong empirical 
evidence supporting a number of positive effects of involvement, the empirical proof of performance 
effects is limited and diverse. Wooldridge et al. (2008) concluded in their analyses of the middle 
management literature that although some evidence of a positive relationship between involvement and 
performance existed, much more research was warranted. Mantera and Vaara (2008) reported that the 
effect of involvement seems to be mediated by psychological ownership, suggesting that without the 
creation of internalised extrinsic motivation, the positive effects of involvement are limited. This leads 
to the hypothesis that involvement increases psychological ownership and that no direct effect on 
performance can be expected. 
Hypothesis 3: Involvement of middle managers in strategy increases the level of psychological 
ownership among middle managers. 
The effects of psychological ownership are mainly tested on the behavioural outcome on both the 
individual and the organisational level. The positive behavioural effects have been found to be: acts of 
good citizenship (O’Driscoll et al., 2006; VandeWalle, Van Dyne and Kostova, 1995; Van Dyne and 
Pierce, 2004), low levels of alienation (Van Dyne and Pierce, 1993), psychological empowerment 
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DATA COLLECTION, MEASURES AND METHODS 
Data for the present study was collected by means of a cross-sectional mail survey as part of a larger 
research project. The 500 largest Danish firms (measured by the number of employees listed in 
“Kobmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau”) were approached with a two-page survey instrument in late 
November 2009. The 500 firms cover a broad set of industries, including basic material, 
manufacturing, utilities, retailing, financial services and other services and have at least 225 full-time 
employees. In addition to the number of employees, the database also provides information about the 
firms’ financial figures from 2004 to 2009, the industry code of their main business, stock listing and 
founding year. The questionnaire was initially tested on three middle managers to receive an 
impression of how the questions were perceived. Subsequently, the questionnaire was tested on a 
sample not included in the main dataset of 87 managers from 57 firms to test the robustness of the 
constructs. The pre-tests raised no concerns.  
 In a first step, the respective firm’s CFO or head of accounting was contacted by a personalised cover 
letter and a questionnaire instrument capturing ESO usage, involvement and autonomy, leadership 
style, individual and organisational psychological sense of ownership and some additional questions 
which serve control purposes in the present analysis (see below). About a week later, a second letter 
with the questionnaire was sent to the ones that had not yet responded to the initial mailing. These two 
waves produced a total of 149 responses. In a third step in December, the remaining individuals that 
had not reacted to our mailed survey were contacted by phone and asked to participate in the survey. 
Out of these, 167 were willing to participate and responded to the questionnaire items on the phone. 
Careful inspection for completeness and plausibility of the responses led to the elimination of nineteen 
answers (one firm had actually received and answered the questionnaire twice, one firm was in the 
Page 171 
 
process of liquidation, three firms had severely reduced the number of employees during the fall of 
2009, thus no longer exhibiting the required number of employees, the other responses were severely 
incomplete or implausible). Thus, a total of 297 answers from a broad set of industries were retained 
(i.e. a response rate of 59.4%).  
To increase the validity and reliability of the answers, a new questionnaire was sent by mail to heads of 
marketing/sales in the 297 companies in February 2010, a second letter was sent two weeks later to the 
non-respondents and finally, the remaining companies were contacted by phone, resulting in a total of 
207 answers (i.e. a response rate of 69.7% of the initial 297 companies). Similarly, a randomly chosen 
middle manager in each of the 297 companies was contacted by phone and asked to answer a one-page 
questionnaire, thus collecting answers from different organisational layers and retrieving multiple 
answers from the companies. A total of 210 middle managers from the 297 companies answered the 
questionnaire (i.e. a response rate of 70.7% of the initial 297 companies). 
The hypotheses will be tested in a Structured Equation Model (SEM) using AMOS SEM software in a 
two stage procedure recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). The first stage involves 
estimation of the measurement model using confirmation factor analysis to determine convergent and 
discriminant validity. The second stage involves comparing the theoretical model with the 
measurement model. Based on the results of the test, the theoretical model will be used to provide path 
coefficients for the hypothesis test. Additional fit measures like Goodness of Fit Index (CFI) and Root 
Mean Square Residual (RMSEA) will be calculated to test the model fit as recommended by Gerbing 
and Anderson (1992). 
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Measures 
To the greatest extent possible, the study builds on existing scales from the literature.  
ESO usage: The definitions of ESO employing companies are diverse throughout the literature. Some 
scholars use a broad definition stating that if more than one employee receives payment from an ESOP, 
the company is considered an ESO employing company (Sengupta et al., 2007). Pendleton et al. (2001) 
distinguish between narrow and broad-based schemes; the latter being schemes where more than 50% 
of the employees are covered by the scheme and the former are schemes covering less than 50% of the 
employees. It could also be argued that the share of the company owned by the employees could be 
used as a measure indicating that the higher percentage of the company owned by the employees, the 
higher is the effect on the creation of psychological ownership. This, however, is rejected by Hammer 
and Stern (1980) who found that the size of the employees’ equity stake in the company had no 
influence on the level of motivation and commitment. This indicates that the more employees covered 
by the scheme, the higher is the effect on the creation of psychological ownership. Since the 
involvement in the strategy process focuses on top and middle management, the share of top and 
middle managers covered by the scheme will be measured using two five-item Likert scales measuring 
the share of top managers and middle managers owning shares in the company (none, some, half, 
majority or all (value 1 to 5)). A total score is then calculated by adding up the two values. A number 
of different combinations of the shares can be found but in general, the share is seen to be in decline at 
lower organisational levels. This indicates that a combination of no top managers owning shares and all 
middle managers owning shares will not occur.  
Page 173 
 
Leadership style: Assessment of top management’s style of reaction to and climate for middle manager 
involvement was facilitated by an instrument for leadership style and climate specifically developed for 
the present study on the basis of previous research conducted by Choi (2004). The instrument took the 
limited time available for top and middle managers to answer a questionnaire into account and 
therefore concentrated on the leadership climate for involvement/autonomous strategic action only – 
leaving aside other aspects of (more broadly defined) leadership style and climate in terms of 
individual work effort or work duration or the like. The resulting four-item measure asked middle 
managers to rate to which degree their superiors were open to their ideas and willing to let them 
experiment with new concepts or products on a 7-point Likert scale (1=fully disagree, 7=fully agree). 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.859 and the factor analysis identified a single factor with an eigenvalue above 
one (eigenvalue of 2.814). The confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the items loaded with 0.812 
to 0.864 on this factor (see table 1).  
Involvement in strategy processes: Involvement of middle managers in strategy processes can be 
realised by allowing middle managers to participate in strategic decisions (Andersen, 2004) or by 
granting middle managers the autonomy to make strategic decisions without prior approval by top 
management. The measurement of participation was based on five questions using a 7-point Likert 
scale previously used by Andersen (2004) exploring the frequency of middle management participation 
in different strategic actions. The measurement of autonomy examined the frequency of middle 
manager autonomy in strategic actions based on the same five strategic decisions as used for measuring 
participation. The autonomy items used a 7-point Likert scale measuring the frequency from never to 
always which is similar to a scale used by Andersen and Nielsen (2009). To test if the concepts could 
be considered one or two variables, a rotated explorative factor analysis was conducted on all ten items. 
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The factor analysis returned three factors with an eigenvalue above one. Questions 1-3 on participation 
loaded on one factor measuring participation in market-oriented strategic actions, while question 1-3 on 
autonomy loaded on another factor measuring market-oriented autonomous strategic actions. Questions 
4-5 on participation and 4-5 on autonomy loaded on the third factor measuring involvement in internal 
strategic actions. To strengthen the test, similar rotated factor analyses were conducted on the answers 
from the heads of marketing and the middle managers; these produced identical results.  
The two factors measuring involvement in market-oriented strategic actions will be applied on the 
grounds that the two items of internal strategic actions are found to theoretically differ from the market-
oriented items and can be eliminated as recommended by Costello and Osborne (2005).    
A confirmatory factor analysis of the three participation items exhibited a satisfactory Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.815, a single factor with an eigenvalue above one (eigenvalue=2.217) and factor loadings 
between 0.749 and 0.918. A similar confirmatory factor analysis of the three autonomy items also 
exhibited a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of 0.840, a single factor with an eigenvalue above one 
(eigenvalue=2.275) and factor loadings between 0.822 and 0.901 (see table 1). 
 
TABLE 1: FACTOR LOADINGS AND RELIABILITIES
Dimensions and variables n Cronbach's alpha Extracted variance Factor loadings Indicator reliability
Leadershipstyle 295.00 0.859 70.34%
Topmanagement activly seeks MM opinions and ideas on strategic issues 0.864 0.746
Topmanagement are open to new ideers and initiatives from all employees 0.832 0.692
Topmanagement appriciate that MM experiments with new ideers and products 0.812 0.659
Topmanagement ensure that the interest of MM are considered when making 
strategic decisions 0.846 0.716
Psychological ownership 296.00 0.862 70.71%
I feel that this is MY company 0.926 0.857
The majority of employees feel that this is OUR company 0.806 0.650
I feel an ownership to and responsibility of the development of the company 0.767 0.588
I find it hard to think about this as MY company (reversed coded) 0.856 0.733
Participation in decisions (MM participate in the decisions of) 296.00 0.815 73.90%
Activities aiming at enhancing market position 0.902 0.814
Sales to new segments or markets 0.948 0.899
Development of important new products 0.749 0.561
Autonomy (MM can make decisions alone without prior approval) 296.00 0.840 75.82%
Activities aiming at enhancing market position 0.888 0.789
Sales to new segments or markets 0.901 0.812
Development of important new products 0.822 0.676
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Psychological ownership: Four questions measuring both the respondents’ perception of psychological 
ownership to the company and the organisational level of psychological ownership were based on a 
former study by Dyne and Pierce (2004). A 7-point Likert scale (1=fully disagree, 7=fully agree) was 
employed. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.862 and factor analysis identified a single factor with an eigenvalue 
above one (eigenvalue of 2.829). Confirmatory factor analysis found that the items loaded with 0.767 
to 0.926 on this factor. This indicates a strong connection between the respondents’ individual 
perception of ownership and the respondents’ perception of the entire organisation’s perception of 
ownership. The strength of the construct would have increased if more than two responses were 
obtained from employees at different organisational levels within the same company. This problem is 
partly addressed by measuring the respondents’ individual sense of ownership, of which they have a 
direct perception, and their perception of the organisation’s sense of ownership and by collecting two 
responses from two different organisational layers (see table 1). 
Company performance: The company performance can be measured in various ways, for instance, 
growth in turnover and net profit (Dess and Robinson, 1984), subjective evaluation of organisational 
performance (Machin and Stewart, 1996; Sengupta et al., 2007; Wall et al., 2004), return on assets 
(ROA) (Burton et al., 2002) or growth in number of employees (Kraus, Harms and Schwarz, 2006). 
Due to the fact that data was collected in late 2009/spring 2010, financial data of an earlier date cannot 
be used as a proxy of performance seeing that it would cause common-method bias. It can, however, be 
argued that the respondents’ perception of involvement, leadership style and psychological ownership 
is developed over a period of time and that a link can be made to the 2009 ROA. To adjust for sector, a 
standardised residual is calculated with ROA 2009 as a dependent variable and sector dummies as 
independent variables. 
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Control variables: The causal link between psychological sense of ownership and company 
performance will be controlled for sector based on 8 different sectors using the national NACE codes 
as referred above. Psychological ownership is controlled for tenure of the respondents as reported in 
Torp (2011). The use of size as a control variable has been widely discussed and potential endogeneity 
problems have been used to argue against controlling for size. 
 
Methods 
To avoid common method bias, data from multiple sources will be applied as recommended by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003). The performance measure is based on financial data collected from an official 
national database, while involvement, ESO, leadership style an psychological ownership are based on 
answers from the CFO and middle manager. This means that the average of two answers should 
represent the perception of the company and, incontrovertibly, an increased number of answers from 
each company would have strengthened the analysis. 
Initially, the validity of the responses was tested by conducting a paired sample t-test on the leadership 
style responses provided by heads of sales/marketing in 207 of the initial 297 companies who returned 
the initial questionnaire. The test has been conducted both on the mean of sum of the four questions 
and on each question. An average of the 199 paired companies showed 5.09 from the CFOs and middle 
managers and 5.03 from heads of sales/marketing with std. dev of 0.07 and 0.09 respectively. This 
yields a significance level of 0.587 rejecting the hypothesis that any difference exists and thus 
providing evidence to suggest that the answers given by the CFOs are representative for the company. 
All four questions in the construct were tested individually and turned out insignificant, again 
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supporting the expectation that the initial answers were representative for the company. A factor 
analysis was also conducted on the 207 answers from the heads of sales/marketing reporting only one 
factor with an eigenvalue above 1 (eigenvalue=2.607), a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.819 and factor loadings 
between 0.748 and 0.850. Similar analyses were conducted on the items and averages of participation 
and autonomy but with less conclusive results. 
A test for non-response bias was conducted on sector, size, turnover, age, capital structure, legal form, 
employee growth and a number of other financial data comparing the 297 respondents with the 
population of the 500 largest companies in Denmark. None of the tests gave rise to concern. A Harman 
1 factor test was conducted on all items reporting five factors with variance explained between 6.0% 
and 34.0% confirming the validity of the constructs 
The correlation matrix in table two shows that all correlations between independent variables are well 
below 0.7 raising no concern for multicollinarity. The table shows a significant positive correlation 
between ESO and psychological ownership, which supports hypothesis 1, and a very high and 
significant positive correlation of 0.61 between leadership style and psychological ownership, 
providing support for hypothesis 2. A significant positive correlation is also found between 
psychological ownership and ROA09, supporting hypothesis 4. The correlation between ESO and 
company performance is significantly positively correlated with both psychological ownership and 
ROA. This partly supports the findings of Hammer, Landau and Stern (1981) and Long (1978) stating 
that ESO by itself only has a weak effect on company performance; only in combination with the 
creation of psychological ownership is it successful in displaying a significant positive influence on 
company performance.  
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A number of OLS were run to test for multicollinarity. The variance inflation factors on all items were 
not higher than 1.5 and well below 9.5 (Kleinbaum et al., 1998; Lomax, 1992).  
Five models were tested in AMOS SEM testing the combined effect of the determinants of 
psychological ownership and the effect of psychological ownership on company performance. Before 
running the model, a test of normality was conducted as recommended by Hult et al. (2006). All 
variables were significantly normally distributed within the 0.001 level using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test of normality. The models were run on the raw data from the survey imported from PASW 18 and 
tested in AMOS 18. Reliability and validity of the constructs have been tested earlier using 
confirmatory factor analysis, all reporting reliable Cronbach’s alphas and factor loadings above 0.7 as 
recommended by Fornell and Larcker (1981). The fit of the models was tested using Normed Fit Index 
(NFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as 
recommended by Hult et al. (2006) and Gerbing and Anderson (1992). The Chi-Square test of model 
significance is disregarded due to large sample sizes (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996).  
 
  
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 ROA 09 0.00 0.99 -4.84 3.49 1
2 Participation1 4.96 1.25 1.00 7.00 .08 1
3 Participation2 4.77 1.38 1.00 7.00 .02 .81 *** 1
4 Participation3 4.67 1.42 1.00 7.00 .07 .48 *** .52 *** 1
5 Autonomy1 3.56 1.48 1.00 7.00 .04 .49 *** .50 *** .31 *** 1
6 Autonomy2 3.22 1.47 1.00 7.00 -.01 .41 *** .50 *** .26 *** .74 *** 1
7 Autonomy3 2.84 1.33 1.00 7.00 -.05 .18 *** .23 *** .40 *** .57 *** .60 *** 1
8 Leadership1 5.04 1.27 1.00 7.00 .05 .35 *** .35 *** .27 *** .18 *** .15 ** .18 *** 1
9 Leadership2 5.51 1.11 1.00 7.00 .00 .28 *** .26 *** .28 *** .14 ** .16 *** .12 ** .63 *** 1
10 Leadership3 4.97 1.16 1.50 7.00 .06 .32 *** .36 *** .33 *** .28 *** .24 *** .24 *** .57 *** .59 *** 1
11 Leadership4 4.85 1.13 1.00 7.00 .08 .27 *** .29 *** .26 *** .22 *** .15 ** .22 *** .68 *** .57 *** .58 *** 1
12 Psyk ownership1 5.68 1.11 1.00 7.00 .09 .34 *** .34 *** .27 *** .19 *** .11 * .08 .53 *** .48 *** .43 *** .51 *** 1
13 Psyk ownership2 5.04 0.98 1.00 7.00 .16 *** .32 *** .30 *** .28 *** .17 *** .11 * .08 .46 *** .48 *** .40 *** .45 *** .68 *** 1
14 Psyk ownership3 5.78 0.89 2.00 7.00 .10 .33 *** .32 *** .27 *** .18 *** .13 ** .08 .41 *** .34 *** .30 *** .42 *** .63 *** .48 *** 1
15 Psyk ownership4 6.25 0.96 1.00 7.00 .13 ** .26 *** .25 *** .22 *** .26 *** .16 *** .17 *** .41 *** .40 *** .41 *** .42 *** .78 *** .56 *** .51 *** 1
16 ESO 0.00 1.00 -0.57 2.71 .13 ** .09 .14 ** .09 .07 .06 .05 .09 .02 .09 .06 .13 ** .07 .10 * .11 * 1
17 Tenure 9.28 6.68 0.10 35.00 .11 * .10 * .06 .03 .09 .05 .07 .09 .14 ** .12 ** .08 .23 *** .11 * .20 *** .21 *** .09 1
n  = 297.  Significance of correlations: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
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Results 
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the validity and the reliability of the constructs. Table 1 
displays the factor loadings, Cronbach’s alpha and Average Variance Extracted (AVE). With factor 
loadings between 0.75 and 0.93, adequate Cronbach’s alphas and AVE>0.50 combined with a 
measurement model with good fit (CFI=0.9872 and RMSEA=0.0341 on participation and CFI=0.9850 
and RMSEA=0.0378 on autonomy), validity and reliability of the constructs and the model seem to be 
achieved. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among all items and none of the 
correlations between items loading on different constructs reported correlations >0.70 suggesting 
adequate discriminate validity. In the appendix, table 2A shows the correlations on the construct level 
which neither constitute grounds for concern.  
 
The structural model is used to test the structures among latent variables and does not test causality. To 
ensure validity of the model, all models tested should be derived from theory. Model 1 tests if ESO, a 
participative leadership and psychological ownership have a direct effect company performance. This 
would be in agreement with the theoretical foundation of the three concepts which suggests that all of 
them reduce agency costs or support strategy implementation. The fit indices showed poor fit and the 
regression weight on leadership style and involvement was insignificant, while psychological 
TABLE 3: Structural Equetion Models (AMOS)
Participation/autonomy
Model and description χ² Δχ² df NFI Delta2 TLI CFI RMSEA χ² Δχ² df NFI Delta2 TLI CFI RMSEA
0: Measurement model 87.32 65 0.9527 0.9875 0.9793 0.9872 0.0341 92.51 65 0.9521 0.9853 0.9757 0.9850 0.0378
1: Only direct effects on performance 290.92 75 0.8426 0.8782 0.8265 0.8761 0.0986 253.25 75 0.8580 0.8957 0.8514 0.8938 0.0896
2: Only mediated by psyc. Ownership 154.77 75 0.9162 0.9550 0.9359 0.9542 0.0599 126.29 *** 75 0.9292 0.0970 0.9572 0.9694 0.0481
3: Lead + inv mediated 153.34 76 0.9154 0.9547 0.9363 0.9539 0.0598 126.44 76 0.9291 0.9705 0.9585 0.9700 0.0474
4: Model 3 + 1 indirect effect 151.30 75 0.9181 0.9570 0.9387 0.9562 0.0586 124.98 75 0.9299 0.9708 0.9583 0.9702 0.0474
5: Model 3 + 2 indirect effects 102.24 *** 74 0.9447 0.9841 0.9770 0.9838 0.0359 107.09 *** 74 0.9400 0.9806 0.9720 0.9830 0.0389
Significance levels: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
Participation Autonomy
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ownership was significant. Model 2 tested the mediating effect of psychological ownership excluding 
any direct effects from ESO and leadership style on performance. This is based on the literature on 
psychological ownership, which finds that all three concepts should be determinants of psychological 
ownership. The model showed better fits, but the effect of ESO was insignificant suggesting that this 
path should be removed. Model 3 removed the effect of ESO in order to test if ESO should be removed 
from the model. Model 4 added the indirect effect of ESO on participation based on earlier findings 
(Pendleton, 2010) suggesting that the effect of ESO is mediated by participation. In model 5, the 
indirect effect of leadership style on involvement is added owing to the argument that companies 
exercising a participative leadership style increased the level of involvement among middle managers. 
To avoid eliminating of a model with a better fit, only one path is added or removed at a time; thus 
testing all models between the five models reported in the table. The fits are apparent from table 3. 
Table 3 shows that models 3, 4 and 5 all displayed good fits with CFI>0.95 and RSEA<0.05; however, 
a significant improvement in the fits emerges from model 4 to model 5, suggesting that model 5 is the 
most adequate model. The standardised betas of the participation model are evident from figure 2, 
while the autonomy betas are shown in figure 2A in the appendix.    
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testing of that connection, however, is lacking. The determinants and roots of psychological ownership 
have been investigated at the personal and organisational level while the importance of management 
attitudes remains uncharted territory. The effects of psychological ownership on employee behaviour, 
commitment and citizenship are addressed by a number of scholars assuming a positive effect on 
company performance while empirical tests and size of this effect constitute a gap in our understanding 
of the importance of psychological ownership. This research aims to close the above-mentioned gap by 
empirically testing the determinants of psychological ownership and the effect of psychological 
ownership on company performance on a large sample of Danish top 500 companies.  
 
Psychological ownership, determinants and effects 
The paper argues that to create a sense of psychological ownership among middle managers, formal 
ownership, involvement of middle managers and implementation of a leadership style that supports and 
encourages middle management involvement and autonomy in strategy processes need to come into 
play. The findings are only partly consistent with the findings of Pierce et al. (1991) who have 
theorised that equity possession is a determinant of psychological ownership, while involvement, 
autonomy and feedback have been propounded as determinants by Pierce et al. (2009). The paper finds 
that the effect of ESO on psychological ownership is mediated by participation, thus rejecting 
hypothesis 1. Autonomy failed to exhibit a mediating effect and no significant effect of ESO was 
reported. Participation was a significant determinant of psychological ownership which acts to support 
hypothesis 3 and, similarly, leadership style was a strong significant determinant of psychological 
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ownership, supporting hypothesis 2. No direct effects of ESO, involvement and participative leadership 
style were found on performance.  
The effects of psychological ownership can be found to be both functional and dysfunctional; they may 
increase commitment, job satisfaction, citizenship and (assumed) company performance or, on a 
negative note, lead to dysfunctional territorial actions. Introducing ESO in combination with the 
organisational settings could counteract such dysfunctional effects by creating an economic incentive to 
reduce the dysfunctional behaviour triggered by psychological ownership. The paper argues that the 
expected positive effects on employee attitudes will increase company performance. 
The findings suggest that ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and a participative 
leadership style have no effect on company performance per se but only an indirect effect through the 
creation of psychological ownership. This indicates that earlier reported positive effects of ESO 
(reduced agency costs or slack) and participation in strategy processes (increased information sharing, 
innovations, easier strategy implementation) can be argued to be effects of the creation of 
psychological ownership and increased commitment, job satisfaction and loyalty. These findings 
challenge our understanding of involvement as a determinant of company performance and suggest that 
involvement needs to be combined with other actions supporting the creation of psychological 
ownership. Since involvement in itself can lead to increased job motivation as well as foot-dragging 
and bureaucracy, an increased understanding of how to motivate employees to participate in strategy 
processes and to do so in the core interest of the company is pertinent. This study reveals that an 
increased focus on how to create psychological ownership and the related individual differences is 
highly warranted. Since psychological ownership has been proven to be a significant strong predictor 
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of company performance (increasing performance with 12%), a key research area in the new decade 
would be to investigate how to create, increase and maintain psychological ownership.        
 
Implications for research 
The present study suggests that the effect of a participative leadership style supporting middle 
management involvement in strategy processes is mediated by the creation of psychological ownership 
and it thereby increases our knowledge about the micro level effects of middle management 
involvement. The effect of involvement can be seen on information sharing, implementation and 
innovation alike, but without the creation of psychological ownership, the commitment and citizenship 
behaviour of middle managers will be lower and the performance effect similarly reduced. The 
argument that involvement per se increases company performance needs to be re-evaluated and 
research on middle management involvement needs to combine involvement with other initiatives that 
support the creation of psychological ownership. The possible downsides of involvement and 
autonomy addressed in the agency theory, e.g., slack, inefficient decision structures and sub-
optimisation, can be addressed by combining an economic incentive like ESO, a leadership style that 
encourages and supports involvement and autonomy and an increased focus on the creation of 
psychological ownership in the pursuit of commitment, citizenship and loyalty among middle 
managers.  
Especially in our increasingly dynamic world, one must bear in mind the vital importance of 
responsiveness, innovativeness and commitment enhanced by the creation of psychological ownership. 
Additionally, the importance of management attitudes toward involvement needs to be addressed to 
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investigate the relationship between leadership style and perceived involvement and how attitudes on 
different areas of involvement, autonomy, innovations and trial and error produce different effects on 
the creation of psychological ownership.  
 
Implications for practice 
The paper suggests that managers need to increase their focus on the creation of psychological 
ownership in the attempt to create commitment and willingness to be involved and enhance company 
performance. Especially the effect of management attitudes towards involvement underpins the 
importance of not only creating an organisational setting that allows for involvement and autonomy, 
but to combine it with incentives like ESO and to focus on the creation of psychological ownership. 
The setting needs to be complemented by management attitudes that not only accept involvement, but 
support, encourage and expect involvement, autonomy and idea testing from the middle managers. The 
significant effect of psychological ownership on company performance and the major effect reported in 
this analysis suggest that psychological ownership could be one of the most important factors in the 
creation of improved company performance.  
The paper also indicates that creating a formal ownership in itself through an ESOP has no effect on 
company performance, whereas introducing ESO in combination with participation has the potential to 
increase psychological ownership and thereby increase company performance. It can also be seen that 
the more people that are covered by the ESO scheme, the higher is the effect, suggesting that 
psychological ownership must be developed throughout the organisation and not only among a few key 
employees.              
Page 186 
 
 
Limitations and future research 
Qualifying the conclusions, the present study suffers from a number of limitations. While the survey in 
this study is cross-sectional, an analysis of individual sectors facing different dynamics and different 
educational levels among employees might foster different or more refined results. Simultaneously, 
while this study only investigates the effect of psychological ownership among top and middle 
managers, the effect of ESO and leadership style on the creation of psychological ownership on 
different organisational levels would enrich our understanding of the concept and allow us to 
investigate both the determinants and the effects of different factors.  
The paper finds a positive effect of ESO in terms of the creation of psychological ownership mediated 
by participation in general, but refrains from testing if different incentive effects can be recognised 
among listed and unlisted companies and if the effect differs in bull and bear markets affecting 
employees’ perception of risk. The study is limited to Danish companies and different effects could be 
expected in different countries and cultures due to different traditions of involvement, management 
attitudes and educational levels. The need for a longitudinal cross-country analysis which could shed 
fresh light on the effect in different sectors, different cultures and across different financial 
environments is highly warranted.    
The study is based on only three respondents from both top and middle management; a wider analysis 
based on more respondents from each company would have strengthened the validity of the 
conclusions. 
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The findings call for future research on the motivational effects of ESO, middle management 
involvement and participative leadership style at the micro level. A better understanding of how 
different employees are motivated by different activities and how this motivation affects company 
performance will extend the tested model and enhance our knowledge. Similarly a better understanding 
of the different dynamics in different sectors will seems highly warranted.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper has tested the effect of ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and a participative 
leadership style on both performance and as determinants of psychological ownership. The analyses are 
based on a cross-sectional survey among 297 of the 500 largest Danish companies measured by number 
of employees.   
The study is not successful in finding a direct effect of ESO, involvement of middle managers and a 
participative leadership style on performance. This suggests that despite a strong theoretical foundation 
supporting the potential positive effects of the concepts, the direct effects on performance are limited. 
In addition, the study finds that participation and a participative leadership style can be seen as 
determinants of psychological ownership and, as one of the first studies, it manages to quantify the 
effect of the different factors. ESO has been conceptualised as an antecedent of psychological 
ownership, but the effects seem to be mediated by participation, while autonomy had no mediating 
effect. 
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Thus, the paper enriches our understanding of the effects of ESO, involvement of middle managers in 
strategy and a participative leadership style by quantifying their effects on the creation of psychological 
ownership. Similarly, the findings highlight the importance of creating internalised extrinsic motivation 
in the form of psychological ownership to support the potential positive effects of involvement and 
ESO.   
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APPENDIX       
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS CONSTRUCT LEVEL
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 ROA 09 0,00 0,99 -4,84 3,49 1
2 Participation 0,00 1,00 -3,30 1,89 ,06 1
3 Autonomy 0,00 1,00 -1,77 2,79 -,01 ,49 *** 1
4 Leadership style 0,00 1,00 -3,43 1,95 ,06 ,42 *** ,26 *** 1
5 Psyc. Ownership 0,00 1,00 -4,15 1,57 ,14 ** ,40 *** ,20 *** ,61 *** 1
6 ESO 0,00 1,00 -0,57 2,71 ,13 ** ,12 ** ,07 ,08 ,12 ** 1
7 Tenure 9,28 6,67 0,10 35,00 ,11 * ,07 ,08 ,13 ** ,22 *** ,09 1
n  = 297.  Significance of correlations: *** p  < .01;  ** p  < .05;   * p  < .10 (two-tailed test). 
   
Page 190
 
Page 191 
 
6. Conclusion 
This dissertation started out with the development of a model that combined the literature on employee 
stock ownership (ESO), middle management involvement in strategy and participative leadership style 
with the motivational theory of psychological ownership and self-determination theory. The model is 
based on the recognition that despite a strong theoretical foundation explaining the potential positive 
effects of ESO, middle management involvement in strategy and participative leadership style, the 
empirical findings are more diverse and inconclusive. Additionally, the literature review revealed that 
the performance effects of the three concepts all seem to be mediated by internalised extrinsic 
motivation in the form of psychological empowerment, organisational citizenship behaviour or 
psychological ownership. This raised the question of whether the potential positive effects of the three 
concepts were prompted by their potential motivational effects and whether reduced agency costs, 
better strategy implementation, enhanced information sharing and more innovation similarly were the 
effects of the increased motivation. If this indeed was the case, future research in the three areas should 
have a stronger focus on not only the motivational effects of the individual concepts, but also the 
combined motivational effects of ESO, middle management involvement and participative leadership 
style.  
This recognition inspired me to look into the literature on motivational theory, especially in the areas of 
psychological ownership and self-determination theory. Analysing these research streams, a number of 
similarities with the findings on ESO, middle management involvement and participative leadership 
style were discovered. Within motivational theory, formal ownership, involvement and participative 
leadership style were seen as determinants of psychological ownership, and psychological ownership 
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was found to be the root of a number of improved employee behaviour and attitudes. A number of 
studies have investigated the effects on employee attitudes and behaviours, while tests of the effect on 
company performance were limited.   
Based on these findings, I developed my model that claimed that ESO, middle management 
involvement in strategy and a participative leadership style all were determinants of psychological 
ownership and that they all were interrelated. The model also combined a number of findings from the 
middle management and motivational literature to include worker and job characteristics as moderators 
of the creation of psychological ownership, and knowledge intensity and environmental dynamism as 
moderators of the performance effect. The model suggested raised a number of propositions that 
needed further analysis and empirical testing. A number of these propositions have been tested in this 
dissertation, while others are to be tested in the future. The dissertation tests the main relationships in 
the model, while potential mediating effects, sector, cultural dynamics and a deeper understanding of 
the motivational effects at the individual level are left to future research. The findings and implications 
of the dissertation will be discussed in the next section while future research is addressed in the end of 
this chapter.  
The three empirical chapters address three key areas of the model. The first empirical chapter tests the 
prevalence and antecedents of employee stock ownership. This to investigate if the prevalence, as 
reported in other countries, has declined despite a growing need for commitment and increased 
responsiveness in a globalised dynamic world. Similarly, the chapter investigates the characteristics of 
the companies employing different ESO schemes to test if the companies employing ESO are the 
companies with the highest expected effect of the scheme. The second empirical chapter tests the 
determinants of psychological ownership. This chapter quantifies the effects of ESO, middle 
Page 193 
 
management involvement in strategy and a participative leadership style on the creation of 
psychological ownership. Additionally, the chapter tests the indirect and interaction effects of the three 
concepts. The last empirical chapter investigates the performance effect of psychological ownership 
and tests if the effect of ESO, middle management involvement and participative leadership style is 
merely indirect through the creation of psychological ownership or if any direct effect on performance 
can be found. 
Since 2000, the prevalence of ESO in Denmark has increased from 21% to 35% of all companies 
employing some kind of ESO scheme. This suggests that companies are becoming increasingly aware 
of the potential positive effects of ESO on commitment and effort. A closer look on the figures shows 
that while the narrow-based schemes covering less than 50% of the employees have increased from 6% 
to 25% of the companies, broad-based schemes have declined from 15% to 10%. This presents two 
possible scenarios: 1) ESO may be seen as merely a salary item with some tax benefits or 2) the general 
view among companies may be that only a limited number of key employees need to be motivated or 
get motivated by an ESOP. The paper also contributed by reporting that the antecedents of ESO 
employing companies depend on the type of ESO scheme. That is, companies with schemes covering 
only top management are small companies with a traditional view on management and strategy as a top 
management task focusing on centralised planning and individual bonuses, whereas companies with 
broad-based schemes more often used group-based bonuses. These findings oppose the arguments in 
the incentive literature which indicate a need for combining broad-based incentives with individually 
focused incentives. This would suggest that companies with narrow-based schemes should complement 
this individual incentive with group-based schemes, while companies with broad-based ESO schemes 
should complement the scheme with individual bonuses. The chapter also reported a higher prevalence 
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of ESO in the construction sector and a significant lower prevalence in the information and 
telecommunication sector; no higher prevalence was reported in the finance sector when adjusting for 
stock listing. This is surprising since the prevalence would be expected to be high in dynamic industries 
with highly educated and highly paid employees like IT and finance and low in a stable sector with 
relatively low educated employees like construction.  
As indicated in the theoretical model, ESO, involvement of middle managers in strategy and 
participative leadership style were all expected to be determinants of psychological ownership and 
foreseen to affect and enhance each other. In chapter four, these relationships were tested and 
quantified. Leadership style and participation were found to be determinants of psychological 
ownership, with leadership style as the most influential factor. Leadership style also had an indirect 
effect mediated by participation suggesting that the leadership style conducted has a strong influence 
on the level of participation. ESO has been conceptualised by Pierce et al. (1991) as a determinant and 
some scholars have argued that the effect is mediated by involvement. ESO only had an indirect effect 
on psychological ownership mediated by participation. This suggests that ESO in itself has no 
motivating effect but needs to be combined with ownership expectations such as influence on the 
company. When testing the effects of autonomy, the findings were less conclusive. Leadership style 
was still a strong and significant determinant of psychological ownership and it had a strong influence 
on the level of autonomy. However, this effect was less pronounced than the effect on participation. 
Autonomy was not found to be a determinant of psychological ownership, which was surprising since it 
was expected that autonomy would be perceived as having an even stronger influence on the company 
and being met with trust from top management. This could suggest that autonomy in its wake might 
bring a narrow focus on a task, department or a division and alienation from the rest of the company, 
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ultimately eroding the sense of ownership. Alternatively, the potential effect of autonomy on company 
performance might be generated, not through an effect on the creation of psychological ownership, but 
through dynamic interaction effects moderating the effect of psychological ownership on company 
performance.  
A number of studies have set out to investigate if any direct effect of ESO, middle management 
involvement in strategy, participative leadership style and psychological ownership on performance can 
be said to exist. Chapter five tested if the three concepts had any direct effect on performance or if the 
effect was mediated by psychological ownership. If the latter was the case, it would underline the 
argument in the theoretical model stating that the effect of the three models might be triggered by their 
motivational effect and not directly by the reduced agency costs, better strategy implementation or 
increased innovativeness. The tested models supported this by reporting that no direct effect of the 
three concepts was found and that psychological ownership had a strong impact on company 
performance. 
The dissertation has developed a theoretical model that implies that ESO, middle management 
involvement in strategy and participative leadership style are interrelated and influence company 
performance through their impact on the creation of psychological ownership. This coherence is 
empirically tested and the effects and interrelations have been tested and quantified. Additionally, it is 
reported that despite the fact that the effect of ESO was expected to be higher in dynamic industries 
with highly educated and paid employees, the prevalence seems to be higher in construction and lower 
in IT and telecommunication. The overall relationships in the model seem to be supported by the 
dissertation; the model and the findings, however, also spotlight a number of questions and 
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consequences that need to be further tested. These future research areas will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
Implications for research 
The dissertation highlights the need for a better understanding of how employees and especially middle 
managers are motivated at the individual level. The findings indicate that ESO, a participative 
leadership style and involvement of middle managers in strategy are mediated by individual-level 
internalised extrinsic motivation. Similarly, the three concepts seem to be interrelated, calling for more 
research combining the three areas to better understand how this interrelation affects the creation of 
psychological ownership.  
The conclusion that different types of companies apply different kinds of ESO schemes calls for a 
better understanding of the motives underlying the choice of scheme. The changes in the prevalence of 
different types of schemes might indicate that companies develop from applying narrow schemes to 
applying more broad-based schemes. Analyses of the effects of external settings like financial climate 
or national legislation on the prevalence of the different types of schemes also need a stronger focus. 
Additionally, a better understanding of the effect of the different ESO schemes on company 
performance in the different types of companies will enhance our knowledge of the “best” type of 
scheme. It can be argued that the importance of motivating only key employees might be high in some 
types of companies, while others are able to achieve the highest performance effect by including and 
hopefully motivating the majority of employees in the scheme.   
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Underpinning the importance of psychological ownership, a better understanding of how to measure 
the concept is highly warranted. This includes definitions of the different components of psychological 
ownership and a conceptualisation and measurement of the importance of the different components. If 
the expected effects of middle management involvement, such as better strategy implementation, more 
innovations and enhanced information sharing, are mediated by psychological ownership, it is 
necessary to pinpoint what is caused by involvement and what is caused by increased motivation. It 
could be argued that these and a number of similar positive effects, like reduced agency costs or 
increased strategic responsiveness, are results of internalised extrinsic motivation unlocking the 
employees’ potential to “be inspired, striving to learn, extend themselves, master new skills and apply 
their talents responsibly”. According to SDT, this potential is released by internalised extrinsic 
motivation in the form of psychological ownership.  
The creation of psychological ownership among middle managers can be expected to increase not by 
the level of involvement, but by the perceived level of involvement. This perception is created by 
expectations, cultures and specific organisational settings and an understanding of how these 
expectations, cultures and settings are created is called for.  
 
Implications for practice 
The dissertation implies that managers should increase the focus on how to motivate their employees. 
The findings suggest that companies planning on introducing ESO, involving middle managers in 
strategy or redefining their leadership style must take into account how the different activities will 
influence the motivation among their employees. In particular, they should focus on the leadership style 
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conducted. Some top managers might think that by allowing employees to gain formal ownership 
through an ESOP or by allowing middle managers to become involved in strategy processes, the 
employees would automatically become motivated and involved in the best interest of the company. 
This seems not to be the case and the effect of these activities on the creation of psychological 
ownership has been found to be less than the effect of the leadership style conducted.  
An increased focus on how to create psychological ownership among employees seems necessary on 
account of its significant effect on company performance. The significant direct effect of psychological 
ownership underpins that motivation and the concept of psychological ownership are two of the most 
important factors in the creation of enhanced company performance. 
The effect of incentives like ESOPs has been argued to be weak due to a low level of controllability at 
lower organisational levels and a traditionally low economic importance. Conversely, ESO has been 
argued to reduce distortion effects caused by multiple tasks with different levels of measurability. This 
suggests that companies with narrow-based ESO schemes should complement the scheme with group-
based bonuses, while companies with broad-based ESO schemes should complement the scheme with 
individually based incentives. Findings suggest that companies tend to do the opposite which highlights 
the need for a stronger focus on how employees are motivated through incentives and whether or not 
the incentives applied support the activities wanted by the company or only part of them.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The model tested in this dissertation has advanced the argument that ESO, middle management 
involvement in strategy and a participative leadership style influence performance through their 
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potential effect on the creation of internalised extrinsic motivation in the form of psychological 
ownership. This raises the question of how different types of employees are motivated by the three 
factors. It can also be discussed if the motivational effect of especially ESO depends on the climate on 
the financial markets seeing that it affects the risk averseness of the employees. In the motivational 
literature, different elements of involvement and leadership style have influenced employees differently 
and a better understanding of the effects on the individual level is highly warranted. 
The empirical part of the dissertation is based on three responses from each company and an analysis 
based on more responses from each company might have strengthened the reliability of the analysis. 
Furthermore, some of the dissertation results indicate that there is a difference between the perceptions 
of top and middle managers regarding the level of involvement, the leadership style employed and the 
sense of ownership, and this raises the question of who to ask to get the best proxy for the level of 
involvement and the leadership style conducted. 
The expected mediating effects on the creation of psychological ownership and job and worker 
characteristics also call for an analysis that would enhance our knowledge. Similarly, the expected 
moderating effects of psychological ownership on company performance, knowledge intensity and 
environmental dynamism call for future research. The model predicts the existence of a direct effect 
between psychological ownership and company performance and that effect has been empirically tested 
in the dissertation. The model, however, also argues that psychological ownership enhances a number 
of positive employee behaviours and attitudes and an analysis of any mediating or moderating effects 
of these behaviours and attitudes on company performance could enrich our understanding of the 
effects. 
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The empirical part of the dissertation is based on a cross-sectional survey among Danish employees. A 
more longitudinal analysis would enrich our understanding of the relationships and increase the 
possibility of testing causality in the relationships. Based on a Danish sample, the findings cannot 
automatically be expected to apply to other countries with other types of employees and other traditions 
and cultures regarding involvement and leadership styles. This research therefore calls for future testing 
of the model in other cultures to better understand how employees are motivated by the three concepts 
and how the concepts influence the creation of psychological ownership and company performance.  
The dissertation also finds significant differences between middle management participation in strategy 
and middle management autonomous strategic actions, indicating that how motivation and the sense of 
ownership are influenced by different kinds of involvement should be further explored.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Questionnaire CFO7 
Company number (CVR No.):   How many years have you been employed in the company:   
 
1: Does more than one employee own shares in the company (incl. the CEO)? (The board is not included) 
(If no, please go to question No. 4). 
 
2: Which employee groups own shares in the company? (In listed companies, only main share owners and shares sold through an ESOP 
should be included).          
 
3. How large a share of the company is owned by the different employee groups? (In listed companies, only main share owners and shares 
sold through an ESOP should be included). 
 
 Ownership share 
a. Top management  
b. Middle management  
c. Employees without management responsibility  
 
4. How often are middle managers (managers below top management) participating in the following strategic decisions? (Included in 
making the decision, not only the implementation). 
 
 Never  Sometimes Always 
Activities aiming at enhancing market position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sales to new segments or markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of important new products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new competencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new policies and routines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. How often are middle managers (managers below top management) autonomously (without prior acceptance by top management) able 
to make the following decisions? 
 
 Never Sometimes Always 
Activities aiming at enhancing market position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sales to new segments or markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of important new products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new competencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new policies and routines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Please indicate how often your middle managers (to the best of your knowledge) spend time on the following activities: 
 
 Never Sometimes Always 
Pay attention to market trends, new technologies etc. that are no part of my daily 
work but that might be important for the firm. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wonder how business and the firm’s strategic position can be improved through 
offering new products to new markets/-segments. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Look for opportunities outside the firm’s current activities.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                            
7 Original scale in Danish. Translated by the author. 
Yes  No  
 None Some Half Majority All 
a. Top management      
b. Middle management      
c. Employees without management responsibility      
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Look for innovative techniques that might open up new business opportunities 
outside what the firm currently does. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Develop action plans for how business opportunities in new markets currently not 
served by the firm can successfully be implemented into the firm’s activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Convince key persons to support an idea on how to capitalize on a business 
opportunity that is currently outside the official strategy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mobilize support on the part of upper level managers for selling/producting 
innovative products to an originating new market. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Search for more resources outside regular budgeting processes in order to get and 
keep initiatives for offering new products to a new markets going. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Work on setting the stage for a change in the official strategy by top-management, so 
that it comprises offering new products to a new market/-segment outside what the 
firm has been doing so far.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Form coalitions inside the firm in order to rally support and approval for going with a 
new product into an unfolding market/-segment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Study possibilities for increasing sales of existing products within currently served 
markets. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Generate ideas for how the firm can improve its competitive position in the existing 
markets. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Explain and sell the firm’s strategy to colleagues and subordinates. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Develop ideas for new products/services for the firm’s existing markets.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. Does the company make use of economic incentives to employees who develop important new ideas? 
 
 Yes No 
Individual economic incentives   
Group based incentives/profit sharing   
Other economic incentives (Gifts, travels etc.)   
 
8. How would the following situation affect company production? 
  
 Status quo 
or increase 5% decline
10% 
decline 
15% 
decline 
20% 
decline or 
more
10% of all people were unavailable in the next year due to, for example, a 
sickness. 
     
Top management requires the firm to reduce all costs to be reduced by 10 
%. 
     
 
10. Please indicate to what extent the company attaches importance to the following activities: 
 
 No importance               High importance 
Development of company mission 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Long-term plans (3-5 years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Annual goals (sales, efficiency, market share etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Short-term action plans (campaigns, short-term projects etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Evaluation of the company’s strategic objectives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Budgets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Calculation of scenarios and risk analyses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Calculation of financial goals to increase shareholder value (e.g. Economic Value 
Added, cash flows etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Balanced scorecard (or a similar instrument measuring performance) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Identification and focus on competitive parameters (price, quality, flexibility, service, 
design, innovation etc.) constituting the foundation of the company model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Formalised follow-up on investments (costs, profit, deviations) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
11. Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements about top management: 
  
  Totally disagree              Totally agree   
They actively seek managers’ opinions and ideas on strategic issues. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They are open to new ideas and initiatives from all members in the organization. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They appreciate if middle and first-line managers experiment with new ideas and 
products. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They ensure that the interests of middle and front-line managers are considered 
when making strategic decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They expect managers to precisely follow top-management’s decisions and 
instructions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They accept and openly stress their awareness for the fact that the majority of new 
initiatives and products will turn out not to be economically successful. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
12. Please indicate to which degree you agree with the following ”sense of ownership” to the company: 
 
 Totally disagree Totally agree 
I feel that this is MY company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The majority of employees feel that this is OUR company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel an ownership to and responsibility for the development of the company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I find it hard to think about this as MY company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would like to receive newsletters informing about the results of the survey: Email:_______________________ 
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Questionnaire to head of marketing 
Company number (CVR No.):  How many years have you been employed in the company:  
 
1. Please indicate to what extent you agree that the following statements describe the official company strategy: 
 
  Totally disagree Totally agree 
Achieving cost leadership (i.e. achieve low cost relative to competitors). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Differentiate our products/services from those of our competitors (e.g. by superior 
product features, quality, customer service, speed of service, responsiveness 
to/flexibility in accommodating specific customers’ wishes) allowing to command a 
price premium.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Being the first to introduce significantly new products/services or to go into a newly 
evolving market/market segment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Increasing our market share in the markets/market segments that we currently serve. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Developing new markets/market segments (note: market does not relate to geography) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Diversifying with entirely new products/services into new/newly unfolding markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Maximize returns from our currently served markets/market segments, potentially at 
the expense of market share. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. How often do middle managers (managers below top management) and front line managers (managers below middle managers) 
participate in the following strategic decisions? (Included in making the decisions, not only the implementation). 
 
 Middle managers Front line managers 
Never Sometimes Always Never Sometimes Always 
Activities aiming at enhancing 
market position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sales to new segments or markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of important new 
products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new competencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new policies and 
routines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. How often are middle managers (managers below top management) and front line managers (managers below middle managers) 
autonomously (without prior acceptance by top management) able to make the following decisions? 
 
 Middle managers Front line managers 
Never Sometimes Always Never Sometimes Always 
Activities aiming at enhancing 
market position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sales to new segments or markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of important new 
products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new competencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new policies and 
routines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements about the company: 
 
  Totally disagree Totally agree 
There are many activities and processes that are not covered by some formal 
procedure. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Often existing rules are ignored and informal agreements are reached to handle some 
situations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Communication between different hierarchical levels and/or functional areas is 
commonly in a formal manner and/or in writing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Planning processes are written down in detail 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Within planning we use extensive rules about timeline, content, size and form of 
documents. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Offering new products/services requires to go through formal communication 
channels first.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There are many internal policies and procedures with which one must comply in 
initiating or maintaining a new product/service offering in the firm. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
All initiatives for new products or services are subject to extensive review to 
determine their financial feasibility ex ante. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Senior executives closely monitor financial performance of different new 
product/service offerings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
New initiatives are mainly judged and tracked based on non-financial criteria like e.g. 
contribution to brand perception, customer satisfaction, social or environmental 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Please indicate how often your front line managers (managers below middle managers) spend time on the following activities: 
 
 Never Sometimes Always 
Pay attention to market trends, new technologies etc. that are no part of my daily 
work but that might be important for the firm. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wonder how business and the firm’s strategic position can be improved through 
offering new products to new markets/-segments. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Look for opportunities outside the firm’s current activities.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Look for innovative techniques that might open up new business opportunities 
outside what the firm currently does. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Develop action plans for how business opportunities in new markets currently not 
served by the firm can successfully be implemented into the firm’s activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Convince key persons to support an idea on how to capitalize on a business 
opportunity that is currently outside the official strategy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mobilize support on the part of upper level managers for selling/producting 
innovative products to an originating new market. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Search for more resources outside regular budgeting processes in order to get and 
keep initiatives for offering new products to a new markets going. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Work on setting the stage for a change in the official strategy by top-management, so 
that it comprises offering new products to a new market/-segment outside what the 
firm has been doing so far.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Form coalitions inside the firm in order to rally support and approval for going with a 
new product into an unfolding market/-segment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Study possibilities for increasing sales of existing products within currently served 
markets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Generate ideas for how the firm can improve its competitive position in the existing 
markets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mobilize support on the part of upper level managers for selling/producing innovative 
products to the currently served markets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Explain and sell the firm’s strategy to colleagues and subordinates. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Develop ideas for new products/services for the firm’s existing markets.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements about top management: 
 
  Totally disagree Totally agree 
They actively seek managers’ opinions and ideas on strategic issues. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They are open to new ideas and initiatives from all members in the organization. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They appreciate if middle and first-line managers experiment with new ideas and 
products. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They ensure that the interests of middle and front-line managers are considered 
when making strategic decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They expect managers to precisely follow top-management’s decisions and 
instructions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They accept and openly stress their awareness for the fact that the majority of new 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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initiatives and products will turn out not to be economically successful. 
 
They monitor the economic performance of new products/services closely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They make detailed follow-ups on negative budget deviations (costs, profits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They use the budget as a basis for performance evaluation and performance pay 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. Please indicate how the company has performed in the last 3 years compared to the sector in general: 
 
 Significantly worse Significantly better 
Cost control/cost reduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Adept at taking advantage of new opportunities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Maintaining or improving profit (margin) on sales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Being able to sell company products/services at higher prices than competitors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Maintaining or improving gross profit on products compared to competitors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Better product/service functionality, delivery and/or quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Profit measured as Return on Sales (ROS) (profit/turnover) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Overall success (financial as well as non financial) for the company as a whole 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sales of new products/services to existing customers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Increasing market shares 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sale of new products/services to new markets/segments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of new products/services introduced to existing markets/segments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of new products/services introduced to new markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would like to receive newsletters informing about the results of the survey: Email: ______________________ 
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Questionnaire to middle manager 
Company number (CVR No.):           How many years have you been employed in the company:   
 
Sex (M/F):     
 
1. How often are middle managers (managers below top management) participating in the following strategic decisions? (Included in 
making the decision, not only the implementation. 
 
 Never  Sometimes Always 
Activities aiming at enhancing market position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sales to new segments or markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of important new products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new competencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new policies and routines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. How often are middle managers (managers below top management) autonomously (without prior acceptance by top management) able 
to make the following decisions? 
 
 Never Sometimes Always 
Activities aiming at enhancing market position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sales to new segments or markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of important new products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new competencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Development of new policies and routines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements about top management: 
  
  Totally disagree                                     Totally 
agree                   
They actively seek managers’ opinions and ideas on strategic issues. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They are open to new ideas and initiatives from all members in the organization. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They appreciate if middle and first-line managers experiment with new ideas and 
products. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They ensure that the interests of middle and front-line managers are considered 
when making strategic decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They expect managers to precisely follow top-management’s decisions and 
instructions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
They accept and openly stress their awareness for the fact that the majority of new 
initiatives and products will turn out not to be economically successful. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. Please indicate to which degree you agree with the following ”sense of ownership” to the company: 
 
 Totally disagree                                     Totally 
agree                   
I feel that this is MY company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The majority of employees feel that this is OUR company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel an ownership to and responsibility for the development of the company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I find it hard to think about this as MY company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Please state how often YOU spend time on: 
 
 Never Sometimes Always 
convince key persons to support an idea on how to capitalize on a business 
opportunity that is currently outside the official strategy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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I would like to receive newsletters informing about the results of the survey: Email: _____________________ 
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Descriptive statistics for the population and the sample 
 
 
 Population Sample 
Number of companies 500 297 
Average turnover 2009 (TDKK) 2,165,613 1,984,447 
Average gross profit 2009 (TDKK) 458,994 466,301 
Average net income 2009 (TDKK) 52,109 88,376 
Average Equity 2009 (TDKK) 1,148,696 1,059,274 
Average total balance 2009 (TDKK) 7,807,562 5,869,718 
Average turnover growth 2008/2009 (%) 5.02 5.87 
Number of listed companies 75 54 
Sector 1 5 2 
Sector 2 175 113 
Sector 3 7 4 
Sector 4 33 17 
Sector 5 131 74 
Sector 6 44 25 
Sector 7 44 23 
Sector 8 61 39 
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